Joint Second Cycle Degree in International Relations: Europe from Visegrad Perspective

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Introduction

The third volume of the *Joint Master Programme in International Relations: Europe in the Visegrad Perspective Online Reader* offers a wide range of insights into contemporary international affairs with special emphasis given to European security and democracy nexus in light of recent migration and refugee crisis and civil war in Eastern Ukraine.

In the opening chapter Justyna Poniewska provides for a historical view on the origin and evolution of the Visegrad Group with major question being what does constitute current *raison d’être* of the regional cooperation among four Central European countries, which decided to build a platform of political cooperation in the early 90s of the twentieth century.

Following this historical analysis of the V4 as political concept and international actor I analyse how and why does the policy of fear became predominant pattern of migration policy in Central Europe in light of current migration and refugee crisis. More specifically, I explain how does the migration policy in Central Europe become securitised and what are the implications of securitization of the migration policy on collective identity transformations in Central Europe.

The third chapter offers an insightful view on migration and refugee crisis seen from the perspective of the philosophy of the other. Based on modern philosophy of the other Marcin Rebes develops his own understanding of the philosophy of hospitality as normative imperative constituting backbone of modern European philosophy.

In the fourth chapter Andrea Schmidt explains mechanisms and implications of shifting new borders in Europe after the end of the Cold War. Geo-economics of Post-Cold War transformation in Europe is a background for an insightful analysis of emergence of new borders or “new iron curtain” of mainly economic character, which divides current Europe.

The fifth chapter tackles upon the role of universities in enhancing regional development in Central Europe. Zoltán Gál explains how do universities contribute to regional economy, a labour market especially.
In the following chapter Natasza Styczyńska investigates phenomenon of Euroscepticism as exemplified in Bulgarian party politics. An in-depth analysis of Bulgarian public discourse on European integration leads to the conclusion that Bulgarian Euroscepticism is not deeply rooted in any consistent party ideology but rather is an outcome of current internal competition between political parties in subsequent elections.

The seventh chapter investigates Russia’s engagement in the Ukrainian crisis. Maksym Beznosiuk provides for sharp and critical view on forms and manifestations of so called hybrid warfare as dominant concept used both in scholarly discourse and policy-making regarding Russia’s engagement in the Ukrainian crisis.

In what follows, the V4 policy towards Ukraine in the period of 2009-2013 is a subject of Pavel Havlíček’s insightful analysis of foreign policy coordination within the V4 format. Here the author explains the essence and substance of the V4-Ukrainian partnership.

The EU - UN co-ordination in peacekeeping operations in Africa is examined by Maciej Stępka in the ninth chapter. Special emphasis in this investigation is paid to coordination of operational aspects of the EU peacekeeping missions under the UN mandate. The EU mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo is a special case study in this analysis.

In the concluding chapter Agata Mazurkiewicz explains the concept and practice of civil-military cooperation in peacekeeping operations. Special reference has been made to Canadian experience in civil-military operations as exemplified in the Afghanistan mission.

Edited by Grzegorz Pożarlik
Do we need V4 after those 25 years of its existence?

In light of the last months crisis associated with the influx of illegal immigrants in the areas of Europe one could observe that the Visegrad Group started to be treated by many as strong and unbending coalition, speaking with one voice about issues of its own safety. Politicians strongly emphasized the autonomy of the region and the unquestionable right of self-determination to act inside it. The desire to draw attention to the importance of Visegrád became the immediate impulse to deal with this subject in the context of an article. The bothering question was if Visegrad Group will start to implement verbal declarations and turn them into deeds.

To fully understand the value of words spoken by V4 leaders and their meaning for Europe there is a need to present what kind of organisation it actually is. Why people demand from V4 real actions and is there any similarity between countries which form this group. A similarity which should create a bound that make a goal equally important for all of the participants.

Visegrad Group was perceived by many as the organization with a potential to become a major subject of international policy in this part of the region. After the fall of the Iron Curtain countries of the former Eastern bloc were faced with the task of building a fundamentally new order in the region. They were given the opportunity to self-determination, to indicate the direction of foreign policy, but also - moving away from the Soviet Union. Although, the same protection had to face many difficult obstacles. On the initiative of the primarily three countries of Central and Eastern Europe - Polish, Czechoslovakia and Hungarian they formed an alliance, which in addition besides geographical proximity had a similar experience in the inability to create their own state policy. The Visegrad Group has often set itself various goals, but the priority has always been the accession to the North Atlantic Treaty structures and the then European Communities.
To fully understand why Visegrad Group is taken by many as an organisation which was created only to achieve several goals and not working nowadays we need to take back in a history. This will help to see this part of a Europe as one policy circle which was somehow made to create a coalition.

**Common history**

The end of World War II for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe did not mean liberation and recovery of autonomy, on the contrary. The Soviet Union played a key role in the liberation of occupied countries from Nazi Germany. On the freed territories, the Russian armed forces - the Red Army - created the centers of power, which were subjected to the center of Moscow. In this way, one invader was turned into another (Nazi Germany to Communist Russia)\(^1\).

The countries inside Europe came under Soviet influence. They created Eastern Bloc, which now is defined as a group of countries implementing communist ideology, which included the dictatorship of the proletariat, the centrally planned economy and the concepts of justice. This block has been highlighted since the end of World War II to the early 90s of the twentieth century. In practice, in these countries, the communist party took over power on the road of revolution, insurrection or coup. Political system prevailing in these countries was described officially as socialism or people's democracy, socialism or real communism\(^2\). This group of Eastern bloc countries included (in accordance with the former nomenclature) Russian Federative Soviet Socialist Republic, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Albanian People's Republic, the Bulgarian People's Republic, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Polish People's Republic (PRL), the Romanian People's Republic and the Hungarian People's Republic. a block east became an autonomous part of the the post-

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war world of their own organizations - the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.

The Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, was understood as the creation of a political and military alliance, established in 1955, terminated in 1991\textsuperscript{3}. The system had a regional character and was available for other countries. Military intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 was the embarrassment and showed that the system is a tool to maintain the Member States in the framework of the socialist bloc under the hegemony of the Soviet Union.

The creation of the Warsaw Pact was dictated by the intention to unify the foreign policy and military USSR and the countries of its addicts and above all, it was a reaction to the formation of NATO and conclusion of the Paris Agreements 1954 which allowing Germany to create army. System was a structure that enabled the Soviet Union full control over the armed forces and defense policy of Member States and was used in the policy of the Soviet Union in a confrontational relationship with the West. The Warsaw Pact was a convenient tool to interfere in the internal affairs of member countries.

Another autonomous organization established to exercise control over the satellite countries was the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). It is an international economic organization of socialist countries, was founded January 25, 1949 in Moscow on the basis of conventions signed by Albania (April 1949), Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany (1950), Poland, Romania, Hungary and USSR\textsuperscript{4}. Main objectives was to accelerate technical progress and economy in the Member States, increasing industrialization, leveling the economic development of individual countries, boosting economic growth and improving the living conditions of the population. Initially, cooperation concerned only international trade. It was implemented through relatively stable relations and the conclusion of long-term bilateral trade agreements. Also embraced within the scope of technical progress, the coordination of economic

\textsuperscript{3} \text{http://encyklopedia.pwn.pl/haslo/Uklad-Warszawski;3990984.html, access 10.04.2016}
\textsuperscript{4} \text{http://encyklopedia.pwn.pl/haslo/Rada-Wzajemnej-Pomocy-Gospodarczej;3965334.html, access 10.04.2016}
plans, joint investments, the use of natural resources and the division of labor. Assessing the creation and activity it should be stated that it was from the beginning of creation unwieldy. Economy Comecon countries strive for self-reliance in the production of all necessary goods. This was in contradiction with the idea of division of labor, which could make sense of Comecon, but it was never realized. Reconciling economic plans was fiction. Waned any form of cooperation. While the Comecon was a fairly easy instrument to subordinate the USSR countries remaining\(^5\).

Organism functioning in that way was created out of hegemony of one superpower and countries depending on it was left behind the Iron Curtain, which symbolized the division of the world into two blocks separated from each other - eastern and western. The term post-Yalta order came into general use after the speech of Winston Churchill that 5 March 1946 year, Fulton - "From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an iron curtain fell by dividing our continent. In addition to this line remained capitals of what used to be Central Europe and Eastern. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Austria64, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia, all these cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call the zone of Soviet, they are all subject, in one form or another, the influence of the Soviet, but and - the high and growing extent - control on the part of Russia \(^6\)

The revolutionary 1989

As an aid in this article the author used research of Dragos Petrescu that specifically dealt with the characteristics of this revolutionary period in time and space. With his publications have been awarded two of the many contained deviations from classically understood definition of revolution, as best can be show in reference in relation to the events of 1989.

The revolution of the Latin *revolutio* - revolution. The definition presented by Piotr Sztompka says that revolution is the most violent form of social change. Occurs

extremely quickly, more dynamic social life for her just the right scale. It covers all spheres of social activity from politics and the economy starting, ending on culture, in other words, the political and social landscape. It touches the constitutive properties of the structure and social hierarchy and making them norms and patterns of interaction. For these reasons, revolutions, although rare, are the most important form of social change. It is possible that with progress and science of revolution creates a trio of concepts embodying the sense of our time. It is undeniable understanding of revolution as a fundamental transformation of constitutive elements of society. They run under the banner of freedom and the social question. An inherent feature of a revolution is to mobilize the masses fundamental changes constitutive elements of society. They run under the banner of freedom and the social question. An inherent feature of a revolution is to mobilize the masses on an unprecedented scale in order to build a new social reality, understood as the beginning of a new social order. The revolution in terms of the classic is also the impossibility of a top-down initiative power. Revolutions are not only moments of greatest social dynamics, but also the greatest violence of change and instilling new ideas. Connects to this because of the widespread seizure border between violence and coercion (understood here as the appropriate legal and illegal use of force). Referring to the definition presented above it is impossible not to see the difference between the determinants of revolution in terms of classic definition and what happened in 1989. This create the question of whether the new combination of events needs redefinition or create entirely new concepts, or was it a completely different kind of revolution in the new meaning - a post-communist.

Energy of people who revolted in 1989, moreover, not in the context of a particular class, only the presentation of mass discontent could not be stopped. It fits right in with the definition of the revolution, which contain created postulates, numerous marches and demonstrations understand as a desire to change. Social discontent, the desire to exit from the yoke of the occupation was so great that in 1989

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7 P. Sztompka, *Socjologia zmian społecznych*, Kraków 2005, p. 279
social movement „Solidarity“ comprised itself already 9,476,584 people. It can only indicate about high self-awareness of social and civic determination. According to the above specific definition of the revolution, this is one of the factors necessary for its existence - people. Rebelled students, the proletariat, the workers and owners of industrial, catholic environmental. In Polish history, or even in the history of Europe it is hard to cited as numerous social self-organization created at the explicit and curve reluctance of the state apparatus. Social movements, analyzed on the example of Polish were organized in such a way as to reach the widest possible audience. Demonstrations, publicized by the press and journalists made the coverage of these events has become almost a global, not just on the borders of our country, where awareness the state of the political situation was high, but also in neighboring countries, which at the same time almost struggled with the occupier. So, we can assume that the revolutionary 1989 meets the main definitional demand - grassroots mobilization of the masses.

But there are some exceptions which require you to define the events of that period as the new revolution. Presented above quotations, taken from the definition clearly specify that it is to be a complete change in the existing order, and enforce a new, differs from the previous procedure. The revolution in 1989 was not an attempt to introduce utopian and innovative solutions, but rather to restore normalcy. Many participants of the events of 1989 wanted to return to the days of freedom, "normality", in which rich capitalist society lived, not one that assumed real socialism. Ideologies were more revolutionary nature of reconstruction and the restoration of freedom, than the implementation of the utopian and experimental solutions. That is what happened in 1989, "there was a total revolution of innovation, as it did in the case of classical revolution, but rather the abandonment of a failed experiment in favor of the existing model of pluralist democracy". Countries covered by sovietization followed the developing living in freedom and prosperity West. The Soviet regime, of course, was

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9 J. Skórzyński, Krótka historia solidarności, Gdańsk 2014, p. 80.
10 For example, the restoration of making redundant people, the restoration of the former CEN introduction of fair wages for workers, legalization of Trade Unions.
not able to provide them with a decent living status. Regime took fundamental freedoms of many, which is why their revolutionary ideas were not perverse. They did not want to introduce a completely new order in the world. People just wanted to be free, to have basic rights and human dignity restored. The vision of the developing countries in the west was the driving force to the streets and the release of their own countries from stagnation and stagnation in both the development of cultural, social and economic. "There was no totalitarian, utopian vision rooted in eschatological expectations of a new kind of society. Visions proclaimed in Central and Eastern Europe, which assumed freedom from repressive totalitarian systems and authoritative, require various adjustments pragmatic." That aspect of the past characterized the year 1989, not escaped the attention of such a thorough researcher as Jürgen Habermas, who in relation to the events of 1989 coined the term "revolution overtaking." Habermas argues that, what then took place was a "revolution, which to some extent drifted back, the revolution, which was preparing the area to catch up on the achievements that have been omitted".

Another argument in support of the thesis that the revolutions of 1989 were a classic example of rebellion is the fact that the brutality, the use of force and coercion are considered by many authors as an indispensable element of a revolution. There are some quotes to support this argument. "Rapid changes in the basics of social structures and class of the country concerned; They accompanied by upheavals caused in part by the bottom-up and a different social class" Theda Skocpol13; Subsequently, "An inherent feature of a revolution is to mobilize the masses on an unprecedented scale in order to build a new social reality - the beginning of a new social order"14. ,,Revolution is a change at the helm of government in the country, made the use of force when at least two opposing groups put forward a claim to power, and each of them has had a significant number of citizens ready to support their claims " that is how Charles Tilly defined the revolution.

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13 D, Petrescu, op.cit, p. 55.
Dragos Peterscu in his publication emphasise that the use of force is inherent in the idea of revolution. A revolution is "change at the helm of government in the country, made the use of force when at least two opposing groups put forward a claim to power, and each of them has had a significant number of citizens ready to support their demands". However, if you consider the violence as an integral component revolution, none of the system changes in 1989 - either in Poland or Hungary or East Germany or Czechoslovakia should not be described as a revolution. If we accept such a prospect, paradoxically, it turns out that the only incident in Romania (The revolution that was meant rapid course, not only resulted by the execution of the hated dictator Nicolae Ceausescu, the numerous victims among the civilian population, alew prowadziła chaos and power Dala People who were in a large extent associated with the previous regime. Despite appearances Democracy for many years after 1989, the year incorrectly ruled Romania was mired in stagnation and backwardness ) in can be considered the definitional revolution.

**Visegrad Group - the beginning**

In the early nineties of the twentieth century, the Visegrad Group has become an important pioneer in the creation of the realities of the new world in this part of the globe. Helped define the three countries of Central Europe as a distinctive, unique group and presented her as a candidate for membership in Western institutions. At the same time it enabled the bilateral political, military and economic cooperation between the countries. Behind her greatest success considered to be the creation of the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), accession to the structures of the North Atlantic Treaty and the European Union. The Visegrad Group differed significantly from other regional groups, which were created at the same time, such as Central European

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Initiative (CEI)\textsuperscript{16}, the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS)\textsuperscript{17}, Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)\textsuperscript{18}. This was not an alliance bringing together many actors. Also excluded the main hegemony in this area - Russia. Instead, they characterized him small number of Member States (the first three, and after the breakup of Czechoslovakia four countries: Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary), common historical experiences and geo-strategic position between Germany - the West - and the former Soviet Union, as well as their strategic goal - integration with the West.

Consequently, the blurred divisions in 1989 Central Europe started to form an autonomous region with ongoing processes inside it. Countries belonging to the Group decided to establish closer cooperation and create a regional group called "Visegrad triangle" (later changed to the name of the Visegrad Group). Due to the fact that the state had no experience in participating in the relatively newly established organizations international and due to the many years of being under the authority of the Soviet Union they had no possibility of mobilization in the region. Cooperation could begin and develop only under the influence of affecting its external and internal factors. Group

\textsuperscript{16} Central Initiative derives from the Quadrilateral Initiative (Quadragonale), established in Budapest November 11, 1989 on the initiative of Austria, Yugoslavia, Hungary and Italy. After the accession of Czechoslovakia in 1990, the initiative was known as Pentagonale after the Polish accession in 1991 - Hexagonale. Under the current name it has been operating since March 20, 1992 on the initiative of Austria. Currently, ISE members are Albania, Austria, Belarus, BośniaiHercegowina, Bulgaria, Montenegro, Croatia, Czech Republic, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine, Hungary and Italy.

\textsuperscript{17} The international organization was founded on the initiative of the governments of Germany and Denmark. Those on 5-6 March 1992 organized a conference of foreign ministers in Copenhagen. Then appointed to life the Council of Baltic Sea States, initially as a forum for intergovernmental cooperation. The Council of the Baltic Sea is the next step in the institutionalization of international relations in the Baltic region after the Cold War, Norway Sweden Denmark Finland Russia Estonia Latvia Lithuania Poland Germany Iceland since 1996, the European Commission.

\textsuperscript{18} The international organization was established in 1992 on the initiative of Turkey, bringing together the countries located in the Black Sea region: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Turkey and Ukraine.
twice (1991 and 1999) set itself targets several times considered expectancy, clarified both tasks and organization of work. In twenty five years of its existence it reached a basic level of its goals.

Factors that influenced the start of cooperation

After the collapse of the post-Yalta order of the sovereignty of the countries of Central and Eastern instability threatened the security level. As a result of political and geopolitical acts they found themselves as if in a "gray zone" or according to another term in "strategic no man's land"¹⁹ between the alliance West on the one hand and the Soviet Union (later Russia and created in December 1991 the Commonwealth of Independent Countries)²⁰ on the other. Countries of Central and Eastern Europe have been deprived of security guarantees remain without any institutions and legal structures that would protect them in time of danger. What's more, among them there were fears that the new International constructs may be undemocratic, it appears again the attractive force which deprive them of sovereignty. This concern was somehow justified because it appeared the unwillingness of the West to intervene and globalize regional conflicts. You could say that Eastern Europe had to rely on their own true potential in emerging countries.

Anxiety of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary were moreover strengthened with the emergence of new threats. It was feared above all the negative consequences of the internal collapse of the USSR (civil war, migration, the collapse of economic relations). In the individual countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the late 1989's and 1990's we discussed several ways to provide new security guarantees in the countries of the former Eastern bloc. An idea which apeared was to stay neutral state or

¹⁹ Ibidem, p. 142.
²⁰ Union economic and politico-military Russia and 10 (initially) the former republics of the USSR, created on December 8, 1991 as a result of the agreement signed at a meeting in the Bialowieza Forest Russian President Boris Yeltsin, the President of Ukraine L. Kravchuk and the President of the Supreme Council of Belarus S. Shushkevich.
demonstrate the absence of any involvement. This concept that was postulated primarily in Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Moving away from the concept occurred with the realization by countries approving it, the models of post-war neutrality (e.g., Finland, Austria) were the result of the bipolar international order, which ended in 1989-1990. Neutrality could not therefore be effective in the newly created conditions, what is more, this idea would be difficult to implement due to too high financial loads. Poland not opted for the road to neutrality and as noted (and minister Polish Deputy Defense) Janusz Onyszkiewicz, "after 1989, talking about neutrality was nonsense [...] History proves that this is true in the case of a peripheral country. Poland is not."\(^{21}\)

Another proposal was to be integrated with North Atlantic Treaty (NATO). Initially, the biggest enthusiasts of this idea was Hungary. The concept, however, was unlikely because of the opposition alliance. NATO was opposed to Central European countries become its members for fear that it would be impossible to organize a system of security and peace in Europe, to the exclusion of Russia. Hence, instead of quick membership in NATO and the security guarantees of NATO representatives suggested the post-communist countries of Central Europe dialogue and the development of mutual relations. There was a belief that the adoption of the former Eastern bloc into NATO would not solve many of their problems. Moving the range of alliance to the East would not increase its security, but it significantly weakened it.

The concept, which was to focus on crafting different forms of protection and prevention against the political situation in the region was to create security cooperation with other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Relying on its own national defense and economic development of the country. However, it would leave countries of the former Eastern bloc in the "gray zone" development. Regional cooperation could take the form of a neutral bloc, some kind of zone delineating the Soviet Union / Russia from the West, but also form a more formalized system of multilateral agreements or bilateral alliances requiring participants to providing assistance in the event of attack. As a group of countries to achieve real success would be sooner achievable. The concept of self-defense, according to the regional Břetislav Dančák contained, however,

\(^{21}\) R. Kupiecki, *Członkostwo w NATO w polskiej polityce zagranicznej*, Warszawa 2002,
a fundamental error: "Central Europe was not a geostrategic whole nor had the necessary potential to form your own security system"\textsuperscript{22}. Lack of homogeneity of the region and the inability of governments to create permanent structures made it the only option Regional, exclusive method to ensure the safety was not realistic at all.\textsuperscript{23}

The most prudent proposal to determine its activities in the new international order and security seemed to be an agreement on cooperation in different fields (not just security) between the countries of Central Europe. The agreement was a safe formula for countries that have just left forced the structure of the state of ungovernability. What's more, in addition to protection against competition powers (both for the countries of the former Eastern bloc and Western), move away from Soviet domination cooperation gave a kind of protection against the revival of nationalist disputes between Central European countries. The advantage of Central European cooperation not only in security matters was the fact that it did not limit it to take further steps towards integration and strengthen its position in the region. With the ultimate telling of individual countries for the security model based on integration with NATO and the EU, regional cooperation has become an important, positive factor in the implementation of this model. Suggesting that the opinion of Matthew Rhodes, the existence of regional cooperation is necessary to the existence of at least one of the two groups, the political factor: the "inner pull" (internal pull) or the corresponding "external push" (external push)\textsuperscript{24}. When deciding on the establishment of an alliance of the Visegrad Group, appeared both these relationships.


What about a pressures from the outside and inside?

The most important change in the foreign policy of the former communist countries was a departure from the policy of pro-Soviet and pro-Western course adoption. The main assumptions included postulate complete departure from the sovereignty of the USSR in any spheres of life and functioning of the state apparatus. Striving authorities has become an association with the European Economic Community (EEC) and the acquisition of membership in NATO and finding himself under his favoritism. Central European countries, compared to other post-socialist countries, showed the greatest willingness to cooperation and integration with the countries of Western Europe. The European Community accounted for one particular kind of liberation from the yoke of the Soviet Union, regarded as a symbol of good and effective political and economic transformations. New understanding of foreign policy was based on the realization by the Visegrad countries that activities at the regional level in the form of unforced development of cooperation are possible and wanted for a Central Europe. Countries were aware that they can strive for membership in the EEC only by acting together. Their goal at the beginning of co-operation has been established to a certain extent automatically, without a deeper knowledge of the European integration process. According to Andrzej Podraza one can not "identify" and stir membership in the European Union with the general words "return to Europe". Only the political situation in this part of the continent blocked the ability to integrate with emerging international structures. This was particularly emphasized by the middle of the country globe with a long European tradition, such as Poland, Hungary or the Czech Republic. These countries shared European standards for centuries, have been, are and will be part of the European civilization. Therefore, it is impossible to speak of a "return to Europe" while never not gone from her.

26 http://aei.pitt.edu/2705/1/DUMMY_DEPOSIT.pdf, access 31.05.2016
The external impact, as noted by the author named before, came from both common problems in relation to the countries of the former east (especially Russia) and the Balkans, as well as the proposals emerging from the pages of European and Euro-Atlantic structures. In a special way to create regional alliances called the West, that the problem of the reunification of Europe after the fall of the Iron Curtain saw as it is in this project²⁷. Successive European politicians presented their vision of a united Europe - for example, the idea of creation in Central and Eastern Europe, a loose confederation of states presented by the French President François Mitterand. Proposed by the European Confederation of it, however, he met with opposition from the Central European countries because it was considered that the concept of the effective wstrzymałaby state of integration with the West, making their cooperation transitional form, ,, preparatory "to Western democracy. The French president believed that the countries of the former Eastern bloc is not they are not yet ready to take an active part in the structures of the West. Therefore, encouraged them to build local and regional alliances, as a peculiar kind of "rehearsal". The present, however, were concepts which assumed engagement in Central European integration, not so much among themselves as directly with the Communities. One of them was the project of Jacques Delors²⁸, the then President of the Commission of the European Communities. This concept assumed that the Community will be the center of a new European architecture, and around them will be created circles of countries having ties with them on various thematic level and commitment. The second circle would constitute the EFTA countries, and in a circle outside would be focused countries of the former Eastern bloc, cooperating directly between the created levels. Own concept also presented the then Vice-President of the Commission, Frans Andriessen. He argued that the best solution would be to create a membership understood the principle of immediacy. This was to enable the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to use the membership only in some specific areas. In the other, for the duration of the transition period, the rights and obligations of those would be suspended. Associated States would have their

²⁷ K. Gawor- Tabor, op.cit. p. 155
²⁸ Ibidem.
representatives in the institutions of Europe. The amount of the resulting concept is evidenced by the fact that the European Communities literally expected from the Central European countries start of integration both in the region and with the already functioning at the time large-scale projects. "Cooperation countries in the region was seen as a kind of test of the willingness and ability of shaping bilateral relations and multilateral by the countries of Central Europe. Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary rewarding to take joint action if only to gain the favor of those states and organizations, which want to work, and which wanted to gain accession. "Since the establishment of democracies in Central Europe benefited thanks to the interest of the West. In return, the West expected that these democracies will implement a program of political and economic integration within the Central European region ".

Cooperation of Central European countries was also, and perhaps primarily motivated by economic issues. The collapse of the previous economic ties and the loss of existing Eastern markets accounted for Polish, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, a significant problem. In addition, Western markets were unwilling to import goods from post-communist countries, thus establishing cooperation between Central European countries build its capabilities to fill gaps in local economic contacts. State cooperation in the economic field has become a strong evidence that the Central European states, although inexperienced, until invading in building their own autonomous identity, cope with changes in transformational and free market reforms. This increased the attractiveness of both individual countries and the entire region. It make it realistic in the eyes of foreign investors and increased inflow of foreign capital. The recovery in the discussions of the eighties of the twentieth century and restore the vitality of the term "Central Europe" greatly facilitated the establishment of cooperation between Polish, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. These countries are treated as a single, coherent whole, having the same identity. For defining and understanding of that identity, it was necessary to take into account many factors, among them the geographical location between East and West Europe, common history, social development. In support of this argument seems to be the perfect words of Vaclav Havel, who made just in the Polish

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29 A. Podraza, *Stosunki polityczne i gospodarcze Wspólnoty Europejskiej z państwami*
parliament - „Joint years similar fate and a similar fight to similar ideals should engender genuine friendship and mutual respect. With this truly authentic self, based on a good understanding of the fate that was imposed on us together, learn together with that of the learned [...] should also grow really good coordination of our policies”\(^\text{30}\)

**The situation in the international arena right before an alliance**

In the international space things that became significant were changes taking place in the Soviet Union, including the resignation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Eduard Shevardnadze\(^\text{31}\) from his sit. It showed that the already precarious situation in the Soviet Union is a threat to the safety of the new democracies in Central Europe. Under conditions of increasing instability as the European Community began to treat the three countries as a whole more stable and encouraged them to cooperate. At the end of 1990 Phare program, initially addressed to the Hungary and Poland, was directed also to Czechoslovakia. This meant the legitimacy of the decision on active participation in the integration of these countries with Western structures. The decisive factor was a disappointment as to the extent and rate of progress in co-operation with the West. There has been a certain degree of stagnation in the implementation of the concept of integration. The need to compensate for economic losses caused by the cut off from the markets of the USSR (the interruption of a very intensive cooperation with the East so far) required to declare a common position on the policy towards the east. Significant was the involvement of Joseph Antal in close contact with the Poland. \(^\text{32}\)


\(^{31}\) In 1990 - a few months before the failed putsch in Moscow - providing the coming political upheaval, he has resigned. He described his resignation as a protest against the "dictatorship of the nascent"

In addition, actions taken by Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary in order to solve the Warsaw Pact and Comecon required simply to provide further common positions and objectives, and the essence of this was to become the alliance of these countries. These countries have decided together to take concrete actions in order to get rid of the remnants of the communist system. (At the summit held in Moscow 1990 years Hungary was the first decided to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact)\textsuperscript{33}. Talks at the highest level of a system- Advisory Committee of Political and between June and November 1990 brought together these three countries\textsuperscript{34}. They set a common strategy and final goal of the negotiations. This collaboration increased their poor alone starting position in the negotiations. Thanks to the joint declaration came Visegrad Group achieved more than expected. Not only led to the reconstruction of the Agreement, and it is completely removed. On 1 April 1991 the structure of the Warsaw Pact stopped its existence. On 1 July there was the last meeting of the Committee - eliminating alliance and Comecon. Signed bilateral agreements with the Soviet Union. This fairly clear situation allowed easier than the year before (1990) on the adoption of joint declarations and documents. The importance of the decision on cooperation would also sign an agreement ,, two plus four"\textsuperscript{35}. Organized in 1990, a series of meetings between representatives of the two German states and the four powers anti-Hitler coalition, relating to the reunification of Germany, divided after World War II finally regulated the relations of countries with Germany. In these meetings they took part the German Democratic Republic, Federal Republic of Germany, France, United States, United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. September 12, 1990 in Moscow, these countries signed the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, also called the Treaty of two plus four, which opened the way for German reunification. These negotiations led to the signing of the agreement ultimately regulating the relations of our country with Germany. It gave Poland the stability and motivated to entering into negotiations and international cooperation as a stable and strong ally.

\textsuperscript{33} K. Gawor - Tybor, \textit{op.cit.} p. 274.
\textsuperscript{34} \textit{Ibidem}, s. 275.
The process of making the Visegrad Triangle

In Poland, in 1970, thanks to the Workers' Defence Committee (KOR)\(^{36}\), Independent Printing House (NOWA)\(^{37}\) and other independent initiatives, could refer to the publications of the opposition Czech, Slovak, Hungarian. Campaigners for democracy in each country met in spite of repression by the Communist leaders\(^{38}\). Polish-Czechoslovak Solidarity operate efficiently and her example was founded in Podkowa Forest in 1987, Polish-Hungarian group "Solidarity". As stated by the Hungarian opposition activist Ákos Engelmayer, Polish-Hungarian and Polish-Czechoslovak activists of "Solidarity" after 1989, joined the civil service, shaping policy in the region.

Official signs of the possibility of regional alignment flowed from the Polish and Czechoslovak. During the visit, the first democratic Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki in Prague January 22 1990\(^{39}\) next to a variety of issues related to bilateral cooperation also raised the issue of cooperation within the triangle: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary. Polish foreign policy priorities were your positive response in the declarations of politicians Czechoslovakia, which was confirmed was a statement of Vaclav Havel forum Polish parliament has already cited in this paper.

Further steps were taken in April 1990 by Vaclav Havel, who organized the meeting of the leaders of Central European countries in Bratislava. He shown the President ten steps program\(^{40}\) discussions on the plan first put forward the problem of

\(^{36}\) Polish opposition organization operating from September 1976 to September 1977, which opposes the policy of the communist authorities, carrying help those persecuted as a result of the events of June 1976 mainly in Radom and Ursus, as well as in Plock. After partial fulfillment of demands by the communist authorities transformed into the Committee for Social Self-Defense KOR

\(^{37}\) The first Polish publishing house in the country outside of censorship, created in 1977 in the 70 largest in the second circuit. In 1989, it transformed into the so-called. "Supernova".

\(^{38}\) A. Ananicz, *From the anti-communist underground to NATO and the EU*, Bratislava 2006, p. 28.

\(^{39}\) [http://www.visegradgroup.eu/calendar, access 31.05.2016](http://www.visegradgroup.eu/calendar)

\(^{40}\) [http://www.athenaeum.umk.pl/numery/42.pdf, access 31.05.2016](http://www.athenaeum.umk.pl/numery/42.pdf)
developing a common strategy to continue embarrassing the state institutions - The Warsaw Pact and Comecon. It was clear that if the countries that could be the strategy to work, it will be expected to strengthen further cooperation and defining common objectives. However, the peak of Bratislava has not been properly prepared for substantive and did not bring any findings. He showed, however, that the main reason for calling was to raise the international profile of Czechoslovakia and enable it to join the Adriatic-Danube group of countries. It was Czechoslovakia more interesting option for regional cooperation, and therefore to Bratislava were invited as observers of foreign ministers of Austria, Italy and Jugoslavia. Due to Czechoslovak concept Poland did not belong to the Adriatic-Danube zone but was seen rather as part of the North (Baltic Sea) area of regional cooperation. Czechoslovakia was thought to play a role of a connecting link between the two groups. It turned out, however, that both Hungary and Czechoslovakia ran into difficulties in the negotiations with the Soviet Union on economic issues and on the withdrawal of Soviet troops in their area. In addition, efforts to solve the Warsaw Pact and Comecon require mutual coordination and common understanding of Poland. External impulses therefore result in a return to the idea of trilateral cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe. It should be emphasized, however, the importance of this meeting. The fundamental issue of talks was the fact that the Central European countries are unable to agree on a common goal and take action to achieve it. The problem turned out to be the final result, crucial for the functioning of the Visegrad Group and the realization of their potential as individual countries ranged between mutual cooperation and competition. Moreover, the meeting showed that it was the then approach to cooperation between individual countries. So, what was the main issue? Czechoslovakia was not then interested in cooperation between only three countries. President Havel, the role of his country he regarded as being an intermediary connecting the north and south of Europe. In the interest of Czechoslovakia it was to make it a crucial bond between Quadrangle - initiative, which descended later the

41 Ibidem.
42 A. Grajewski, Udział Polski w ugrupowaniach regionalnych, „Rocznik Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej” 1991, Warszawa 1993, pp. 102 – 103
Central European Initiative, the Baltic and northern part of Europe, to which belonged also Poland.

Czechoslovakia saw itself as part of a larger, more serious international project, hence her skepticism when engaging in the creation of the Visegrad Group. The most unfavorable from the point of view of future cooperation was the position of the authorities of the Czech Republic. It was believed that closer ties within the group may delay or hinder the implementation of the main objective of Czech foreign policy, which was the integration of the Western European and Atlantic structures. Initially, they take up more so than for the national group concepts development. Expression ago gave the Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus in an interview with "Le Figaro", in which he stated that: "Visegrad does not concern us. It was a process started in Central and Eastern Europe in a completely artificial way by the West, perhaps by Brussels, but certainly not by us." Poland due to its geopolitical position does not agree with the concept of Czechoslovakia. They feared for deeper integration of the southern part of the continent and its excessive rapprochement with the West. This could possibly lead to a situation in which Poland would remain alone between Germany and the USSR. This would be a huge threat for the country, given the uncertain future changes in the USSR and unexplained situation with the status of the border with Germany.

Hungary did not appear to be too enthusiastic to projects closer cooperation in both political and economic. Concerns section of Hungarian economists woke especially cooperation with the Polish economically unstable. According to Jerzy Robert Nowak the most important reason for objections to closer regional cooperation with the Polish were fears that this cooperation will affect the deterioration of the relations of Hungary with both Germany and the USSR. More serious hopes, as in the case of Czechoslovakia, then woke cooperation Italian-Austrian-Hungarian-Czechoslovak-Yugoslav, in which they would created opportunities for the modernization of three economically less developed partners.

So at the beginning of 1990, when there was a meeting in Bratislava, there was no appropriate internal pull,, "", as well as an external push." The Visegrad countries had
then still different visions provide security guarantees. They approached indifferent to the projects presented, and no state showed excessive or even any initiative. For the realization of the concept of closer cooperation between Polish, Czechoslovakia and Hungary influenced on the one hand developments in the international arena pose a threat to safety and the need to respond to them, on the other hand fall the ideology of the foreign policy of individual states. The vision of cooperation was not yet seen as a realistic goal, but rather one of the concept, which is worth a look. Each state still saw its way to integration in individual projects.

**The functioning of the Visegrad Group**

Importantly, already in the Declaration signed in 1991, it was emphasized that there should be a bureaucratic activity. It rejected formal nature of the organization and found that the meetings were held at various levels and in various forms. Informal cooperation and general superficially set goals and a lack of co-ordination mechanisms have not turned the Visegrad serious player on the political scene. This alliance turned into more of ad hoc advisory forum by accident interests of individual members than to a serious alliance of exerting real influence in this part of Europe.

The contents of the Visegrad cooperation mentioned earlier, created in 1999, has been clarified precisely the structure of the Group. Cooperation based would have on a rotating annual presidency and meetings of representatives of the four member countries at different level\(^\text{44}\). The country task which includes one-year presidency at the beginning of leadership shift action objectives and priorities that will be implemented, and the terminal to report on the descriptions made or started projects. This is accomplished at the summit of prime ministers. Then it comes to the evaluation


\(^{44}\) K. Gawor - Tabor, *op.cit*, s. 193.
of results of the implementation of the document and take appropriate political
decisions necessary, ad hoc cases. The implementation of these decisions shall be
assessed at the next summit. The annual reports provide valuable information on the
functioning of a Group meticulously depict the number and subject matter of meetings
at all levels, as well as summarize the annual achievements in various areas of
cooperation. In addition, according to the annex to the contents of the Visegrad
cooperation in 1999, adopted in 2002 Esztergom\footnote{Ibidem, s. 186.} determined that if an application is
made for a meeting in the shape of "Visegrad Group plus additional partner" the
projects in question must first be examined by the Visegrad countries, only later a
country which currently holds the presidency represents a third country, the so-called
"national plus" initiative. This adopted to Visegrad group solution was regarded as a
strong and compact organization, which always stands together and is well prepared to
talk. Meetings between representatives of the alliance dispense at the
intergovernmental level, and this is the simple fact that as a Member of Central Europe
dominates the system, in which governments are most privileged meeting coordinated
by Prime Minister of the country holding the Presidency. Once a year there is an official
and unofficial summit. Regular meetings are also ambassadors of the Visegrad countries
(about 4 times a year) are discussed levels of implementation of the annual plan of the
Presidency. Secretaries of State of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (responsible for the
preparation of meetings of prime ministers) meet twice a year. The controversy is,
however, that like the president, has not been well defined frequency of meetings at
the level of inter-parliamentary. They are held at two levels - the presidents and
chairmen of parliaments comission. Another important element when discussing the
activities of the Visegrad Group meetings are defined "Visegrad Group PLUS an
additional partner". V4 partners are other regional organizations such as the Benelux,
the Baltic Council, the Nordic Council\footnote{It was important for us to work closely with the Benelux, thanks to their experience
could be inspired before the accession to the European Union in 2004. Even signed a
joint document which said that the cooperation is to develop especially in the area of
accession to the Schengen zone and the protection środowiska natural, social policy and
employment.}. Jurij Marusiak noticed a trend that meetings
under this program held since 2007 with the representatives of countries which exercise the current presidency of the Council of the European Union. Thanks to community member countries are up to date with what programs are carried out in a given period czasowym. I should also mention that a meeting concerning the V4 + are held with members who are seeking accession to EU structures including Ukraine and Moldova. These meetings allow you to present the countries of the Visegrad Group as supporters of integration, on the other hand allow the transfer of experiences based on their own integration processes. Group-shaped V4 + also meets with Japan, mainly for promotional purposes in the region.  

There are many objections to the way the Group works. The fact that both meetings at the presidential forum are not strictly defined in terms of their frequency makes the alliance seems to be a very liberal approach to the brevity structures. The documents Visegrad meeting of the presidents were not paid. This raises certain doubts. It seems interesting to what extent the statements and declarations made by presidents, who in all countries of the Visegrad represent the country in the international arena and are the superiors of the armed forces should relate to those undertaken at the level of government. Furthermore, very general goals seem to be a confirmation of the initial assumptions, that the Group does not require formal institutions of control. Presented at the top level political slogans are often poetic declarations with no reference to reality. Forms of enforcement of its feasibility is also not specified, which leaves the possibility of action on a gentleman’s agreement basis. The disadvantage of weak institutionalization is that the twist of the Group remains in the hands of a few actors whose goals and aspirations are not always identical. Decisions made are not legally binding. The predominant informal nature of the cooperation within the Group is also reflected in the results. Instead of legally binding decisions the Visegrad countries seem to prefer rather joint statements or declarations. This translates to poor institutionalization and provides a limited number of pillars on which there can be built a regional identity. Institutions are often used as a reference

point (which enjoy the confidence of the citizens). In the case of the Group this point, however, and the lack of it is more difficult to define the regional identity.

However, the fact that the Visegrad group is not institutionalized - there is no permanent secretariat, nor the clear leader - is evidenced by the fact that the countries of the former Eastern bloc were not ready for the re-commissioning of its own autonomy in the hands of a single center of power. Freedom and self-determination recovered after so many years was so valuable that countries do not seek a leader who would determine future directions of their development and integration. The idea of leadership stood in contradiction with the philosophy of European integration. The Member States of the Communities, and later the European Union, were and are very sceptical about formal leadership aspirations. To some extent such, and not another group structure can also be read as a positive aspect, that gives opportunity to organize meetings and ad hoc coalitions with other countries. The flexible organizational structure allows the Visegrad more intensive cooperation with partners from outside the Group.

To sum up, although the Visegrad Group has been in existence for over twenty-five years it can not be equated as a subject of the progressive development path. It achieved its initially established goals - accession to NATO and the Warsaw University, and became the initiator of creating a regional grouping - CEFTA, but hard to cite a further, significant performance attributed to the alliance. Seems accurate to say that the Group would not have been if not for the existence of factors, both external and internal. Such cooperation was indeed a sovereign decision of each country in response to the transformation and deideologizację contemporary foreign policy. However, first of all, it was caused by the need to ensure their own security in the international situation after 1989. The impact of the decision and to guarantee the safety then have these external factors - the unstable situation in the Soviet Union and the Western Balkans. New Europe, freed from the yoke of the Soviet occupiers looking for solutions to integrate with the rest of the continent. An alliance, therefore, seemed to be the most effective time endeavor.
At the beginning of its existence, when new, free Central Europe created an alliance bringing together the three countries with similar experiences, identical objectives and priorities, in the eyes of the world it was perceived as a platform for the main initiation of policy in the region. However, as revealed by this work, the Visegrad Group did not use their full potential. Reasons for this could be many. Poor institutionalization of a group that has not developed a formal way to enforce the declaration proclaimed; strong desire of each country to appear on the international arena as a separate solution; mentioned ,,syndrome Comecon'', understood as the fear of creating cooperation of institutional relations. Member countries have not developed an ideal model for cooperation among themselves. For example, during voting in the European Parliament, summing up the individual distribution of votes (Poland - 51, the Czech Republic and Hungary - 21, Slovakia - 13, for a total of 106 for all 751 seats), the Group could create a strong strength of the real impact and the possibility of presenting initiatives. Following the results of the voting, however, it can rarely be observed that the Member alliance show the identity of interests, understood as concepts alliance - the Visegrad Group. It can provide only a small attachment and commitment to the creation of more and stronger and more stable Central and Eastern Europe. The Visegrad Group not only is their present, but even the recent past. Since the joint entry into the European Union countries can not find the cooperation area. From the point of view of Brussels the "Visegrad four" is simply the four countries with different expectations and interests. Countries seem to create the Group only on the occasion of official meetings at the annual summit of prime ministers or presidents, but without showing the willingness to take concrete, specific within the timeframe of projects.

However, the Visegrad Group has contributed to the improvement of security in the region. Thanks to its appointment, integration with Western Europe was possible. The Group's activities, which in such a short time has been brought to life was no small challenge for countries recovering its economy, national policy, and above all moralia and civic awareness. this placed region cee as determined, ready to make sacrifices, but also to change the area. The activities of the Group in the early years was treated as a special kind,, rehearsal "before accession Four European structures. Even in a regional
alliance was no need to give up their aspirations and dedication national aspirations of each of the V4 countries to build a strong and lasting (at least in theory) coalition.
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Security first or the fear of the other. Securitising the migration crisis debate in Central Europe

In this paper I examine major hypotheses in scholarly debate and policy-making analyses touching upon the nexus between security and democracy as major dilemma concerning the EU migration policy.

In doing so I argue that collective fear of the other has been dominant pattern of both contemporary boundary drawing in collective identity construction and migration crisis policy-making in Central Europe especially. Consequently, we see an ongoing securitisation of both national and the EU based migration policy-making.

1. Securitisation of the migration crisis in Europe. A conceptual debate

Security-migration nexus became subject of increasing interest among scholars representing traditionally distinct disciplines in social science. This has been very much direct consequence of refugee crisis debate across Europe. Traditionally security was subject of concern among scholars representing international relations and political science while migration was mainly researched by sociologists, economists and geographers. Mass influx of refugees and migrants, which became securitised by policy-makers across Europe - Central Europe especially - reinforced crossdisciplinary research on an interplay between security and migration.

Security studies and migration studies researches begun to approach refugee crisis in Europe by focusing on dynamics of mutual interdependence between migration influx and rise of security threats. An example of such conceptual interdependence between
Security and migration can be found in Jef Huysmans’ and Vickie Squire’s study on Migration and Security.¹

Such new research agenda proposed by Huysmans and Squire includes a set of following questions: “To what extent can migration be conceived of as security issue in the strategic sense that IR and traditional security studies analysts understand security? What kind of insecurities does migration raise, and for whom or what? What is the impact of framing migration in terms of security, and what alternative frames of reference might be used? How can a critical political analysis of mobility be developed out of the nexus of migration and security?”²

The origin of security-migration nexus is to be found already in the beginning of post-Cold War security studies and political sociology paradigm change. The Copenhagen School theory of societal security is clear case of such paradigm change.³

Barry Buzan, one of the most prominent representatives of the Copenhagen School of international relations emphasised a need to reconceptualise the very notion of security in early years after disintegration of the Cold War international order by introducing non-military dimensions of security into the realm of security studies research agenda. Migration - along with national identity - was one of those non-military aspects of security, which became central to researchers analysing rapid changes in security environment in the post-Cold War reality.

The essence of securitisation of migration lies – according to Barry Buzan – in the fact that: “The threat of migration is fundamentally a question of how relative numbers interact with the absorptive and adaptive capacities of society...The fear of

² Ibid. p.2
being swamped by foreigners...is easy to mobilize on the political agenda as a security issue.”

More recently securitisation of migration has been subject of research related to consequences of uncontrolled flows of migrants and refugees from regions affected by civil wars, ethnic and religious conflicts or natural environment disasters. This has been particularly relevant to mass influx of migrants and refugees coming to Europe after so-called Arab Spring.

A case in point here is the research on securitisation of migration connected to so-called Balkan route. An interesting case study comes from Ružica Jakešević and Siniša Tatalović who analyse the case of Croatian experience in wider Balkan region context.

As they argue: „The securitization of migration (especially the irregular one) is becoming increasingly present in different parts of the world. Refugee crises are an inevitable consequence of numerous conflicts and wars which are characteristic of the contemporary world. The increased movement of people from underdeveloped to developed countries represents a very complex social phenomenon which includes political, economic, environmental, ethnic, religious and other elements. Especially irregular migrations are increasingly becoming associated with activities of organized criminal groups, which have taken the control over human trafficking. Years of neglect regarding this problem contributed significantly to the recent escalation of the refugee crisis in Europe. What is especially worrying is that in a number of countries, particularly


in Eastern Europe, the refugee crisis has stimulated some legislative measures which point out to framing migration as an almost exclusively security issue (in terms of traditionally conceived national security), while humanitarian and social components are increasingly neglected.”

Another valuable study comes from András Szalai and Gabriella Göbl who explain similarities and differences between Western European countries securitisation of migration policy in late 80s and 90s of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century and today’s securitisation of migration policy in Central Europe. Following this standpoint they explain why it is legitimate to compare experience of Western European countries with securitisation of migration with the current experience of Central European countries. As they claim: “A cursory look at the domestic discourse on migration in Hungary, but also in other Central and Eastern European states—most notably Slovakia and the Czech Republic—shows clear similarities with Western European discourses of the 1980s, 1990s and early 2000s. These states are therefore not pioneers of securitization when it comes to the rhetoric of migration, but rather adopters of a pre-existing West European discourse about both the dangers of migration writ large, and assimilation/integration policies referred to as multiculturalism.

Though these societies have practically no first-hand experience with migration—save for the limited influx of refugees from the Balkans in the 1990s—elite attempts at securitizing the current migration wave have been very effective, and nowhere more than in Hungary. These states also differ on a number of other issues. First, they have no sense of “historical obligation” like Western European states do about accepting migrants from former colonies—an argument that is used by supporters of liberal migration policies. Second, these societies are mostly racially—and in the case of Hungary and the Czech Republic, also ethnically—homogeneous.”

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6 Ibid. p. 1251 (6)
8 Ibid. pp. 10-11
To complete this brief outline of analytical perspectives on different conceptualisations of securitisation of migration in Central Europe in light of current refugee crisis in Europe let us refer to Jarmila Androvićova’s contribution. In her analysis of political debate on refugee crisis in Slovakia we may find a very interesting typology of broad and narrow conceptualisations of securitisation of migration. Going beyond mainstream mass media discussion of securitisation of migration being confined to migration-terrorism nexus Jarmila Androvićova suggests – refering to Alessandra Buonfino’s study on Politicization and Securitization of the Discourse of Immigration in Europe, to focus on a broader context of securitisation of migration, namely on social construction of risks connected to integration of migrants into Slovak society. As she argues: „Apart from the scalability of securitization, we can talk about its narrower and broader definitions. The narrow definition usually refers to a connection between migration and terrorism or crime, while the broad definition refers to the connection between migration and the entire, complex notion of security, considered in all its different dimensions (cultural, economic, political). In this paper, I work with the broader definition of securitization, in which migrants are constructed as cultural, economic or social risks (in the sense that it is “risky” to build social relationships with them). This conceptualization creates social distance from immigrants and leads to direct discrimination against them. At the same time, negative representations of migrants form the basis for their securitization in the narrow sense as well – connecting them with terrorism and criminalizing them. These two perceptions of immigrants are especially interconnected with regard to some categories of immigrants, mainly those of Muslim origin, since their culture is often seen as inherently violent.”

Curiously enough, we may find correlation between Jarmila Androvićova’s understanding of securitisation of current migration discourse in Slovakia and Ulrich

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Beck’s world risk society theory.\textsuperscript{11} What makes these to conceptualisations of risk comparable is the emphasis given to social construction of risk in the form of social manufacturing. As Ulrich Beck argued: ”Modern society has become a risk society in the sense that it is increasingly occupied with debating, preventing and managing risks that it itself has produced [...]Risk 'is not reducible to the product of probability of occurrence multiplied with the intensity and scope of potential harm'. Rather, it is a socially constructed phenomenon, in which some people have a greater capacity to define risks than others. Not all actors really benefit from the reflexivity of risk - only those with real scope to define their own risks. Risk exposure is replacing class as the principal inequality of modern society, because of how risk is reflexively defined by actors: 'In risk society relations of definition are to be conceived analogous to Marx’s relations of production’. The inequalities of definition enable powerful actors to maximize risks for 'others’ and minimize risks for ‘themselves’. Risk definition, essentially, is a power game”\textsuperscript{12}

2. Security vs democracy. The EU migration policy dilemmas from Central European perspective.

Having briefly outlined major approaches in conceptualisation of securitisation of migration in light of current refugee crisis in Europe, let me turn to empirical case study analysis of policy making directed towards nexus between democracy and security. I will focus on an analysis of selected policy making mechanisms and policy instruments at the level of the European Union and its member states with special emphasis given to Central European countries.

Major feature of securitisation of migration policy in today’s Europe both at the level of the EU and its member states in light of the post-Arab Spring developments is the

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid. pp.332-333 (4-5)
focus on protection of external and internal borders of the EU - Schengen area management especially - as well as militarisation of migration and asylum policy in response to terrorist threats being associated with mass influx of migrants from areas affected by operation of extremist terrorist groups. Equally important in this context is little attention being paid by policy-makers bot the EU and especially at member state level to protection of rights of vulnerable migrant people.

Security vs democracy dilemma in today’s European migration policy finds its evidence in prioritisisation of security concerns over human security or human rights in general. In what follows I will focus on some cases illustrating such developments. In doing so, I will examine some of the policy instruments adopted by Central European governments in response to migration influx in connection to home security policy.

Let me, however, begin with more general reflection on premises and reality behind the EU migration policy agenda. Security first approach seems to prevail in reaction of at least some of the EU member states towards the EU agenda on migration as exemplified in slow implementation of refugee relocation and resettlement plans. As rightly observed by Tamirace Fakhoury: “As the EU has pushed for a refugee distribution system among the 28 member states, rifts have brought the tension between national and supranational governance to the fore. In May 2015, for instance, the UK criticised the EU relocation plan over the Mediterranean migrant crisis for its "non-voluntary" character. In the framework of the second implementation package (September 2015), the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia voted against the EU proposal to relocate 120,000 refugees [...] National rifts over the refugee question have shifted attention to the individual actions of EU member states, stressing states’ interests rather than migrants’ vulnerabilities, and stirring controversies over whether European asylum rules should be applied or not amid what has become Europe’s "migrant crisis.” Deterrence measures, such as sealing migratory routes and
border detention, have furthermore entrenched the perception that the influx of migrants into Europe has evolved into a threat to national borders.”

Secondly, a highly contested EU-Turkey readmission deal represents a clear case of security first approach of the EU member states towards migration problem. Contested character of this agreement stems from the fact that indeed the EU and its member states seem to outsource its responsibility for tackling the refugee problem by relying on Turkey’s willingness to provide necessary assistance to refugees. As insightfully noticed by Ahmet İÇDUYGU: "Since the adoption of the EU-Turkey deal, the targeted aims are being critically questioned by many both in the EU and Turkey. There is only one somehow successful result of this deal, which partly satisfies the European side: there has been a considerable decline in the numbers of irregular border crossings between Turkey and Greece since March 2016. Apart from this, there has been very little progress with the other targets of the agreement. The EU has not been so successful in returning the irregular migrants and Syrian refugees from Greece to Turkey. Only a very small portion of the promised €3 billion has arrived in Turkey. The EU’s decision on the free-visa regime between Turkey and the EU has been continuously delayed, and consequently the political leadership in Turkey has begun to intimidate the European decision-makers, indicating that if the visa requirements for Turkish citizens are not lifted, Turkey might not fulfill its obligations under this deal. Hence, the future of the EU-Turkey deal seems to be quite uncertain.”

As already argued security first approach in the EU member states migration policies prevail significantly over concerns about human rights, which leads to the conclusion that democratic norms and values are being frequently overshadowed.


14 İÇDUYGU, Ahmet, After the EU-Turkey refugee deal: a perspective from Turkey, retrieved from http://www.clingendael.nl, accessed on 10 January 2017
The sharpest case of such situation is the Hungarian migration policy. The most explicit example of securitisation of Hungarian migration policy has been barbed wire fence built on Hungarian-Serbian border aiming to prevent migrants to enter Hungary followed by legislation according to which all asylum seekers can be detained in camps made of shipping containers while their case is proceeded and eventually forced back to Serbia. Prior justification of such policy given by prime minister’s spokesman - Zoltan Kovacs - indicates clearly security over democracy approach in the Hungarian migration policy. As stated by Zoltan Kovacs: *We are going to introduce a new measure — no migrants, not even those who have achieved their request for asylum, can move freely until there is a final, legal decision whether they are entitled to political asylum or refugee status. They will not be entitled to move freely in the country [...] You have to stop migration beyond Europe’s borders. The recognition is very welcome [...] Everybody who comes to the EU as a migrant is basically coming illegally*\(^{15}\)

A similar approach to migration vs. democracy dilemma has been adopted in Poland. Linking directly migration inflow with escalation of terrorist threat a package of new regulations had been adopted recently. The key regulation in this respect is Law on Counterterrorism of 10 June 2016. Political justification given by policy makers to recently adopted anti-terrorist package leaves no doubt about perceived causal relationship between migration inflow to Europe and national security threat in the form of terrorist attacks. In the opinion expressed by Mariusz Błaszczyk, minister of interior, “the Counterterrorism Law was that it is one of the instruments that keeps Poland safe and will therefore remain in effect”\(^{16}\)

Special reference is made in the new counterterrorism law to foreigners coming and residing to Poland. As diagnosed by the Amnesty International: “*Foreigners in Poland are particular targets of the new Counterterrorism Law, which allows for their covert surveillance, including through wire-tapping, monitoring of electronic*

communications, telecommunication networks and devices without judicial oversight for three months (after which it may be extended by a court order). These measures can be employed if there is a “fear”, not even a reasonable suspicion, that the person may be involved in terrorism-related activities. Singling out foreign nationals in this manner is discriminatory and could lead to racial and ethnic profiling, especially given the secret nature of surveillance.”

Following the adoption of the counter-terrorist legislation, on 30 January 2017, minister of interior announced possible introduction of an amendment to newly adopted law, which goes into even more extreme direction: “It introduces automatic, group-based detention of asylum-seekers as well as the provisions on safe country of origin and safe third country lists which restrict access to the regular asylum procedure have discriminatory consequences for groups of asylum seekers originating from "safe countries"”


\[17\] Ibid.
Conclusion

By the way of conclusion it needs to be emphasised that we have been observing in Europe recently an increasing securitisation of migration policies both at the EU and national levels. It takes a form of institutional and discursive prioritisation of security over democracy concerns. With different forms and different intensity we witness manufacturing of risk situations into security threats, which implicates restrictive sometimes oppressive policy-making. This will probably be the case in the foreseeable future at least as long as the policy of fear will dominate in Europe.

As rightly observed by Tamirace Fakhoury what deserves a special attention in further research on migration-security nexus is: "whether the influx of migrants into Europe, rather than constituting a watershed crisis, unlocks and overlaps with underlying dilemmas within the EU. In this view, the question of temporality plays an important role in explaining EU’s securitised response. The contested refugee relocation scheme has spurred renewed doubts over the costs of “transferring sovereignty.” States reluctant to complying with the quota system have drawn on the lexicon of security and cultural incompatibility to justify national responses." 

\(^{18}\) Ibid.p.8

\(^{19}\) Fakhoury, Tamirace, Tangled Connections..., op.cit. p.10
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Refugees and immigrants in light of the philosophy of the other

Abstract:

In meeting with the other who is stranger for me I am scared. Classical metaphysic doesn't approach fear of man like contemporary philosophy (e.g. Kierkegaard) which is involved in fears and anxiety. Experiences of fear appears in philosophy when philosophers began to claim that man transcends oneself and needs something to find his identity. Identity can be analysed at ontological, but also at agathological level. In the ontological sense, there is no motion of other because I concentrate on myself. In the agathological meaning of fear there is no reference to “somebody”, but only “for somebody”. Fear and anxiety are not overcome but they lose objective character “of somebody” and change to “for somebody”. The problem of fear occurs in question about identity in horizon of freedom and responsibility.

Hegel in his “Phenomenology of spirit” is striving at presenting of freedom, liberty as important for philosophy. In contrast to him, Levinas rejects freedom and liberty towards responsibility and justice which includes “for somebody” (take care of somebody and for somebody). Fear myself from stranger is getting sacrifice when I come in contact with other. Primary experiences which changes my mind is experiences of face. In experiences of other my fear “of myself” is transformed in fear “for other” in horizon of responsibility. I decline all imagination of other which is result of our totality thoughts and I am ready for other. Feelings of helplessness and defencelessness which accompanies epiphany of face case that my totality thought reduced to myself is getting in obsession for other (I am for other, I fear for other) refugees, other, hospitality, immigrants, foreigner.
Problem of refugees in Europe has become a very important issue. The main misconception is to link refugees with terrorism. Meanwhile, refugees – overwhelmingly – are people who run away from/escape wars. Negative evaluation influx of refugees is a result of deficiency information about policy, immigration and protection against terrorism. Cases of attacks on the civilian population in France and Germany makes anxiety of our security. However, the cause of terrorism is not the migration of the population, but radicalization of behavior in the extreme factions of Islam. Migrants are victims of terror similar to the Europeans, who fear for their lives and the situation of the increasing terrorist attacks in Europe. Solution of the conflict in the Middle East and the elimination of criminal networks is only possible with increased European integration. Meanwhile, Europe is struggling with the problems of nationalism and radicalization of attitudes between nation states who want to weaken the European community, which have provided in Europe security and peace since 1945. Growing gradually integration of the European secured the relative prosperity for its citizens. Guarantee of human rights and pay particular attention to ethnic minorities, religious. Stability ensures not only representative of the majority, but also respect for the rights of minorities.

I do not want to go deeper in a political aspect in the ordinary sense of the word, but consider the problem of refugees from the perspective of the philosophy of other and philosophy of dialogues. This philosophy focuses on others and its significance for the identity of "I". It is something of an answer for the crisis of values. Reflection from the perspective of the “axiological I” did not bring problem of relationship between man and man in European thought. Only after focusing on the relation values regained its importance. It does not deal with issue of minorities, but showing a second man as another. The minority is equivocal, but the other, which stands in front of me, is concrete. But there is something very important which connects the problem of minorities, refugees and philosophy of other, it is the relationship I-Other. Philosophy of other goes even further and sees otherness in every human.

The philosophy of other is not indirectly involved expressis verbis in refugees and immigrants, but takes up the problem of the other face which has got face of widows,
orphans and foreigners. They symbolize someone who suffers an account of lost his nearest and dearest, and therefore they need to help from me. Widow is somebody who lost husband, his parents, and foreigner his land, his patria. This last can come back to land, but widow and orphan never. These persons are for me stronger, another which makes me think about me and my attitude towards another. Before of the meeting with other I feel myself at the home. When I encounter other I lost conscious myself and I open space for us in discourse.

Jacques Derrida in reference to Levinas and his philosophy based on the concept of another tries to juxtapose with the question of hospitality\footnote{During a guest lecture on the occasion of honorary doctorate at the University of Silesia in Katowice, 11 December 1997, Derrida explains the etymology of the word hospitality which combines the word hostis (enemy) and hospes (guest). The other is recently enemy and guest. Besides term hospitality is interesting the Slavic word “gospodarz” (host) which consists of two elements: “gosti” (a stranger, a guest, a friend) and a “poti”, which is a ruler, it means: guest and host. Hospitality is reciprocal relation between guest and host. The guest is host of host.}. He devotes lectures given at the Ecole Pratique de Haut Rtudes from December 1995 to March 1996 year. Two Jacques Derrida lectures: "Foreigner Question" and "Step of Hospitality/No hospitality" indicate the problem of hospitality. The first of them shows the problem of hospitality from the perspective of the other, the second of them shows the paradox between the idea of hospitality and the idea of pluralism.

Derrida is not representative of the philosophy of another such as philosophy of dialogue, but he shows in his lectures an important issue which is a matter of hospitality, which makes possible the relation between me and another. Reaching for his lectures and publications, we can get the relationship between me as a host and the other who comes to my house. Derrida in this context refers to Plato and Sophocles, but also to Kant and Levinas, especially in lectures titled "Step of Hospitality/No hospitality". He refers to Levinas expressly and his philosophy established on the relationship with another, completely different.
In the "Foreigner Question" Derrida refers to Plato’s “The Apology of Socrates” (17d) but also “Sophist” in which Socrates asks the guest for the answer for the question about who the sophist, politics and philosophy are. The foreigner helps Socrates to give answer about wisdom and truth.

Derrida reflects on the foreigner question, or this question is formulated by the stranger [foreigner] or only concerns the stranger. Both of these options are possible. Derrida used the term étranger which refers to the ancient Greek “xenos”. This term includes English stranger such as foreigner. Derrida asks what means foreigner and concludes: “It is not only man or woman who keeps abroad, on the outside of society, the family, the city. It is not the other, the completely other who is relegated to an absolute outside, savage, barbaric, precultural, and prejuridical, outside and prior to family, the community, the city, the nation, or the State. The relationship to the foreigner is regulated by law, by the becoming-law of justice.”

In "Step of Hospitality/No hospitality" Derrida derives the necessity of dialogue for the issue of hospitality. He shows ethical problem but also a political hospitality. Hospitality is the limit which appears when another, a stranger, a foreigner haunts me.

Derrida claims the hospitality is unconditional, or it is not at all. When we consider who we want to take home, and who does not, we are not hospitable. The hospitality is unconditional and absolute openness for foreigner. Hospitality poses a certain ambiguity, requires from us for preparation, and so that when we meet someone our preparation cast doubt because we don’t have enough words to express it to them. Another has something mysterious, which makes the question our certainty and knowledge that served us to prepare for the hospitality. The meeting of foreigner happens something that challenges our preparation. May we be unprepared? Derrida claims he does not. If we were not prepared, it would be impossible to make a decision. Therefore, it exists opposing threats: not-preparing for a meeting and planned,

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3 J. Derrida. Step of hospitality/no hospitality. in: Of hospitality Anne Defourmantelle invites Jacques Derrida to respond, Stanford 2000, p. 73.
prepared a meeting with a stranger, who my preparation makes neglected. In this sense, Derrida's position coincides to Levinas, who sees that you cannot prepare for the meeting. When we make this, the relationship is completed, it is in the past. Derrida shows the tension between absolute responsibility understood as to someone else, and social responsibility interpreted from the perspective of anyone who comes.

Hospitality is the willingness, openness for another, means to admit the other home, to take them to myself, my own home or country. It is unconditional and is the original openness for another. This original openness is a responsibility that is unconditional and infinite. It is something extremely different than the legal or political conditional. Its ethical openness makes possible them. Without hospitality, it would not be possible to make any decisions about acceptance and rejection. Responsibility understood as giving answers does not apply to scheduled activities, but an event that is for me, it is individual and unique.

Hospitality is the basis, which aims to the legal or political regulation nature which has a finite character, eg. immigration policy. Unconditional hospitality without legislation, norms, rights leads to the various types of aberrations, and the same right of hospitality would remain only an idea, wish, if not legal-political form.

There is still the question of the boundary between me and the others. In the hospitality of the other I admit him at home. This phenomenon changes my mind, I left myself to be for the other. Unlimited and infinite hospitality complements legal and political form that hospitality embodies.

Derrida sees in the hospitality the opportunities of choice, decision-making. Without alternative man could not make a decision and be free.

The right decision appears in the horizon of the two extreme positions: first of them, when another becomes one of us, losing its otherness. Arriving to us he forgets his own language and culture, second, if we do not require him to have learned our language.

The idea of hospitality is a kind of duty, responsibility for the other. Unlimited offering is for another, who may be a stranger, a foreigner or exile. A man who comes
from afar and about who we know nothing, can hurt me but also gives me opportunities to find myself.

Therefore, between the offering for another and danger, which carries a stranger, there is the possibility of a decision. The real decision is a risky, because I can let the enemy to come home but he can ravage my home, my world.

But just because I do not know what he brings with him really or he does not threat me and my house, and I do not know, or I give him to understand that he is not at home, it makes that I need to make a decision to be accommodated. Hospitality is independent of the stranger who haunts my house.

When Derrida considers the problem of hospitality he concentrates on the experience of being at home, Levinas makes a step further, he perceives a substitution. I lost myself to be for the other. In this relation for another nobody can substitute me.

The main problem for the philosophers of the twentieth century is a matter of reciprocity. Luce Irigaray shows reciprocity as an important element of hospitality\(^4\). She points to the coexistence instead of integration and affirmation, which appears by Derrida. Reciprocity appears by Tischner which is symmetrical relation, but by Levinas reflects to asymmetrical relationship. When the decision by Derrida is a choice in the horizon of being at home, Levinas recalls being in the horizon for another. Tischner does not use integration and affirmation but concentrates on solidarity, one for another. The experiences of other in philosophy of other anticipates process of integration and affirmation such as coexistence, because concentrates on opening for otherhood.

The problem of reciprocity appears from the perspective of search for identity. Reciprocity is possible because there is a problem of “I” identity and hospitality, which is implicated and unconditional.

As it was shown the example of Derrida, important issue is the question of the relationship, which is presented in its dialectic, it is a focus on the uncertainty and danger, it is offering, in spite of everything. Derrida's analysis appears in the controversy to Levinas and his philosophy of the other. Adhesive connecting Derrida and Levinas is a responsibility that should be considered first of all as a form of

response. This is a guest in the Sophist answers the question of knowledge and philosophy.

Derrida refers to two sentences from *Totality and Infinity* and *Otherwise than being or beyond essence*\(^5\). As shown Derrida problem is fear that allows us to make a decision. In the case of Derrida and Levinas fear, anxiety accompanies every encounter of man with man. This fear is the fear of ignorance, lack of knowledge of what will happen in the future. Another can destroy my house, my property. Exposing himself to another in the hospitality I risk my house. Another can wreak havoc, but my fear, fear of others may also be fear of threat that never comes. In the hospitality fear causes that I can decide, I can entertain foreign.

The experiences of fear are not only accompanied by the idea of hospitality or fear of another face, which may be a foreigner, homeless and motherless, but also my relation to myself in horizon of God. For example, by St. Augustin von Hippo, the fear concerns experiences of myself in light of face of God. The fear is fear of my life and its sense. The take care of myself discloses recently two kind of feeling: desire and fear.

St. Augustine states that a person who has not merged yet with God must endure the pain, hardship and suffering. It is accompanied by contradictory to each other the sensation of pleasure and displeased. Pleasure, over which a man regrets, is opposed to suffering distress, with which man should enjoy. Therefore, he needs to put up with hardships, but he cannot exalt them. A man can feel the joy that he can endure difficulties, but he prefers not to do it. In these adversities man desires prosperity, and in this prosperity, he feels anxiety that it comes its opposite, that the prosperity and joy flowing from it must once finish. Augustine observes that man is afraid of adversity and the transience of joy. This appears to man’s care of himself. Only in God, man finds his solace\(^6\).

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\(^5\) J. Derrida. *Step of hospitality/ no hospitality. in: Of hospitality* Anne Defourmantelle *invites Jacques Derrida to respond*, Stanford 2000, p. 109. He refers to *Totality et Infinity* and *Otherwise than being or beyond essence*, in which Levinas the subject as a host changes to hostage.

St. Augustin introduces also the term of sin to the philosophy which was developed by Kierkegaard who influences on interpretation of fear.

In modern philosophy, the problem of anxiety and fear takes Soren Kierkegaard. This fear is a result from the feeling of fear for myself against something or someone who was threatening me. Heidegger mentions the fear (dread) that may not hold that “before” what I am anxiety, it has an ontological character, but it is also the fear that one can define better why I am afraid.

Anxiety in Soren Kierkegaard allows freedom. If I cannot experience of fear I would not be free and capable for make decisions. Similarly, Derrida understands the anxiety as a space of freedom. Soren Kierkegaard in “The Concept of Dread” states: “Dread is a qualification of the dreaming spirit, and as such it has its place in psychology. When awake, the difference between myself and my other is posited; sleeping, it is suspended; dreaming, it is a nothing vaguely hinted at. The reality of the spirit constantly shows itself in a form which entices its possibility, but it is away as soon as one grasps after it, and it is a nothing which is able only to alarm. More it cannot do so long as it only shows itself. One almost never sees the concept dread dealt with in psychology, and I must therefore call attention to the fact that it is different from fear and similar concepts which refer to something definite, whereas dread is freedom’s reality as possibility for possibility.” One does not therefore find dread in the beast, precisely for the reason that by nature the beast is not qualified by spirit.

Kierkegaard develops his thesis by claiming “Anxiety is a sympathetic antipathy and an antipathetic sympathy.” Kierkegaard presents in this manner dialectical character of human freedom.

The difference between dread and fear is based on the experience of ignorance. Kierkegaard distinguishes the dread that accompanies ignorance, from fear to good and evil (sin).

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Another philosopher who raises the issue of the threat is Heidegger. He proposes in “Phenomenology of religious life” the problem of the tension between desire and fear (dread). Heidegger puts the problem of anxiety and fear on the basis of time, temporality. Heidegger rejects thinking based on concept of time as a succession of events or their simultaneity and notes that the time is associated with the experience of caring for their own being. It shows that before I know things by means of subject-object relations, I am dealing with an understanding of yourself and your world. Heidegger recalls some story about care [Sorge].

When a care passed over the river, at the bottom it saw clay bottom. it formed it and asked a passing Jupiter for breathing the spirit into its. The care wanted to give name for creature from clay. Jupiter opposes to its and he wants to make his name. When we dispute over the name the earth joined to them, because it was formed from the earth. We could not reach a consensus; therefore, we call Saturn, and ask him for this solution of problems. Saturn said: After the death Jupiter receives spirit, earth body, but during the life it is entrusted for the care. In care, it makes expression of self-understanding of man and his reference to source. This means that taking care of themselves and their reference to the world anticipates consciousness of our recognized world.

Heidegger indicates a care [Sorge] as an important element of philosophy. On it fear and anxiety about their own being is based. This fear is not possible in a relationship with another man, but in relation to himself. Therefore, Heidegger says about settling in, but is not able to reach a dialogical relationship. Early texts Heidegger reveal another, but from the perspective of their own being.

From Buber anxiety appears in the dialogic relationship. It is articulated in the speech. Fear from something moves to relations from someone. Fear by Levinas, similarly by Buber, appears in the horizon of the relationship between myself and others. Levinas approaches to Kierkegaard. The threat appears when we construct a

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10 M. Heidegger, Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens, Frankfurt am Main 1995, pp. 207.
world based on our thinking. Invitation to conversation accompanied by anxiety, but by Levinas changes to I am for another.

Fear by Levinas, as mentioned earlier Heidegger refers on Augustine, appears in a dialectic - understood more differently than commonly. Fear appears in the tension between me and the world. This voltage *timeo* and *tentatio*\(^\text{11}\) appear at the level of interpersonal relations. Anxiety is associated with a feeling of mystery. Another is a mystery for me.

Therefore, it is necessary references to hermeneutics face of another by Levinas. I could not recognize another as object which is in front of me, but I can try to understand them in experiences of face. The mystery makes me that I feel fear of experience face, but the epiphany of face cases that I left myself. Face wakes up, gives to thought. In the accuse of face I lose my innocence. The Innocence appears by Kierkegaard in the original fear. In the meeting fear in innocence turns to fear of him. The fear that I come so late. Fear by Levinas makes possible being for another. This corresponds in a sense to ideas of hospitality by Derrida. Derrida shows the relationship and the fact that the duty of hospitality must express itself in law and politics, for Levinas, any attempt to verbalize of the other leads to a distortion of the relationship of openness on the other.

The fear that accompanies the Derrida's philosophy, was an area of freedom, by Levinas in relationship with others, in the responsibility for it.

At the base of Levinas's thinking is an experience of another, which I cannot comprehend on behalf of abstract concepts, but through the experience of face. Epiphany of face of the other makes my identity questioned. In man, there is a feeling of fear of another man. He threatens me, because it is unpredictable. Experience of fear accompanied by a fascination with mystery. The experience the face we cannot express otherwise than by means of hermeneutics. Mystery of another we can verbalize only when the experience of the other belongs to the past, but still remains a mystery that demands expression. The *express the inexpressible* is the hermeneutics of another, who

says about other and what about someone who is embarrassed in front of others. Fear of yourself through the experience of the other turns into fear in the horizon of responsibility. I cannot answer the ethical call, which sends the other to me. Through dedication the egocentric fear turns into fear, that I do not live up responsibility for the other. This altruistic fear is the dread of him. The fear and dread are therapeutic and they cause that we reject any imagination of another, which comes from our thinking prone to simplification and stereotyping relationships. Vulnerability, feeling that I can do nothing, makes that we experience of annihilation of our ideas. It happens in the experience of face of the other. Metaphysics could not give an analysis of the experience of fear, because the relationship between human beings avoid the subject of further reflection, meanwhile modern thinking has to deal with it. Fear arises on the ontological basis, but also fear in the agathological horizon. Ontology is deaf to another. Its movement is a movement around myself. In the agathological sense fear does not have of something, but only fear for something. Fear and anxiety will not be overcome, but loses itself and objective character of it what in favor of who. Hegel's philosophy could see the problem of freedom as the key, shows the process of liberation on the basis of what the world is, Levinas gives up with freedom for responsibility and justice, which is of somebody and for somebody. In it the initial fear turns into sacrifice for the other.

Modern thought comes often from term of justice to the political context. This term in the case of Emmanuel Levinas has a meaning far deeper and refers to the relationship between God and man (in a religious context) as well as man with man (in the context of ethical). Both of these horizons combines ritual law of Judaism. Justice has its basis in the law of God, from which man and God cannot be repealed. This law obliges and makes that it must be accepted by man as his own, a flowing from his will.

Presenting the problem of experience in Philosophy of drama Tischner indicates examples of which drew from the Old Testament and the philosophy of Levinas. He juxtaposes Abraham with Odysseus. Odysseus returns to place from where he went out and which he knows. In contrary of it, Abraham goes to a place that he has never seen. Abraham hears the voice of God, who tells him to leave the land where he lives and go
on a journey into the unknown. On his way, there are people who are beacon given by
God for him. Therefore, for Levinas "face of another is a trace / vestige of
Transcendence. Take another to say so at the same time come to God. We come to
God, giving witness to others."\(^{12}\). Another is for Abraham a beacon, for Levinas is still a
fact of which I bear witness. To reach God and submit a witness of other it is necessity
for meeting, during which I discover "signpost" and enter into a relationship that starts
submit the witness for others.

"The key word describing the meeting is face. Things have appearances, people
have faces. Things show up by appearances, faces manifest themselves. Faces are
traces of Transcendence. Toward what leads these traces? What dramas opening
before us?"\(^{13}\). Tischner in references to Levinas tries to show what is the traces left by
God in the face of another.

Face of another through nakedness and poverty invites you to violence, but also
to its rejection. Levinas writes in *Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo*:
"I do not know if one can speak of a "phenomenology" of the face, since
phenomenology describes what appears. So, too, I wonder if one can speak of a look
turned toward the face, for the look is knowledge, perception. I think rather that access
to the face is straightaway ethical. You turn yourself toward the Other as toward an
object when you see a nose, eyes, a forehead, a chin, and you can describe them. The
best way of encountering the Other is not even to notice the color of his eyes! When
one observes the color of the eyes one is not in social relationship with the Other. The
relation with the face can surely be dominated by perception, but what is specifically
the face is what cannot be reduced to that. There is first the very uprightness of the

\(^{12}\) “Twarz innego jest śladem Transcendencji. Przyjmować innego, znaczy więc zarazem
dochodzić do Boga. Dochodzić do Boga, dając świadectwo o innych” J. Tischner,

\(^{13}\) “Słowem kluczowym opisującym spotkanie jest twarz. Rzeczy mają wyglądy, ludzie
mają twarze. Rzeczy zjawiają się poprzez poglądy, twarze objawiają się. Twarze są
śladami Transcendencji. Ku czemu prowadzą te ślady? Jakie dramaty otwierają przed
face, its upright exposure, without defense. The skin of the face is that which stays most naked, most destitute. It is the most naked, though with a decent nudity. It is the most destitute also: there is an essential poverty in the face; the proof of this is that one tries to mask this poverty by putting on poses, by taking on a countenance. The face is exposed, menaced, as if inviting us to an act of violence. In the same time, the face is what forbids us to kill." At the first sight in the epiphany of face I have tried to dominate another, I want to take other in possession, such as I can take things, because the face of other invites me to a violence. In this way, otherhood can be taken (absorb) in myself. Other would not be then separated by me but was similar than I. Levinas states that we can have opportunity for two contrast experiences. I am intending to kill my neighbor and recently I can open for another and his otherhood. „the first word of the face is the “thou should not kill”’. It is an order. There is a commandment in the appearance of the face, as if a master spoke to me”15. The other who was stranger changes in foreigner who is getting my master. To be a master means asymmetrical relation between me and other. The other invites me to be for him, to be responsible for him.

Face of other is a gift for us. Philosophy speaks about a face which refers to etymology of the concept of the mask, prosopon16. Tischner notes that the concept of a person appeared in the Greek drama. This is a person expressed by the words prosopon, which means mask. In contrast to today’s understanding it does not obscure the truth, but discovers it. In the ancient theater donning masks served the release of sadness, grief and joy. It was aimed to express the hidden contents. Mask as a person expresses the hidden content. Unlike the Greek drama, modern drama shows reciprocity relations and freedom instead of fate. Man opens for another, but also for the world and time, which is the dramatic time. Tischner claims that man as a person

15 Ibid., p. 89.
reveals/ discovers his face. It may also want to cover his face. However, the man is the one who wants to tell the truth. With the philosophy of the other person is shown in relationship with others.

The face of the other reveals in the prism of nudity and mystery. Nudity and the mystery of the face is not a lie, but honesty. It speaks better than words. Thanks to it, the other invites me to himself. Through face as prostopen is expressed essential content. Between me and the other is distance. Our mutual separation cannot otherwise be overcome as with the help of speech, which the other begins. I don’t learn the other in the same way as the world of things, which represent me, but by epiphany of face that carries inside the nakedness of the face and secrets.

„The absolutely other is the Other. He and I do not form a number. The collectivity in which I say “you” or “we” or not a plural of the “I”. I, you – these are not individuals of a common concept. Neither possession nor the unity of number nor the unity of concepts link me to the Stranger, the Stranger who disturb the being at home with oneself. But Stranger also means the free one. Over him I have no power”. Levinas draws attention to the fact that the existing philosophy centered on man himself, showing him thinking about himself and about the uniform system which bases on totality philosophy. “Totality philosophies concentrate on the whole reality and therefore is blind to the face of another”. Meanwhile, the face ensures that our initial desire to take control of another, to subjugate it under our will leads to totalization. To displace of the other, makes it a part of our system means that another loses absolute separation me from the other. For Levinas, otherness of another cannot be overcome in any way as by adopting its otherness in speech.

Speech is not pronouncing words, but also the trace left by God in the face of another man. He invites me to violence and at the same time shows the secret that makes the original desire to take control of it, turns into being for another. Tischner

17 Ibid., p. 24.
19 J. Tischner, Filozofia dramatu, p. 29.
highlights "the face of another puts us in the crisis point of the world"\textsuperscript{20}. because someone who has got face is other for me. I can speak about him in light of relation between subject and object. The ethical Attitude towards other anticipates consciousness and object of sciences.

In the meeting, I am helpless in the face of the other. The call which comes from the face of the other is absolutely and therefore, I cannot run away from him. It does mean that murders is not possible. Tischner claims "murders exist. They violence to what absolute. Man is able to kill, but is not able to make the murder ceased to be rape"\textsuperscript{21}. Tischner refers to Levinas and explains what \textit{kill} means. A murder is possible, but the murder itself is always violence, is a transgression against another man and his otherness. His face is a trace left by God. Philosophy was concentrated on rational thought. Levinas points that the basis of rational thought is in the relation which appears in the epiphany of face. The face is trail which expresses the origin of man thoughts.

Tischner claims "To be the image of God, does not mean to be an icon of God, but be on his traces"\textsuperscript{22}. To follow God is possible only in encounter of other man, because God left trace in his face.

"Trace is the trace on the face of another. Following the footsteps of the ordinary, we give up one, to be able to find next to the next; but this mark, which is the face of another, we cannot give up. It is in fact a mark on the track - we go for the one

\textsuperscript{20} "Twarz innego stawia nas w krzyżowym punkcie świata". J. Tischner, \textit{Filozofia dramatu}, pp. 32.

\textsuperscript{21} „Zabójstwa istnieją. Są gwałtem zadanyemu temu, co absolutne. Człowiek jest w stanie zabić, ale nie jest w stanie sprawić, że zabójstwo przestało być gwałtem”. J. Tischner, Filozofia dramatu, Paryż 1990, pp. 33.

\textsuperscript{22} Być podobieństwem Boga, nie znaczy być ikoną Boga, lecz znajdować się na Jego śludach", p. Ibid., p. 47.
who was on the footsteps of God”\textsuperscript{23}. And here we come to a recovery track which does not represent God, but is a trace left by him.

The trace/visage of God is in the face of the other. Levinas, but also Tischner refer to Rosenzweig and his main work the \textit{Star of Redemption} [\textit{Stern der Erlösungen}]. For Rosenzweig, human face symbolizes the Star of David, the star, which contains the ultimate meaning of existence. The star consists of two triangles. First of them, forehead and two cheeks or nose and ears are triangular passive. Second, is inverted to the first, two ears and mouth express active in life. By Levinas face is shown from the perspective of passive, silence. In opposite to him, for Tischner face is active and appears essential events which is meeting\textsuperscript{24}.

For Levinas, the face of another expresses the inexpressible. He appears speech, which precedes the conversation based on subject-object relations. The nakedness and mysteries of face appeals to me, myself to invite me for to be for the other.

„The way in which the other presents himself, exceeding the idea of the other in me, we here name face, exceeding the idea of the other in me, we here name face. This mode does not consist in figuring as a theme under my gaze, in spreading itself forth as a set of qualities forming an image. The face of the Other at each moment destroys and overflows the plastic image it leaves me, the idea existing to my own measure and to the measure of its ideatum – the adequate idea.”\textsuperscript{25} The face of the other causes that I open for him. Before I would like to dominate on him but the experience of the other makes possible for anticipation of my consciousness concentrates on myself.

„The epiphany of face qua face opens humanity. The face in its nakedness as face presents to me the destitution of the poor one and the stranger; but this poverty

\textsuperscript{23} „Ślad jest śladem w twarzy innego. Idąc po zwykłych śladowach, porzucamy jeden, by móc się znaleźć obok następnego: ale tego śladu, którym jest twarz innego, porzucić nie możemy. Jest to bowiem ślad na śladzie – idziemy za tym, kto znalazł się na śladach Boga.” Ibid., pp. 47.

\textsuperscript{24} J. Tischner, \textit{Filozofia dramatu}, p. 31.

\textsuperscript{25} E. Levinas, \textit{Totality et Infinite}, translated by A. Lingis, Pittsburgh 1996, p. 50.
and exile which appeal to my powers, address me, do not deliver themselves over to the powers as givens, remain the expression of the face. The poor one, the stranger, presents himself as an equal. His equality within this essential poverty consists in referring to the third party, thus present at the encounter, whom in the midst of his destitution the Other already serves. He comes to join me. But he joins me to himself for service: He commands me as a Master. This command can concern me only inasmuch as I am Master myself; consequently, this command commands me to command.”

We come now to an important passage in which Levinas presents the issue of face, a trace of God in the face of orphans, widows, the foreigners. Man - in today’s experience of face - face of refugees from Aleppo. There’s something that invites you, which gives us the feeling that no one can replace us in our being for another, helping another. In philosophy of the other appears face, which brings in itself fear, anxiety, but also need to take decisions.

In meeting with other who is stranger for me I feel fear and scary. Classical metaphysic doesn’t take up fear of man such as contemporary philosophy (e.g. Kierkegaard) which is involved in fears and anxiety. Experiences of fear appear in philosophy when philosophers began to claim that man transcends oneself and needs something to find his identity. Identity can be analysed in ontological, but also in agathological level. In the ontological sense, there is no motion of other because I concentrate on myself. In the agathological meaning of fears is not “of somebody”, but only “for somebody”. Fear and anxiety are not overcome but they lose objective character “of somebody” and change to “for somebody”. The problem of fear occurs in question about identity in horizon of freedom and responsibility.

Hegel in his “Phenomenology of mind” is striving at presenting of freedom, liberty as important for philosophy27. In contrast to him, Levinas rejects freedom and liberty and turns in responsibility and justice which includes “for somebody” (take care of somebody and for somebody). Fear myself from stranger is getting sacrifice when I

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26 Ibid., p. 213.
come in contact with other. Primary experience which changes my mind is experience of face. In experience of other my fear “of myself” is transformed in fear “for other” in horizon of responsibility. I decline all imagination of other which is result of our totality thoughts and I am ready for other. Feelings of helplessness and defencelessness which accompanies epiphany of face case that my totality thought reduced to myself is getting in obsession for other (I am for other, I fear for other). In seminar paper, I’d like to present fear and its transformation in fear “for” in face of other by Levinas.

In my answer for the other’s question which comes from face of the other I response for him. In fall Levinas, the responsibility bases on ethical question which is formulated by the other. This question appears in the face of the other

“The responsibility for the other cannot have begun in my commitment, in my decision. The unlimited responsibility in which I find myself comes from the hither side of my freedom, from a “prior to every memory, an “ulterior to every accomplishment”, from the non-present par excellence, the non-original, the anarchical, prior to or beyond essence. The responsibility for the other is the locus in which is situated the null-site of subjectivity, where the privilege of the question “where?” no longer holds.”

Responsibility for the other proceeds my freedom. When I meet the other, I left myself and my egocentric point of view to be for the other. Levinas introduces experiences of substitution for responsibility.

Together with the problem of substitution it appears that the fear of others, becoming fear for another. Tischner claims in reference to Levinas: “as long as enough one of person is rejected in the world, nobody has the right to happiness.”

In the experiences of suffering, pain, but also nudity of the other’s face it reveals by Levinas call me to be for another. He asks me in the ethical question for my help for

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28 See J. Tischner, Filozofia dramatu, p. 42.
29 E. Levinas, Otherwise than being or beyond essence, translated by A. Lingis, Pittsburgh 2009, pp. 10.
30 J. Tischner, Filozofia dramatu, p. 35.
him. The answer for the question which springs from another, makes that nobody can excuse me. I must answer for this question by myself. Tischner goes even further, because he emphasis particular on choosing. That it makes me irreplaceable, I find my identity. Tischner based on choosing shows human entangled in evil. Initial innocent adulation, portraying that I am better makes that I come to the conviction that I am underrated by another. The biggest sin for a man is broken the dialogues, our reciprocal ties. Tischner highlights its phenomena in *Philosophy of drama*. Entangled in sin, man loses the sense of owns existence. When he understands that he caused evil, he doesn't see sense of his life. Tischner introduces in his philosophy the concept of damnation, which used the aforementioned Kierkegaard. Tischner recognizes that restoring the original condition of man can make only by God in re-selecting the man.

Chosen by God, man is ready again for being for another. Therefore, Tischner says that the drama of a man is a religious drama.

In its, the crucial role plays the problem of symmetry meeting. Another, also a widow, the orphan, the foreigner is different from me, but I can get with them in dialogue. Neither Levinas and Tischner do not come to the conclusion that the difference between me and others may disappear, but we can through dialogue aka the conversation go beyond themselves and establish a relationship with the other in the ethical relation.

Levinas are not involved in political, but in ethical relation between man and man. Unlike Derrida, and in a sense Tischner, as we have seen earlier, philosophy of the other by Levinas is based on the asymmetric relationship as by Rosenzweig, In opposite to him, Buber and Tischner refer to the relationship which is characterized by attitude between I and you, expressed by the dialogical relationship and appears in the concept of the meeting. This attitude towards the other is based on our understanding of myself and openness for others. The face of another is an invitation to leave your home and to go beyond myself. Because only in a relationship with another man I can find my own identity. It is interesting Tischner’s contribution to the philosophy of the other, who shows that true freedom is the freedom in which another man chooses me to be for him. This freedom is the basis of my responsibility. In Philosophy of the other,
the other is always other, he is different from me, because between me and the other is a gap which can be overcome only by talk with other. The other (another) is still different, which makes me desire to be for someone else. This is accompanied by the fear of myself, of my own home, but also by sacrifice for somebody. Platform of speech makes maintaining our separateness we can be for another, or, -as in the case of Buber and Tischner - be for interlocutor and with him. It seems that Tischner goes even further than Levinas, because for him the other becomes the second (instead of the other), partner.

For Levinas, the other is a stranger, a foreigner. To him my freedom is a challenge. In its own way is a refugee who hides a place which he did not know. Levinas emphasizes the importance of responsibility and reveals its source meaning, but for him there is no insurmountable difference, for Tischner is common for us. In an interesting manner Tischner talks about how evil becomes a viable reality. This is achieved through treachery, which occurs through the excited man in the sense that it is better than others. For Levinas, the other will be a foreigner, orphan, widow. For Tischner will be second, with whom I can have a dialogue. A refugee is for Tischner man without a home. Analysis of its aims to show the suffering and pain of others. Other, a foreigner, can be perhaps first of all, fugitive, emigrant, and the widow and the orphan, victims of war, as well as a foreigner visiting us carries with it some content, their culture, customs, traditions, but also the experience of ethics. His face stimulates me to think, to act, to stand up for him, to help him in his suffering. For this, to see the face, you need openness and thinking for other.

The philosophers of the twentieth-century clamoring for it, the man begins to think. Absorbed in fact the pursuit of money, power and honors he brought thinking to what brings him the advantage, which can be seen in reality. Despite advances in technology man stopped thinking. He forgot to think, because he lost his openness for the world, lost possibility to establish the relationship with another. Meeting another reminds him the need to turn to the other.
Heidegger notes that man gives up with thinking\textsuperscript{31}, although our epoch is considered an era of reason. Philosophy must return to the origin from which it flows. For Heidegger thinking means to be next to them, to be near from thinking. Heidegger does not mention in a relationship with another human being as a main problem although he takes up in context of own being. Another appears as a part of my world. Thinking is always thinking of being. For the philosophy of dialogue, basis is encounter of the other who is calling me.

The philosophy of dialogue stresses the necessarily of openness for the other, but also it articulates that it is impossible to overcome the distance between me and the others. I can only go beyond myself to meet others in the speech. In the dialogical speech, social justice changes in a responsibility for the other. His face marked by suffering calls for help, but recently it restores the man his identity. Beginning of thinking means thinking with others and for others and to be next to him.

Resume

Philosophy of the other shows important issue which is openness for the other, which may be a widow, an orphan or a foreigner. The question is not just a question of another, but the question of another, which makes that I answer for his question. I become “to be for the other”, and it also means finding my identity. In being for another, nobody can replace me. It was only through a relationship with another my freedom is restored to me. This ethical character of the other’s face does not define what to do, but that I have to respond for the call sent by another. The philosophy of the twentieth century have recognized the man in relation to his actions, or have compared it to other beings, philosophy of other points out that we need to focus on the relationship.

Today’s crisis of migration and refugees due to a variety of factors, but the main element is the imbalance of the relationship. Hostility towards strangers arises, on one hands, from the crisis of Christian values such as hospitality and openness, on the other hand the political crisis, as a result of which we see the ineffectiveness of government action in ensuring safety. The first element of it, it means a loss of confidence in the values such as respect for human rights and believe in the good that is displaced by the quick results.
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European construction aroused popular aspirations, which were radically opposed to what is actually happening: aspirations for a continent that would resist antisocial policies while being open to the world, according to a democratic, social, ecological and solidarity-based logic... This was in particular what was hoped for in Eastern Europe, where the populations aspired to live better and more freely. Their hopes were profoundly disappointed, preparing the ground for xenophobic currents... Understanding what were the turns that history took, where things went wrong, understanding the present crisis is essential for the peoples to be able to reappropriate their choices and thus their future. (Catherine Samary)

THE MEANING OF BORDERS

The economic crisis of 2008 raised old fears and questions to be solved. The stability and integrity of the European Union were questioned as the problems seemed to be somewhat similar, but the reasons and the heritage were different among the old, as well as the new member states. This paper is an attempt to point out the roots and differences on the European continent. It tries to explore the problem how the phenomenon ‘Europe’ can be identified, from which angles we can speak about a homogeneous Europe, and where cleavages can be pointed out. If such cleavages exist, can they serve as inner borders of the continent, what can be told about their origin, historical background?

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1 This paper appeared first in: Challenges for the European Union in the Next Decade. A View from the Danube Region, Istvan Tarrosy, Susan Milford (eds.), ID Research Ltd., IDM, Pecs 2013
Starting off our investigation the first and foremost problem we have to focus on is the question of borders. Borders are strongly connected with the possibility to identify a unit, a group of people, settlements, defense zone, possibility of separations from the others. Among others, one group of the most visible borders is political borders. Unavoidably, they can exclude and oppose, dividing the larger from the smaller, the richer from the poorer, the weaker from the stronger. As a practical consequence of their political nature, they often also mark the division line between one currency zone and another, or the limits between different types of electrical sockets. Apart from political borders there exist many types of boundaries that demarcate the outer limits of the place we call ‘home’, or at least of that area where stuff looks, sounds and tastes familiar. They usually are the most visible ones, though. Not just on the border, where the precarious embrace of two sovereign entities has solidified into barriers, buildings and a bureaucracy; also on either side.

The examination of the roles of the borders is a complicated problem. The first question is the way in which we make a definition about the role and the appearance of borders. There are physical aspects, such as the process of designation of borders, the changing of borders, or even their disappearance. The second problem is the examination of the spatial changes of borders, the definition of the question what kind of decision could affect how they actually change, what kind of conflicts could arise after the new positions of borders. Changes can be a consequence of a historical development (Gorzelak, Jałowiecki, 2002); borders can be created naturally or violently (Bialasiewicz, 1999, Paasi, 2002). They can be created by the state (from above), from outside (as a consequence of the winning of the war), from inside (according to national demands). Borders can be distinguished according their character—natural or created. According to Éger and Bialasiewicz (Éger, 2001, Bialasiewicz, 2002), borders can be created in several ways: they can be natural or artificial, or even symbolic3 (Bialasiewicz, 1999).

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3 This latter issue is characteristic in those cases when there is no way to describe the political borders of a given state. Partly because the national demands and the political decisions are far from each other, or because the previously existed state became divided among other empires, as in the case of Poland in the 19th century.
Edited by the author

Apart from the political, cultural, physical or geographical borders of Europe it is also important to define the so-called inner\(^4\) borders of the continent. As this definition is not clear, there is a great number of scientists who try to delineate borders of different parts of Europe in different ways, especially if they want to describe such problematic issues as Central, Eastern or East-Central Europe.\(^5\)

Border as a phenomenon got its importance with the birth of the nation states in the 19\(^{th}\) century and kept it through several ages. After the First World War, with the collapse and the disappearance of the great empires in Central and Eastern Europe, state borders strengthened their separating role. (Hardi – Hajdú – Mezei, 2009)

Connecting the problems of borders with the identification of Europe it is obvious that ‘Europe’ can be identified as a concept as well as a continent, and the borders of both oscillate wildly. (Jacobs, 2012)

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\(^4\) Or it can be called invisible.

\(^5\) If we take a look at the Hungarian attempts we have to mention Gábor Gyani (Gyani, 1988, 1999), or Jenő Szűcs (Szűcs, 1981) who distinguished two different parts of the Eastern part of Europe during the age of Socialism. This was a unique experiment as they argued that it was an inner cleavage in the so-called homogeneous Socialist bloc breaching with the theory of the homogeneous Socialist world. In the last decade of the Socialist era the transition, with the change of the regime the idea of Central Europe became more and more accepted. Several works got published, the idea of the redefinition of Europe, the Central European borders, their meaning became the theme of several dissertations, articles in the region.
According to Jacobs’s interpretation, in the Middle Ages, ‘Europe’ became virtually synonymous with Christendom.

A relatively recent and generally unaccepted theory sees Europe spanning half the globe, from Iceland to the Bering Strait, nearly touching Alaska. During the cold war, however, the opposite tendency triumphed more often: all of the Soviet Union, including Vilnius, Riga and other cities that today lie within the European Union, were excluded from Europe entirely. At times even the Soviet satellite states in the Warsaw Pact were left out, as well, so much had “Europe” come to be synonymous with “the West” and its associated political values.6

Analyzing Europe’s historical models we can distinguish some characteristic aspects. Among others the so-called diversity can be mentioned; the difference in the process of development of the different regions. As a consequence, from there can be distinguished minor inner structures separated by geographical, historical, economic and cultural cleavages, or the results of different ways of development and the interactions among the zones. Secondly, the role of expansion, or the connection between an expanding Europe and other cultures of the world, the global connections. Thirdly, the diversification, the political sphere. Instead of a homogeneous political, cultural and economic integration nation states appear to entail potential political conflicts. Finally, the possibility of the interruption of historical problems and wounds, the weakness of the chance of the integration. (Kosáry, 1997)

Although attempts to create federative structures existed, such as the ideas of Jászi to reorganise the Habsburg Monarchy in accordance with the federal way – but his

6 http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/09/where-is-europe/
theory was not supported by the surrounding nations. Instead of integration they wanted to create their own nation states. (Erdősi – Gál – Hajdú, 2002)

The examination of the roles of borders was very popular among the geographers in the West, even during the age of Socialism; however, it was almost neglected in the Socialist sphere of Europe. There are several reasons for this lack of interest. Among others, there was no reason to deal with borders because it was against of the attempts of the creation of a partly homogeneous Socialist sphere of interest. As most of the policies were controlled either by the state parties themselves, or directly by Moscow, there was little chance to care about cross-border cooperations, even if there had appeared such attempts between Socialist states.

During the age of cold war it was well known and agreed upon where the borders of the divided Europe were to be found, and which borders were the most important ones (Bialasiewicz, 2009). The borders that divided Europe also divided the world. They made geopolitical division between East and West. The Iron Curtain both divided Europe, and because the division was exported to other parts of the world, also worked as a global border. The revolutions of 1989 brought, among other things, a profound reordering of the spatial imaginary of Europe. The collapse of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet bloc rendered necessary new geographical stories, new spatial representation to capture and codify the cartographic chaos of the exEastern European space (Bialasiewicz, 2003). Although the cold war was over the border did not disappear at once. It was inevitable that the European borders between West and East became strengthened and while in the Western part of Europe a kind of integration was recognisable with the declining role of the borders, in the Eastern part of the continent the isolation of the borders became even more determining.\(^7\)

\(^7\) That caused several problems in the case of the so-called national, or artificial borders of some states from the Socialist group. The intensity of cross-border relations declined, as all initiatives had to become either from the capitals, or at least the capitals had to support such attempts. For instance, this practice hindered the intensive cross-border relations between the Hungary and the Hungarian ethnic minority around the Hungarian state borders. (Gulyás, 2005)

Typically, for the group of former Socialist countries a specific cleavage arose between the two parts of Europe. In the Western part of the continent borders
began to lose their importance, and states going into the direction to struggle over the creation of federative structures—the then existing federative Socialist states, such as Czechoslovakia or Yugoslavia launched their processes of dissolution. The situation did not change significantly after the transition either. As Western European states were going ahead of the loss of their borders following the idea of unification, the collapse of old federative states in the post-Socialist world recalled old fears and repressed nationalism with a new, overdue process of nation-making. (Hardi – Hajdú – Mezei, 2009) That duality can be recognised in the perception of the EU membership within the “old members” and the “new” member states. The process and the experience of European integration are present together with the reflex of the nation states that can influence the perceptions concerning the notion of borders.

**THE DIVISION OF EUROPE AS A HISTORICAL FACT**

As the whole Central and Eastern European (CEE) region belonged to the sphere of interest of the Soviet Union, it was hardly possible to discuss about any kind of cultural, ethnic, or even religious cleavages, or just differences within the group of the Socialist countries. However, especially from the second half of 1980’s new discussions began about the structure of Europe. Following Huntington’s theory or the consequences of the discussion between Halecki and Bidlo from the 1930’s about the borders of East and West, it was accepted that the historical division of Europe into Central and Eastern was dated from 1054 as a consequence of the great schism. According to this division, the Baltic states, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia and Croatia remained the Western part of CEE region, while the territory of Russia, Belorus, the Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania, FYROM and parts of Bosnia created the Eastern. (Huntington, 1996, Gorzelak, 2002) The theories composed either in the interwar period or in the Western democracies gradually became shared among postSocialist scientists, too.
It is also accepted that Central Europe composed a frontier belt between West and East, it remained the border of the West, a special kind of transitional zone. It is a special transitional and civilisational zone. A part of periphery or semi-periphery without the Mediterranean and the Scandinavian space. If we take a look at the following maps, we can see the cleavages from the West and from the East. It was commonly accepted that the transition zone lies between the so-called Iron Curtain and the cleavage of Eastern Christianity.

Source: Gorzelak, Grzegorz, 2010 The regional patterns of the post-socialist transformation in Central and Eastern Europe (RSA conference, Pécs)

The first map shows the line between Latin Christianity and Orthodoxia, while the second map represents the line of the Iron Curtain. As the first map is in Polish there are some cities with Polish names, like Rome=Rzym, Munich=Monachium, London=Londyn, etc.

England, the Netherlands, or even the feudal France belonged to the more developed parts, and as for the neighbouring territories, the German and Italian regions were divided, some parts belonging to the core area and some parts to the
semi-peripheries. The famous Polish geographer, Grzegorz Gorzelak in his theory calls the frontier belt as “Golden Curtain”, the symbolic line that divides the rich West from the poor East. With the enlargement of the EU it is still an issue, as it will be seen later.

Examining the consequences of this division it is also important to explore the reasons of these dynamic changes. The European continent of the 18th century can be characterized as a triple-divided construction (Wallerstein, 1983):

1. A more developed epicentre—a central core or plateau, the developed countries with the appearance of capitalism, the free market, global division of labour, including the existence of independent political units (in this case, states) at the same time. There is no political centre, compared to global empires.

2. A periphery—a synonym for the dependent developing countries. The main reason for the position of the developed countries is economic power.

3. A semi-periphery—states that are located between the core and the periphery. They catch influence from the core area, but there are characteristic features that make them similar to the periphery, too.

It can be said that this division survived for centuries. This historic heritage remained in Europe as a dual structure. The difference can be caught in the following issues: nation state versus global governance, representation of the local or global interests, federalism or strong nation state. The questions of the role of religion and the national language are also remarkable.

If we look at the difference between East and West, semi-periphery can be calculated to the East, too.
There is a difference in the question of the role of the state. The revival of nation states after transition was very often accompanied by strong centralisation efforts, which resulted in the total absence or a weakness of the decentralised institutional system and autonomies of the regions. The judgement of 1989, or the transition process itself differs according to the judges. It can be described as the ‘annus mirabilis’ when a great political and economic transformation appeared without violence (Kornai, 2005). On the other hand, there is a perception that as the change was so rapid and covered all spheres it can be called revolution. According to rather sceptical Jürgen Habermas, it can be described rather as a “repairing revolution” instead of a regenerative revolution.\(^\text{10}\)

There is another phenomenon frequently used to characterize this region. As the assistance of the state, or the government is determinative the initiatives usually come from above. The word is “refolution”, which is a compositon of two words: reform and revolution blended together (also created by Ash (Ash, 1990, Frentzel-Zagórska, 1993). It referred at first to the role of the participants of the transition. Ash states that the initiators of the reforms were rather the Communists in late Socialism and the ideas of the “inhabitants”, the newly organised or reorganised civil society was not so determining. As it is visible, the state, the “upper level” got an enormously great role inherited from previous centuries.\(^\text{11}\)

\(^\text{10}\) Nachholende Revolution. Referring to the fact that the reason of these revolutions was the going back to the democratic legal state and the norms of the developed capitalist Western European region. According to Habermas’s theory, bureaucratic Socialism could not be identified as an alternative version of organised Capitalism. It is rather a backward formation of Capitalism. This is why the revolutions of 1989 can be called as “repairing revolutions”. This definition implies that this type of revolution does not have any importance or lesson for the developed Western world.

\(^\text{11}\) It also has got a Hungarian version: “Reforradalom” that is also the composition of the two words into one. There is another description, the so-called “velvet revolution” which also refers to the fact that the events took place mostly without violence. As Ash remarks, the symbol of the new type of revolution is the “round table” instead of the guillotine that represents the possibility of agreement instead of terrorism.
THE SCENARIOS OF TRANSITION

The economic and political transition of the 1990’s across the CEE region was simultaneous with the faster expansion of globalisation in Europe. (Gál – Rácz, 2008) The change of the regimes brought to life several scenarios in connection with economic transition. New models were created, new types of identification emerged. At the millennium more optimistic views became widespread according to the success or failure of the transition. The model created by Iván Szelényi 12 distinguished three different types of transition models from which two “belong to” the post-Socialist European states. He estimated the outer-directed capitalism as the better scenario from the two European models with the limited possibility of transition crisis and a realitvely short time frame. However, the crisis that reached Europe in late 2008 pointed out that the deeper a country is involved with foreign capital and foreign direct investment, the greater vulnerability it has to experience.

At the time of the economic transition in the CEE countries in late 1980’s and the early 1990’s economic development policies were facing extraordinarily big challenges due to the following circumstances:


1. The transition to market economy was accompanied by the urgent demand of adaptation to a completely different environment of world economy.
2. There was an inappropriate development trend of economy based on depressing structure of obsolete industry and stagnating service sector.
3. There was a significant deficiency in domestic capital funds with high foreign debts. (Gál – Rácz, 2008)
## Types of transition

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<td>Growing portion of TNCs, many small investors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political system</td>
<td>Multi-party democratic system</td>
<td>Multiparty system with authoritarianism</td>
<td>Mono-party system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition crises</td>
<td>Deep, relatively short period (4-5 years)</td>
<td>Shallow at the beginning, but long lasted (10 years &lt;)</td>
<td>No crises</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Iván Szélényi edited by the author

The transition, however, had another face. The major part of the new economy was necessarily built on foreign investment-based or restructured economic organisations. The expansion of multinational firms yielding their profits from their absolute price advantages (cheap products) in the first period of transition served as a basis for this new economy. The new economic development model was primarily centred around the product export-orientated processing industry, and its system of relations and cooperation (both in market and development aspects) were determined by international networks.
### Characteristics of CEE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Transformation of the Horthy</th>
<th>Transformation of Germany</th>
<th>The great historical transformation in Europe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>CEE</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>West</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Soviet Union restoration</td>
<td>after Mao</td>
<td>transformation from the Middle Ages to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>socialism into Chile</td>
<td>after</td>
<td>modernity, from pre-capitalism to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>capitalism restoration</td>
<td>WW2</td>
<td>to capitalism</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Yes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In the main direction of the development of the political system?</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Yes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parallel in all spheres?</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Without violence?</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Without foreign military occupation?</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fast?</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No (very long)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>


**HISTORICAL BORDERS AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION**

The change of the regime also raised the question concerning the future of the nation state versus European integration. This issue, we argue, is strongly connected with the problem of identification. As a result of the transition, the post-Socialist world experienced the rebirth of nation states on the map of Europe, on one side, and the collapse of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, on the other. The question of national autonomy and the dissolution of the old states in accordance with the appearance of the process of democratisation of the given
societies raised even more new questions. New, or entombed problems occurred again, such as dangerous nationalism and xenophobia that led to new conflicts again. If we accept the normative regulation of the nation state that includes its inhabitants, territory and the problem of the legitimacy of sovereignty we have to discuss the problem of becoming an independent nation state or to belong to any other supranational bodies.

The EU membership can be characterized as a final proof that the transformation is over, however, it brought about some problems that need proper solutions. There is an East–West dimension, which could be embraced in the discussion about EU membership, or scepticism about the EU. As Scruton says, the EU tries to demolish the territorial legal authorities such as national faith, all the elements that mean the basis of European legitimacy since the era of Enlightenment. (Scruton, 2005)

Among others the following issues have to be mentioned: the problem of “Western overshadowing” which can be detected in the process of economic decision-making, like the question of “delocalisation”, or the problem of immigration and competition for cheap labour, “social dumping” or the problem that the East is conceived almost solely through the inflow of EU funds.

13http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/industrialrelations/dictionary/definitions/SOCIALDUMPING.htm

In 2004 ten new member states joined the European Union. Eight of them belonged to the group of former Socialist countries, five of them (Slovenia, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) were relatively young states, the parts of dissolved states. Three years later two other states joined the European Union, so altogether more than one-third of the EU member states had previously “belonged” to the Socialist bloc with almost 40 years of Socialist heritage. With their EU membership a lot of new problems raised and a number of debates began to focus on the ‘multi-speed’ Europe. As it became obvious, according to different calculations, the EU membership and the incoming support caused rather diversification than convergence. (Gorzelak, 2010) Different sets of data prove that there is no clear influence on regional growth and regional differentiation in the new member states.
Figure 2. GDP per capita in EUROs in 2005

THE CRISIS AND THE REACTION

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 opened a new historical chapter for Eastern Europe. But it also marked a turning point at the heart of neo-liberal globalisation and European construction. The economic crisis in the early 2000’s brought to the surface a lot of questions originated in the process of ambiguous transformation. The scenarios for the transformation were different, however, the tasks that had to be solved were almost the same. As Samary argues the problems concerning the success or failure of economic transition already began in the late 1980’s.

1. The Hungarian Communist leaders were the only ones to decide to respond to the crisis of external debt by selling the country’s best enterprises to foreign capital — which initially made it possible to attenuate an internal austerity policy, and made Hungary, in the first years of the following decade of “transition”, the principal host country for foreign direct investment. Nor did they hesitate, following on the
new European relations established by Gorbachev, to help bring down the Wall, for a price.

2. In Poland after the repression of Solidarnosc under the regime of the Polish general Jaruzelski, compromise agreements made possible the introduction of liberal shock therapy in the country, backed up by the cancellation of Polish debt decided on by the United States at the beginning of the 1990’s: no expense was spared to win over the new elites “who were in power to privatizations ... and to NATO.” (Samary, 2012)

EU membership—apart from giving the final ‘proof’ of the member states that they belong to Europe—did not solve a lot of already existing problems. However, it was expected to become even wider. From the late 1980’s with the entry of Spain and Portugal in 1986 by the mid 2000’s it grew from 1 to 4.9. With the arrival of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007, it increased to 20.1.

But as Samary sees whereas enlargement towards the countries of Southern Europe and Ireland was accompanied by an increase in the “structural funds” of the European budget, it was the opposite which was decided in the EU’s “Agenda 2000”. Germany had only given up the deutschmark by obtaining severe budgetary rules; and it did not want to “pay out” for the integration of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

Summarizing the debates on the inner borders of Europe we have to focus on the depth of the integration in several aspects. The heritage of the previous centuries is well known, such as the role of the FDI (foreign direct investment), as well as foreign human capital, or the foreign experience combined with the local initiatives. According to the statistical data collected by Eurostat or the World Bank, the fear of growing inequalities is still alive. The ever-existing periphery or semi-periphery cannot disappear at once. Summarizing our statement it can be said that instead of the Iron Curtain there is a visible ‘Wage Curtain’ emerging.
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Zoltán Gál

Hungarian Academy of Sciences

The regional engagement of mid-range universities in Central and Eastern Europe

Introduction

Modern universities are viewed as the core of the knowledge base, acting as key elements of innovation systems, supporting science and innovation-based regional growth (Huggins & Kitagawa 2009). The so-called regional engagement of universities has been developed through an evolutionary process during the last 50 years. Traditionally, universities primarily focused on teaching and, to some extent, research, while university education was elite education. In many European countries, due to the gradual expansion of the higher education sector, the appearance of mass education and lifelong learning, and the declining share of grants provided by the state in the 1970’s and 1980’s, competition between the universities has become stronger, and they have been forced to perform their research activities on a profit-oriented basis. Universities have had to seek alternative sources of funding from business, industry, civil society and non-national state actors (Harloe & Perry, 2004). Also, public funding became increasingly competitive funding, and research activities often require public-private partnership. This is called the “entrepreneurial turn”, or the servicing mission of universities (Tjedvoll, 1997; Inman & Schuetze, 2010).

Later, in addition to teaching and research universities started to adapt a third mission or developmental role, which can be described as “community service”

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1 This paper appeared first in: Challenges for the European Union in the Next Decade. A View from the Danube Region, Istvan Tarrosy, Susan Milford (eds.), ID Research Ltd., IDM, Pecs 2013
mainly by the US literature, and “regional engagement” in Europe (Holland, 2001), “regional innovation organisation” or “academic entrepreneurialism” (OECD, 1999).

The university engagement literature, while accepting that universities may well undertake knowledge-generative activities, proposes that they adopt a broader, developmental focus on adapting their core functions of teaching and research, as well as community service, to address regional needs (OECD 1999; Chatterton & Goddard 2000). With regard to human capital formation, the university engagement literature focuses on the importance of regionally-focused teaching (Chatterton & Goddard, 2000), which is manifested in a stronger focus on regional student recruitment and graduate retention; the development of programmes that address skills required by regional industries, particularly, small and medium-sized enterprises; and the localisation of learning processes, for example, through workplace-based learning and regional projects.

This third (developmental and engagement) mission is a somewhat indefinite concept, which refers to the economic development role motivated by the social responsibility of the institutions. According to Harloe and Perry (2004), the third role of universities in relation to sub-national (EU regions) economies and societies has been widely justified in terms of the development of the knowledge economy and the significance of the regions in economic development. This “regionalization of the economy” strengthens the links between the universities and the clusters of firms and regionally-based supply chains of small and medium-sized firms (Gunasekara, 2004). Knowledge and innovation have become increasingly important sources of economic development, and there is a pressure from government, businesses and communities for universities to align their core functions with regional needs (Chatterton & Goddard, 2000).

Huggins and Kitagawa (2009) argue that although universities emphasize their international orientation, they are embedded in their region and add to the area’s economic and social strength through e.g. preserving local jobs, diversifying the local economy and attracting inward investors. Among many others, these authors state that economic development and the welfare of regions can be enhanced through universities’ various engagement with the local economy, including
research, infrastructure development, education, effective industry–university partnerships, technological innovation and community development.

This paper tries to adapt the models of universities’ regional engagement in the case of a peripheral border region in Central and Eastern Europe, the South Transdanubia Region in Hungary. Although the study applies the concept of mid-range university to Central and Eastern Europe, the term of mid-ranged universities was borrowed from the study by Wright et al. (2009), which is focused on mid-range universities and their links with industry in British, Belgian, German and Swedish regions.

In the UK, for example, mid-range universities are defined as all universities excepting top universities and new (post-1992) universities. For example, the sample of Wright et al. (2008) included universities teaching between 8 thousand and 33 thousand students and employing between 700 and 2,500 full-time researchers.

However, in the UK and other European countries there are many first-ranked universities located in non-metropolitan regions, which is not the case in Central and Eastern Europe. As the consequence of a spatial concentration of top universities in Central and Eastern European countries almost exclusively in metropolitan areas, mid-range universities are most often located in non-metropolitan regions (Gál and Ptáček, 2011).

The article examines to what extent regional, mid-range universities may enhance economic development in a lagging area and to what extent European models of the universities’ third role may be relevant in this particular region. The hypothesis is that universities’ developmental role is much weaker in peripheral regions where mostly mid-range universities are present, and the traditional models designed for first-ranked universities located in prosperous economic environment are not directly applicable due to e.g. the different sectoral structure of the economy and the different nature of the knowledge supply and demand (Gál and Zsibók, 2011).

The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we briefly summarize the results of the literature concerning the economic impact of the universities and the methods of the quantitative measurement. Then, the paper presents the relevant theoretical considerations about the developmental role of universities including the
traditional theories, the triple helix model and its variants and the regional engagement literature. The following section focuses on the specificities of the midrange, peripheral universities, which have similar characteristics to those of South Transdanubia. After it, case studies are presented from the region, which may reveal the position of the universities in the system of regional and cross-border development.

Finally, some concluding considerations are included in the last section.

**University engagement and the developmental role of universities in the regions**

The literature on the “engaged university” (OECD 1999; Holland 2001; Chatterton & Goddard 2000) also focuses on the third role of universities in regional development, but it differs from the triple helix model in its emphasis on the responses of universities that adopted a stronger regional focus in their teaching and research missions. The evolution of the engaged universities ran parallelly with the regionalization of the economy, or “the rise of the regions” which means that the salience of the regional scale increases and the regulatory capacity of the nation-state declines (Arbo & Benneworth, 2007). Essentially, universities’ regional engagement means meeting the various needs of the modern client population, such as flexible structures for lifelong learning created by changing skill demands, more locally based education as public maintenance support for students declines, greater links between research and teaching, and more engagement with the end users of research (Chatterton & Goddard, 2000). Also, regional institutions including universities have gained more and more importance in the governance of the regional economy; therefore, universities as important parts of the regional networks have become more embedded in their regional environment.

The engaged university approach encompasses a range of mechanisms by which universities engage with their regions. The literature on the responsive university places less emphasis on academic entrepreneurialism, compared with the triple helix model, and more on community service. Here, community service means that the university is a community-based institution serving the needs of the society in a local
area or region (Chatterton & Goddard, 2000). Unlike in the US, European higher education institutions are highly dependent on state support. However, from the point of view of their regions, they function as autonomous institutions and have control over the nature of teaching and research, since they are under national regulations and raise the majority of their funding from national sources. Therefore, regional engagement is not inherent to these institutions. There is an external pressure from government, businesses and communities for universities to align their core functions with regional needs. Universities also need to diversify sources of funding due to the rising relative costs of education, the intensifying competition for students and research contracts in conjunction with fiscal and demographic pressures, in order to maintain their academic standing and in some cases, to even survive. Taking a specific approach, OECD (1999) as well as Srinivas and Viljamaa (2008) analysed the process and motives of becoming an engaged university in the context of institutional change and institutional interactions.

University engagement can incorporate several activities. Together with the shift of the higher education sector from elite education to mass education and the prevalence of lifelong learning, there is a requirement from universities to educate graduates in compliance with the needs of the regional labour market. This means that universities provide an interface between graduates and the labour market in their region. According to Chatterton and Goddard (2000), engaged universities provide flexible structures for lifelong learning created by changing skill demands; and more locally-based education as public maintenance support for student declines.

In the field of research, universities’ engagement means greater links between research and teaching; and more engagement with the end users of research, e.g. in the form of regional research networks and joint research with participants from the academia and the industry (Chatterton & Goddard, 2000). Since university researches are conducted mainly in international academic networks, universities are able to channel the international knowledge accumulated to regional users. A considerable part of the literature, e.g. Varga (2009) build on the notion that knowledge generation becomes localized and agglomeration effects are crucial for the spillover effects to work. Evidence proves (see e.g. Drucker & Goldstein, 2007)
the importance of proximity in supporting university–industry joint research efforts and other collaborations.

Universities engage with their regions not only in the fields of education and research, but also in regional institutions and governance systems. This is the consequence of the previously mentioned phenomenon that the regionalization of the state activity has been on the increase in Europe, and administrative and political decisions are increasingly made at the regional level (Chatterton & Goddard 2000). For this reason, institutional capacities have to be built and extended at the sub-national level and sub-national policy networks have to be created. As important regional actors, universities are part of these governance networks (see Arbo & Benneworth, 2007).

In addition, the community service of the universities often takes the form of developing the social and cultural infrastructure of the region in accordance with the specific needs of university students and academics.

Arbo and Benneworth (2007) review the numerous aspects through which higher education institutions are embedded in their regions. These are primarily non-economic aspects including regional policy, national and regional innovation systems, human capital development and governance systems. They concentrate on the numerous interfaces through which the university and its region may be linked.

The impact of local universities is not restricted to the technical sphere, but may spread into wider social and economic effects on their region. Commitment to social and organizational innovation is gaining more and more importance as main barriers emerge from the social sides even if universities and regions try to introduce adopted technologies. Social and organizational innovation means in wider context the generation and implementation of new ideas and creativity in order to overcome the social barriers of innovation and it requires ongoing social interactions (Mumord – Moertl, 2003). Innovators face many social and managerial barriers, which inhibit innovations. Among others, the inadequate funding, risk avoidance, incorrect measures and forecasts, lack of partnerships and deficiencies in collaboration are the most important social and managerial constraints. Social innovations facilitate the formation of new institutions, networks and building up social capital through collective learning processes (Kitagawa, 2004).
**Mid-range universities in peripheral regions**

Many of the empirical studies on universities’ regional developmental role and economic impact derive their findings from investigating large, world-class research universities located in highly-developed economic environment. Nevertheless, Wright et al. (2008) argue that those findings are not necessarily relevant for all the universities, especially for mid-range universities. The main features of the midrange, regional universities are that they are located in secondary cities where the regional demand for innovation is moderate, the density of contacts are much lower and possible spillover effects emerge more sparsely; they may not possess a base of world-class research; academics work in a smaller local scientific community in which they interact with the industry; and the creation of spin-off companies is different in its nature (Wright et al., 2008).

According to Gál and Ptáček (2011), the model of university engagement can be adopted by those mid-range universities in the less developed East European regions, which do not have the critical mass to engage in world-class scientific research, but instead these universities can focus on other than high-technology innovation. For the less developed, reindustrializing Central and Eastern European regions with substantial human capital resources, benefiting from the relocation of European industry but not yet fully developed knowledge creation and transfer capacities, this special situation forces mid-range universities to take on new roles in contrast with other countries/regions where university–state–industry–citizen relations have perhaps had longer time frames to evolve. This new role means a stronger regional engagement in medium-tech innovations and in social and organizational innovation.

In their paper, Huggins and Johnston (2009) compared the economic impact of universities of different types, and they found that there are significant differences in the wealth generated by universities according to regional location and the type of institution. According to their results, universities in more competitive regions are generally more productive than those located in less competitive regions, and more traditional universities are generally more productive than newer ones in the UK.
Furthermore, the overall economic and innovation performance of regions in the UK is generally inversely related to their dependence on the universities located within their boundaries. This means that weaker regions tend to be more dependent on their universities for income and innovation, but often these universities underperform in comparison with similar institutions in more competitive regions. Although knowledge commercialization activity might be a source of productivity advantage for universities, markets for knowledge in less competitive regions appear to be weak on the demand side. Huggins and Johnston (2009) emphasize that the regional environment may also influence the actions of institutions, since a relatively strong knowledge-generating university in a relatively weak region may have a greater propensity to engage with firms in other regions. In weak regions the private economy’s strength may be insufficient and small and medium-sized enterprises may be unable to exploit the benefits of the engagement with the universities. In the long run this may result in a leakage of knowledge from the home region, which further deepens the disparities in regional competitiveness.

Benneworth and Hospers (2007) focus on how peripheral regions—which are functionally distant from core economic activities—can reposition themselves in the knowledge economy. They argue that such regions are internally fragmented, which reduces their capacity to attract and embed external investment to reduce this distance, and upgrade their status among other regions within a technical division of labour. In regions with sub-optimal innovation systems, it is very hard to lay down the foundations of a sustainable local economic growth. According to Benneworth and Hospers (2007), a governance failure is in the root of this problem, namely the networking deficiencies. They list a range of internal and external barriers that lessfavoured regions face when building local networks, which exploit the knowledge spillovers of external investments. Internal barriers include a lack of local institutional capacity, a lack of critical mass or substantive outcome, the lack of entrepreneurial resources, and a mismatch between the science base and the knowledge users. External barriers to building and integrating local networks are the unfavourable economic specialization (to low-tech industries), externally imposed barriers to local governance integration, antipathy by external firm owners to local innovation, and poor external image discouraging potential investors.
University engagement in Central and Eastern Europe. Limits of economic impact of universities in Central and Eastern Europe

There is a substantial spatial concentration of top universities almost exclusively in metropolitan areas in the Central and Eastern European countries. Mid-range universities are most often located in non-metropolitan regions or to put it in another way, most of the universities outside the capital cities can be classified as mid-range, where the R&D potential and the “density of contacts” are much lower and possible spillover effects emerge more sparsely. For this very reason, mid-range universities represent the keystones of regional innovation systems and are often crucial parts of regional innovation strategies (Gál & Ptáček, 2011). During the transition in the 1990’s universities were mostly facing the pressure of the state to increase their educational role. The system of universities’ financing in this decade did not motivate them to search for new contacts and collaboration with industry and it was much easier to survive through the rising numbers of students.

The gradual “marketization” of the higher education sector started after 2000 as a result of several factors. In general, it was the recognition of knowledge as a source of economic growth. In the process of the marketization, universities started to use standard tools borrowed from Western Europe, but the result could not be the same because of different history and position of universities in the regional or national innovation systems. EU accession and the possibility to use EU development funds (such as cohesion funds) for building knowledge infrastructure induced an active approach from the side of universities. The establishment of the supporting innovation infrastructure (scientific parks, scientific incubators) was further developed at the universities thanks to the role of intermediaries (mostly technology transfer offices or R&D services) which focused, on the one hand, on the building of ties with industry and, on the other hand, on gaining EU funds for infrastructure building. In that period, the trend of incoming foreign direct investments shifted from the lowpaid routine labour towards investments requiring a skilled and university educated labour force. In this sense multinational companies have a pioneering role in the knowledge spillover from universities to industry (Ptáček, 2009). The regional impact of these processes is leading to the ongoing polarisation of the R&D potential between metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas; that is, R&D resources and
research capacities are more and more unequally distributed among the regions (Ptáček, 2009; Gál 2005). This resulted in that mid-range universities remain the keystones of regional innovation infrastructure outside of the metropolitan regions; furthermore, their role even increases. Sectoral research institutes set up in the socialist era and sponsored by the industry and relevant ministries were mostly closed down after the regime change, and so their role was taken over by local universities.

In sum, the role of mid-range universities in CEE countries is weaker than in more developed countries of the EU and the process of adaptation to new social and economic conditions started substantially later than in Western Europe. At the same time mid-range universities located mostly outside of the metropolitan areas have to face similar problems and disadvantages as in their western counterparts such as less intensive university-industry contacts, weak local R&D networks etc. (see Table 1 and Gál & Ptáček, 2011).

Table 1. Main indicators of mid-range universities in Western Europe and their CEE counterparts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>University of Pécs</th>
<th>UP Olovíčko</th>
<th>Other institutes</th>
<th>University of Karlsruhe</th>
<th>University of Gent</th>
<th>University of Antwerp</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N students</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td>33,000</td>
<td>15,686</td>
<td>21,160</td>
<td>8,029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N FTE researchers</td>
<td>1051</td>
<td>1158</td>
<td>2500</td>
<td>1401</td>
<td>846</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N FTE technology transfer</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HERD Mill. Eur</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N spin-offs</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total RSBO</td>
<td>n.a</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional GDP (Bn Eur)</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>103.8</td>
<td>316.9</td>
<td>157.3</td>
<td>157.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRP per capita (Eur)</td>
<td>6,900</td>
<td>9,600</td>
<td>24,145</td>
<td>29,694</td>
<td>26,194</td>
<td>26,194</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: by the author and Wright et al. 2008
It is often argued that universities are able to generate economic effects based on knowledge spillovers and innovation transfers to businesses (Etzkowitz et al. 2000). The differences between the advanced regions of metropolitan agglomerations and the most backward regions are emphasised in the relationship between universities and their regions (Ács et al. 2000). This means that in most of the non-metropolitan Central and Eastern European regions, where the regional innovation systems and the university–industry linkages are still weak, the role of universities in local development has to be revised and, consequently, the economic impact of universities cannot be unambiguously extended to transition economies. For example, a Hungarian study concluded that the knowledge-producing ability of the academic sector did not increase the knowledge exploitation ability of the local business sector and, moreover, both universities and the less developed local economy may be responsible for several hindering factors of intraregional knowledge transfer between universities and industries (Gál & Csonka, 2007). Similarly, Bajmóczy and Lukovics (2009) showed that university researches for local economic development may mean an outstanding instrument in case of advanced regions but not necessarily for the less developed regions where the lack of appropriate industrial base is one of the main constraints. They measured the contribution of Hungarian universities to regional economic and innovation performance between 1998 and 2004. The results showed that the presence of universities does not affect the growth rate of per capita gross value added and gross tax base per taxpayer. Therefore, general economic effects of universities and related R&D investments are hardly visible in transition economies such as many Central and Eastern European regions.

Our case study area, South Transdanubia, is a less developed reindustrializing region with lower knowledge absorption capacity and with an underdeveloped research and technology development sector relative to the national average (Figure 1). Basic conditions for change in the technology sphere are rather unfavourable. Its regional GERD was 23 M euros in 2007, which is only 2.5 per cent of Hungary’s total. The region has one of the poorest R&D capacities in Hungary (in 2007 with only 4.1 per cent of the Hungarian R&D employees). The region has large public RTD
infrastructure mainly based on the two universities\textsuperscript{2} absorbing more than four fifths of regional GERD, therefore the HEI\textsuperscript{3} sector plays dominant role in R&D performance (Table 1). Unlike the public RTD sector, the visibility and the performance of the business sector is very low, even in comparison with the national average. The RTD creation of the business sector in Southern Transdanubia is limited (3.4 M € BERD in 2004). Universities are the major employers of RTD personnel. The orientation of the knowledge creation activity of the region is based to a great extent on the profile of its universities, which have the strongest potential in life science (biotech) research and they also have a good reputation with measurable RTD outputs in laser physics, environmental and animal cytology research.\textsuperscript{4} However, the strongest barrier in South Transdanubia is the clear mismatch between the knowledge-production specialisation of the universities and the economic structure of the region.

\textit{Figure 1. Key indicators on Southern Transdanubia’s knowledge-based development in comparison to the national average, in percentage*}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure1}
\caption{Key indicators on Southern Transdanubia’s knowledge-based development in comparison to the national average, in percentage*}
\end{figure}

\textit{Source: calculated by the author based on EUROSTAT and KSH (Hungarian Statistical Office) data}

\textsuperscript{2} University of Pécs (est. 1367) and University of Kaposvár (est. 2000).
\textsuperscript{3} Higher Education Institution
\textsuperscript{4} The relative strength of biotech research base is demonstrated by its large share of total input-output indicators and also by the increase of RTD spending in this field (64.8 M in 2004). In addition, the 11 university spin-offs in the biotech sector are tightly connected to the Medical School (MS) which has 48 employees and produces a turnover of €3 million (2004).
*BERD = Business expenditure on Research and Development,
GERD = Gross expenditure on Research and Development
HERD = Higher Education expenditure on Research and Development
GOVERD = Government expenditure on Research and Development
Note: The following years were used for BERD, GERD, HERD,
GOVERD 1999, 2003; R&D personnel 1999, 2004; HR
1997, 2004; Patents 199s, 2003 and Lifelong learning 1999,
2004.

The main findings of this section are based on an empirical survey, which listed 92
time-series indicators covering 20 different EU regions, including South Transdanubia
commissioned by ERAWATCH S.A. in Brussels (Gál & Csonka, 2007). This research
was focused on the constraints of knowledge transfers in the case of mid-range
universities in the less developed transition regions with traditional, non-research
universities. The survey on South Transdanubia identified the main reasons for the
poorer performance in RTD transfers. On the one hand, there is a mismatch between
the economic and research specialisations, which is combined with the low share of
the business sector in RTD investment, the high share of the traditional lower tech
sectors, the small size of local SMEs and the consequent lack of resources to invest
into RTD and absorb its results. On the other hand, there is a lack of demand for
research results from larger (mainly foreign-owned) companies and, to some extent,
the necessary knowledge supply in the region for certain sectors and in certain
disciplines is also lacking (Gál & Csonka 2007).5 It should be also accepted that these
regions are specialised in activities that are not highly research intensive, therefore,
increased R&D expenditures cannot be easily exploited by local businesses or utilized
by HEIs. In these situations, setting up a new research base that is not linked to the
needs of the regional economy could be like building “cathedrals in the desert”, as
they are unlikely to be able to develop knowledge transfer and spillovers with local
economic actors, particularly for high-tech industries (Dory, 2008; Gál, 2010).

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5 A few large enterprises in high-tech electronics have been engaged in high-tech
activities, but their influence on the local RTD sector is considered to be marginal,
**Engaged universities – the Hungarian case**

Universities can act as regional actors, developing stronger partnerships between universities and the regional development agencies, emphasising the key role of higher education in regional development. The policy approaches and activities in CEE regions almost exclusively concentrated only on the first two missions of the universities and the notion of regional engagement did not constitute the part of the university strategies up until very recently. Two compelling endogenous and exogenous factors have contributed to the recognition of the importance of stronger regional engagement of the universities these days. Firstly, the accumulated knowledge and the experience of the staff at the higher education institutions provide expertise in various fields, and this can be a very effective way of accelerating progress of collaboration through the exploitation of economic and social interactions transmitted by spin-offs and other university-based consultants within the newly formed regional networks (Schmidt, 2012). Secondly, exogenous pressures are extorted by new market demand and policy goals, which envisage a real regional and social prosperity that integrates knowledge, social and human development. This exogenous factor facilitates connectivity among different institutions including universities and other stakeholders and will provide not only better funding opportunities, but also a collective learning platform for social interactions (Leydesdorff & Etzkovitz, 2001).

In the following sub-sections we present two case studies the author himself participated in, from South Transdanubia, which show the new types of developmental roles and community engagement that local universities can take in a peripheral, border region in order to revitalize the economy of a lagging, de-industrialized area. The first one presents an example of an urban development project based on campus (property) development in conjunction with the European Capital of Culture 2010 Project of Pécs, and a city development strategy of the health and environmental sectors; the second one provides insights into the building of a common cross-border knowledge region in the framework of universities’ as they usually rely on the in-house RTD activities of their parent companies importing the technology from outside the region.
partnership. It is characteristic of both case studies that the strategies are strongly reliant on the contribution of the local academic sector.

**University engagement in the South Transdanubian region: the European capital of culture 2010 project and the so-called “growth pole” development programmes.**

In the case study presented in this section we focus on the biggest city of the South Transdanubia Region and its university. The city of Pécs has adopted two strategies in strong collaboration with the University of Pécs to mobilise endogenous resources and enhance its competitiveness (the University of Pécs is the first university in Hungary that was founded in 1367). Higher education has been a strong driver of economic restructuring; in fact, it was probably the university which saved the city of Pécs from the depression experienced by other Central and Eastern European industrial regions after the change of the political regime—even if it could not fully prevent the disadvantageous processes (Lux, 2010). In the 1990’s and the 2000’s, Pécs, the city with 2,000 years of history dated back to the Roman and medieval times, has lost most of its economic potential which was built on coal and uranium mining and several industrial plants. Due to its peripheral situation and the adverse effects of the war in the former Yugoslavia, foreign direct investments are insufficient in the region and there is a lack of local economic strength. In an economic environment characterized by a decreasing industrial sector, the city’s cultural, educational and market services give a chance for the economy to rise again. Cultural issues first appeared markedly in local development policy in the 1995 city development strategy, which envisaged a growth path built on knowledge-based economy, services and innovation, where innovative tourism and “cultural industry” get priority (Ibid). After the integration of several local universities and a number of smaller higher education facilities in 2000, the University of Pécs has become one of the largest employers in the city and even the region. Although R&D outputs in engineering and natural sciences and the university–industry links are limited, the presence of students and employees has had a multiplier effect on the economy of Pécs, mainly in the field of rented flats, consumer products and services and culture.
Of course, the university has contributed to the urban ambience and real estate site development of Pécs, as well (Ibid). One of the strategies is a comprehensive initiative, which aims to reconfigure the economy of the city to utilize the heritage and cultural basis in the framework of a singular large project of the European Capital of Culture 2010 to generate growth. The European Capital of Culture 2010 project tried to capitalize on the idea of culture-led urban regeneration and helped Pécs to reinvent itself through culture. The University of Pécs played a major role in organizing the European Cultural Capital project, which became the largest ever exercise of community service of the local university, being heavily involved not only in the cultural events, but also in the development of the new cultural, community and educational functions of the city’s newly built cultural quarter (Ibid). The project is the Zsolnay Cultural Quarter: built on the site of the eponymous ceramics factory, which was originally established as a mixture between production facility, artist’s colony and living environment for the owner and his family, it intends to endow a disused area with new cultural, community and educational functions serving as the new training site for the university’s Faculty of Music and Visual Arts, and partly for the Faculty of Humanities. Benneworth et al. (2010) describes the universities’ urban development role and the major factors conditioning the success of co-operation for both the city and the university in detail.

The strong university engagement in the city’s development was also reflected by the development pole programme called “Pécs—Pole of Quality of Life” which has three pillars: health industry, environmental industry and cultural industry. The main features of this programme are introduced by—among others—Lux (2010) as follows:

1. Similar to the European Capital of Culture 2010 project, the “growth pole” programme strongly involved the contribution of the University of Pécs during the

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6 The development pole-based type of development appeared in France and its main characteristic is that the central motivator of the development process is the university. The overall aim of the pole programme is to promote the formation of internationally-competitive clusters; specialization on high value-added,
planning period as well as in the governance and the implementation, especially within the health industry pillar and the environmental industry pillar. (Figure 2)

2. “Health industry” covers health services relying on the university’s Faculty of Medicine and its clinics, which have achieved outstanding results in treating movement-related disorders. Several industrial functions are connected to these services including the manufacturing of medical and prosthetic equipment; and other services in the field of human recreation.

3. The “Cultural industry” pillar of the programme is expected to benefit from the European Capital of Culture 2010 programme, and this returns to the idea of promoting the urban culture of Pécs as a complex, innovative product.

4. The “Environmental industry” pillar is both narrower and wider than the “quality of life” concept: it might be helpful in fostering a cleaner, more attractive environment, but the actual elements of the development project have a prioritized focus on alternative energy sources.

5. **Figure 2. The system of cluster initiatives and projects in Pécs**

![Diagram of Pécs Pole of Quality of Life and Pécs ECoC 2010 initiatives](image)

*Note: Lux (2010) p. 115*

innovative activities; strong cooperation primarily between businesses and additionally between universities and local governments; to strengthen the regions through the increasing competitiveness and better business environment of the pole cities. The expected results (for the period between 2007 and 2013) include that the businesses – through clustering and the cooperation with the academic and university sector – reach the critical size which is necessary for being
competitive in Europe and pole cities emerge as centres which are able to strengthen and sustain competitiveness for both themselves and their surrounding regions on an international scale.

**Conclusions**

This paper has applied the regional and community engagement literature to midrange universities of Central and Eastern Europe and explored the peculiarities and specificities of these mid-range universities facing a number of extra constraints in the less developed CEE regions. After summing up the ways in which universities may contribute to the economic development of their regions and presenting the measurement methodologies and the theoretical considerations, the paper focused on the problem of adapting the literature on peripheral regions with mid-range universities. From the presented theories, the literature on the universities’ regional engagement is the most relevant in the context of our investigation. There are several facilitating and hindering factors concerning the process of becoming a regionally engaged university, and our main lesson is that the whole regional innovation system should be developed in an integrated manner in order to reach this goal.

The mentioned constraints impede peripheral, mid-range universities to build linkages to the local economy and develop internationally recognized areas of research excellence, with the associated critical mass, and exploit the advantages of global knowledge networks. The research found that not only the position of universities in the collaboration with business sector but their role in the innovation system is quite different, which is mainly due to the different development path of innovation systems and development trajectories in post-communist countries described in the paper. Because of historical path-dependence, mid-range universities, unlike top universities, are very often located in non-metropolitan regions in CEE countries where the RTD potential and “density of contacts” are much lower and possible spillovers emerge more sparsely than in capital city regions.
We argued that in these regions, setting up new university-based research directions that are not linked to the needs of the regional economy are unlikely to be able to develop knowledge transfer and spillovers with local economic actors. In peripheral situation the lack of research capacity in science and engineering RTD can be also a serious obstacle to the modernisation of the industrial structure. Universities are looking for contacts out of the regions and their contribution to the regional innovation infrastructure cannot fulfil the possible expectations. Rather, these universities need to take careful strategic decisions to build up those areas and the related intermediaries where they have the scope to make an international impact but also to differentiate investment in those areas where they can make a regional contribution.

Economic policy practices suggest that the support of university researches for stimulating local economic development may be an outstanding instrument in case of advanced regions but not necessarily for the less developed CEE regions where the lack of appropriate industrial base is one of the main constraints. It can be also argued that business-led networks connecting different actors have much higher importance in economically-advanced regions while in the less advanced ones universities and public agencies play more significant role in network building and in catalysing activities of the key actors. If universities are embedded in a region it has a clear impact upon the intensity and nature of the relationships and, hence, their ability to effect tacit and codified knowledge transfers. Regionally-focused teaching and research are manifest in a stronger focus on regional student recruitment and graduate retention (in order to combat brain drains in R&D), the innovation-oriented regional development programmes addressing skills required by regional industries and the localisation of learning processes.

The paper also argued that mid-range universities in the reindustrializing CEE regions have to take on new roles, which means a stronger regional engagement also in medium-tech innovations and in social and organizational innovations.

Universities have to be practically relevant in the development and evaluation of regional policy that fosters 'new combinations' of partnership-based, innovation-centred approaches, which maximise the development of human capacities such as skills and mobility, and the formation of social capital through networking, collective
learning and building up trust. In the less developed CEE regions there is a need for much more comprehensive and complex economic policies initiating not only the support of the university sector but also the starting of developing high-tech industries, small-scale enterprises and constructing regional advantage with the stronger developmental role and community involvement of universities. This contributes towards the third mission of universities through meeting learning needs of the region. This might be achieved by exchanging knowledge between higher education and the business community or through outreach to local communities to combat social exclusion and to improve cultural understanding.
References


(Non) Existence of Bulgarian Party-Based Euroscepticism – Why Should We Care?¹

Abstract

Euroscepticism is often linked to the disappointment with the outcomes of transition as well as overgrown expectations that accompanied the accession to the European Union. The main aim of the paper is to investigate if and how party-based Euroscepticism has been active in Bulgaria, a post-communist country in CEE and a member of the European Union since 2007. The paper will present the rhetoric and characteristics of main Eurosceptic political parties in Bulgaria. Bulgarian public opinion used to be perceived as one of the most pro-European among the member states, but current events show that the European issue is not so salient for the Bulgarian society and political elite. The difficult social and political situation marginalises discussions about the functioning of the EU and the future of Europe. Not only the absence of Euroscepticism, but also the lack of any European issues in party manifestos is puzzling. This paper aims to answer the question if Bulgarian politicians are so pro-European or rather if Europe doesn’t really matter to the elites.

Keywords: Euroscepticism, Bulgaria, political parties, European integration

Many scholars have already noticed that Euroscepticism has developed in Eastern Europe after the “big bang” EU enlargement of 2004, and it is often linked to the disappointment that some felt with the outcomes of transition as well as overgrown

¹ This paper appeared first in Politeja Journal of the Faculty of International and Political Studies of the Jagiellonian University in Kraków, Number 33 (1/2015) - Dylematy i kontrowersje wokół integracji europejskiej
expectations that accompanied the accession to the European Union. The main aim of the paper is to investigate if and how party-based Euroscepticism has been active in Bulgaria, a post-communist country in CEE and a member of the European Union since 2007. The paper will present the rhetoric and characteristics of main political parties in Bulgaria, as well as the evolution of the Eurosceptic arguments, and it will search for the anti-European postulates that are included in the programmes and political practice of the main Bulgarian political parties. Although Bulgarian public opinion used to be perceived as one of the most pro-European among the member states, current events show that the European issue is not so important for the Bulgarian society, and similar to other new member states, Bulgarian political parties seem to treat European elections as second order elections or even just as a test before the national ones. A difficult social and political situation marginalizes discussions about the functioning of the EU and the future of Europe. Not only the absence of Euroscepticism, but also the lack of any European issues in the party manifestos is puzzling. This paper aims to answer the question if Bulgarian politicians are so pro-European or rather if Europe doesn’t really matter to the elites.

Introduction

One of the outcomes of the 2014 European Parliament elections in all the member states is the relatively good performance of parties critical towards the European Union and European integration in general. This phenomenon is visible not only in the Old Member States, but also in the countries that joined EU during so called “big bang” enlargement of 2004 and 2007, as well as in the newest member state – Croatia, which became the 28th member of the EU only on 1 July 2013. will argue that various factors (political, social, economic and cultural) are responsible for the development of Euroscepticism in the new member states of CEE. Some of these factors could be compared to ones found in the pre-enlargement EU-15, hence some of the determinants of Euroscepticism might be present only in the countries of post-communist Europe. Still, Bulgaria seems to be the only EU country without a clearly
defined Eurosceptic political party – European elections of 2007, 2009 and the last ones of 2014 were treated as a “litmus test” of the popularity of the current government, but haven’t pointed to Eurosceptic political actors. Being treated as a domestic issue for the opposition in the EP campaign, the elections served as a measure of the possibility of winning the next parliamentary elections.

When discussing the election results, one should pay attention to the turnout rate. Low turnout during the European Parliament election is a general pattern, shared among almost all of the EU member states. It’s not different in the case of new member states – Bulgaria among them. In 2014, the turnout was only 35.84%, which was similar to other post-communist countries and lower than the already low EU average of 42.54%. Similarly, in 2007 and 2009 the turnout was under the EU average – 29.22% and 38.99% respectively.

Lack of interest in the European issues might be an outcome of the domestic political situation. For over a year now Bulgaria has been hit by serious and long lasting anti-government street protests that are linked to the dismissal of Boyko Borissov’s government and the creation of a new one, which due to its policies has generated new protests and been dismissed just after 14 months, and new elections have been scheduled for October 2014. Since 2009, Borissov’s party GERB has ruled with support from three other parliamentary groups (including the nationalist party Ataka). The GERB government was in power till February 2013, when it submitted its resignation as a result of massive street protests. Early elections resulted in the formation of a new government by the Bulgarian Socialist Party and the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, supported by the Ataka party and led by Prime Minister Plamen Oresharski. Soon after new protests started, mainly in the capital city – Sofia, they continued for several months and were considered the biggest and longest in Bulgaria's recent

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history. On August 2014, Oresharski’s government was officially dissolved and the President appointed a new government that is supposed to lead Bulgaria through early elections in October 2014. Protesters demanded more transparent politics, fighting corruption effectively, applying rule of law and adherence to European law, as well as social reforms and raising the standard of living. European flags were used by the protesters next to Bulgarian ones.

Nowadays only 26% of Bulgarians trust the government and as few as 32% feel that the seven years of EU membership have brought positive change, while 51% do not believe that it has resulted in any significant change. With the political and economic situation becoming more exacerbated, one may assume that Bulgarians will attend European Parliament elections either to express their attitudes – their dissatisfaction with membership in the European Union, or to support the EU as the only possible stimulator of the domestic changes. Those opposing the EU and Bulgarian membership might voice concerns about the profits of membership, as the European Commission is regularly cutting or freezing funds and accusing Bulgarian government of ineffective reforms and corruption. European Union supporters are stressing the fact that European institutions are guarantors of the rule of law and that EU membership is the last possible stimulator of indispensable reforms. With these two oppositional stances, one might have anticipated an expressive campaign focused on European issues, but this did not happen. As it will be presented in the next paragraphs, not only was Eurosceptic rhetoric not very visible, but European matters in general were nearly invisible.

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Explaining Euroscepticism

Euroscepticism is a social and political phenomenon that was first noticed and which gained popularity in the United Kingdom, and it is generally associated with opposition towards European integration, rejecting the so-called European values and criticising European Union and its institutions in general. However, Euroscepticism cannot be treated as a single ideology. One can find Euroscepticism in different forms, from nationalistic claims that European integration is a great danger to the nation state and national identity, to socialists who see a decrease in solidarity and in the risk-regulation system of the EU. As Vasilopoulou claims, Euroscepticism should be understood as a multidimensional phenomenon, as it can be directed at the system as a whole, to its institutional design, specific policies (for example, enlargement, the euro), or the perceived general direction of the EU regulatory system, with the assessment of the latter being largely subjective.

As the term is vague and used both in academic and public discourse, researchers still are debating the best possible definition of the term. Taggart proposed to understand Euroscepticism as the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration. Measuring the level and roots of Euroscepticism brought many different classifications of stances toward European integration and the European Union.

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7 N. Styczyńska, ‘Euroscepticism in New Member States – The Case of Poland’, Contemporary European Studies, Special Issue (2009), p. 139.
10 Many scholars aimed to explain and classify Euroscepticism, typologies were proposed by Szczerbiak and Taggart in 2002, 2003, 2008, Zuba in 2006, Kopecki and
and Mudde allows one to distinguish between those who constructively criticise the European Union, but do not negate the idea of European integration (Eurosceptics), from those who reject the very idea of the EU and demand withdrawal from the Union (Eurorejects). The Eurosceptic and Eurorealist rhetoric is often blurred, especially in public discourse. This is mainly due to oversimplified media coverage, but is also caused by a shift in rhetoric among particular individuals in the post-accession era from a Eurosceptic (EU-rejecting) position to a more realistic position – questioning particular areas of integration. Flood proposed a six-point continuum that includes rejectionists, revisionists, minimalists, gradualists, reformists and maximalists. This definition, although very complex, was not incorporated into the public discourse, probably because of its detail. Other definitions include that of Conti, that introduced the differentiation between hard Euroscepticism, soft Euroscepticism, no commitment, functional Europeanism and identity Europeanism. Some scholars proposed a more concise way of categorizing attitudes towards European integration, such as Vasilopoulou, who mentions 3 categories of rejecting, conditional and compromising attitudes, or Sorensen, who focused on public-based Euroscepticism, identifying economic, sovereignty, democratic and socio-political types of Euroscepticism.

To better understand Euroscepticism, it must be analysed within the context of nation states. In the case of post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, anti-European attitudes may be caused by disappointment with the economic and political transition, or might be linked to overgrown expectations that accompanied the

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accession to the European Union. Countries or the social groups which managed to make it through the transformation period successfully provided stronger support to European integration and the EU, than those who were faced with greater difficulties or still are in the process of transformation.\textsuperscript{19} Zuba classified a few of the main fears concerning European integration, some of which were stronger in the post-Communist countries than in the old member states of the EU. However, universal fears can be found in both Western and Eastern Europe and usually focus on the issues of political sovereignty, culture and identity, which according to those opposing European integration, are threatened by the EU and the process of further and deeper integration. Central Eastern European fears referred to the anticipated cut-throat competition with the “old” member states mainly in the agriculture sector – this kind of threat was mostly seen in Poland, Slovenia and Latvia. The problem of weak and unadapted agriculture was combined with a fear of the repurchase of land by foreigners, a fear visible among almost all new member states, including Bulgaria.\textsuperscript{20}

Some anti-EU arguments are the common ground for Euroscepticism and populism, as these two trends often appear together on the political arena. In both discourses, clear and extreme slogans are the key to bringing together all those disappointed by economic or political transformation, giving a clear picture of who is to blame. Populists using Eurosceptic rhetoric often argue that European integration is an elite project in which ordinary citizens have no say.\textsuperscript{21}

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., pp. 113-114.
In search of Bulgarian party-based Euroscepticim

In researching the rhetoric of the Bulgarian political parties, one may find arguments against EU accession that are concerned with economic issues (all economic and financial implications of integration) as well as political and cultural ones. The latter ones are related to issues of sovereignty as well as cultural, religious and national identity. Had they appeared, Eurosceptic arguments of Bulgarian political parties would include economic and identity issues. Identity-based Euroscepticism is linked to the integration dilemma that involves a contradiction between national identity and European identity and includes a fear of being “absorbed” by a supranational institution, therefore losing national sovereignty. This is visible not only in Bulgaria but also in many other countries of the region (e.g., Poland). Other and more politically driven arguments include immigration issues and joining the Schengen Area. The possibility of European institutions intervening in the domestic issues is also an important matter for the EU adversaries. Euroscepticism in Bulgaria (similarly to other post-communist countries, such as Poland or Hungary) is the domain of populist parties, especially the populist radical right, which perceives the EU as a threat to the national economy. It uses nationalistic and xenophobic arguments, claiming that the main “enemies” of Bulgaria are the Turkish and Roma minorities as well as European institutions that treat Bulgaria as a “second category member state”. This amalgam of Eurosceptic and xenophobic attitudes may affect not only the domestic, but also European politics and international relations in the region. Still it is important to notice that Eurosceptic rhetoric and anti-European attitudes are marginal and do not constitute an important part of the political discourse.

The turning point for the Bulgarian political system was the return of the former Tsar Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha to the country in spring 2001, and the quickly launched political movement called Movement Simeon the Second (NDSV), which

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gained an almost absolute majority in the Parliament. After elections in June 2001\textsuperscript{23} Simeon’s movement reshaped itself to be a party and in June 2007 changed its name to The National Movement for Stability and Progress. After gaining more than 42% of votes in the Parliament elections, Simeon II formulated a government in coalition with the Turkish minority party: Movement of Rights and Freedoms (DPS) and became the first royal in Europe to regain power in-line with democratic procedures. Interestingly, until Simeon II’s comeback on the political scene, the Bulgarian party system followed a classical bi-polar model, with a post-communist left (Bulgarian Socialist Party – BSP) and an anti-communist centre-right (The Union of Democratic Forces – SDS, then after 1998 Alliance of Democratic Forces – ODS). For the first time after 2001, the structure of the political competition changed, opposing both traditional parties (BSP and SDS) to the newcomer NDSV\textsuperscript{24}. Many scholars and publicists investigated the phenomenon of NDSV’s rapid popularity, and they stressed the charisma of Tsar Simeon II and his European background and equated that support that he was given with overall disappointment with the political elite among Bulgarian society\textsuperscript{25}. After 2001 a “populist wave” was rapidly cresting\textsuperscript{26} – in 2005, shortly before the general elections Nacjonalen Sojuz ATAKA party was created by Volen Siderov. Shortly after its creation, the party gained 21 seats out of 240 in the National Assembly. Ataka developed a radical right political discourse not only against the establishment but also against minorities, utilizing nationalistic rhetoric on the defence of national interests that included criticism towards the European Union and the accession negotiations.\textsuperscript{27} The party mobilized its supporters while taking to the streets and organizing public meetings, manifestations

\textsuperscript{26} D. Smilov, ‘Bulgaria’.
\textsuperscript{27} B. Cholova, ‘Populism in Bulgaria...’, p. 16.
and protests all around Bulgaria. Ataka entered the European Parliament in 2007, gaining 3 seats and together with other European populist parties, such as Austrian Freedom Party and French National Front, they formed the Tradition and Sovereignty (ITS) group in the European Parliament. Up till 2009, Ataka was an outsider on the Bulgarian political scene, criticized both by other parties and media for its radical xenophobic attitudes. In 2008 Siderov declared *I want a new monolithic Bulgaria, I want an end to the theft, I want a new policy on incomes and a revision of all the privatization deals and I want a stop to the construction of mosques, even in areas where Muslims live.* Ataka declares the major enemies of the Bulgarian nation and state to be the Roma and Turks who are accused of causing the present bad economic situation of Bulgaria; moreover, Ataka labels the DPF party as an anti-systemic ethnic party, and calls for its prohibition.

The political program called “20 Principles of the Ataka Political Party” includes the anti-NATO declaration in point 13: *Leaving NATO. Abstention from taking part in military unions. Total neutrality. No foreign military bases on Bulgarian territory and ends with a demand: Let’s bring Bulgaria back for the Bulgarians!* Siderov called for removing the Turkish-language news broadcasts from Bulgarian state television, which originally was a result of Bulgaria’s ratification of European human rights conventions.

Ataka won 2 seats in 2009 European Parliament elections and joined the Non-Attached group of the EP. In 2009 elections to the national Parliament Ataka gained 9,5% of votes (21 seats) and decided to support the government established by Boyko Borissov and his party GERB. In the 2013 earlier elections to the Parliament Ataka managed to collect 7,3% of votes, that means that more than 250 000 Bulgarians supported their nationalistic and xenophobic rhetoric. In 2013, the National Front for Bulgaria’s

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Salvation which splintered from Ataka in 2011, took part in the elections and gained 3.7 percent of votes. As Tucker\textsuperscript{31} argues, this proves that radical nationalist vote actually increased from 9.4% in 2009 to 11% in 2013 (if we count votes for Ataka and National Front for Bulgaria’s Salvation together).

The party called Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB) was launched by Boyko Borissov, the mayor of Sofia and former Secretary General of the Ministry of Interior in 2006. He gained popularity while being a mayor of the capital, Sofia, declaring efforts to fight organized crime. Thanks to Borissov’s charisma and populist anti-elite and anti-mafia rhetoric in 2007, the party scored well (21% of votes) in the European and local elections and finally won the 2009 general elections, gaining 116 seats out of 240 and allowing it to form its own government, although without a majority in the Parliament (but supported by nationalist Ataka). GERB also won the 2009 elections to the European Parliament gaining 5 seats (more than 24 percent of votes) and joined the European People’s Party in the EP. As Cholova stressed, Borissov as mayor of Sofia developed a classical populist rhetoric, criticizing the governing parties for the lack of efficiency and bad management; he called the other parties “they” and emphasized that his priorities are not words but “deeds”\textsuperscript{32}. DeDominicis et al state that Borissov’s charisma stems partly from the perception that he, as a former police official, knows and understands the world of official corruption and has both the will and the skill to fight it\textsuperscript{33}. Nowadays GERB is not so radical in its rhetoric and declares being a moderate and pro-European party, which has as its main aim the fight against corruption and the improvement of the standard of life of the average Bulgarian. Nonetheless, some xenophobic attitudes can be easily found in the speeches of GERB’s politicians. While visiting the USA, Borissov referred to a huge number of Bulgarian immigrants and stated that Bulgaria was left with bad “human material” consisting of “one million Roma, 700 000 Turks, 2.5 million retirees”. Although GERB declares to be a center-right conservative party, and at the same time pro-European, it

is constantly adapting some of the Ataka’s postulates, taking over some part of Ataka’s protest votes as well. The EU is not discussed often, however, it is mentioned in the foreign policy section of the party programme, arguing that Bulgaria’s foreign relations must be expanded to include not only the EU but also other states.\(^{34}\)

As stated above, since the 2014 EP elections the main Eurosceptic political party in Bulgaria was Attack (Ataka), having 3 and 2 MEPs in the 2007 and 2009 elections respectively. During the 2014 European Parliament election campaign the Ataka party did not dedicate much space in its electoral programme to Europe, indicating that the issue is of low salience. The programme of the party – called the *20 Principles of the Ataka Political Party* refers to the EU when raising issues concerning economic solutions. According to the party manifesto every Bulgarian investor, entrepreneur, and/or manufacturer shall have precedence over any foreign one, up until Bulgaria’s living standards reach the average European level. Bulgaria’s production, commerce, banks and all other means of production should be in Bulgarian hands.\(^{35}\) The party claims the need of introducing the minimum labour pay by law with hourly wages corresponding to the average European ones and calls for reconsideration of the closed chapters in the accession negotiations with the EU; renegotiation of all unfavourable clauses, damaging Bulgaria’s interest. This includes the cancellation of any agreements, accords or memoranda implying or demanding the decommissioning of the Kozlodui Nuclear Power Plant.\(^{36}\) This indicates that although the party is a fervent supporter of national sovereignty, it indirectly accepts the existence of the EU, yet calls for renegotiation of the accession treaty and seeks to reinforce foreign relations with other states. It does not wish for Bulgaria’s withdrawal from the EU. It is important to mention that while backing the ruling parties, Ataka managed to push a ban on land sale to foreign citizens, despite EU regulations in this respect, and supported the decision to construct

\(^{36}\) Ibid.
a border fence to keep Syrians and other immigrants in Turkey.\(^{37}\)

When examining the party manifestos during the 2014 European Parliament election campaign, one may be surprised how little (or nothing) they propose on the European issues. As Anthony Georgieff points out, none of Bulgarian parties standing in the European Union elections in 2014 – except the Ataka party, which claimed to oppose “Euro-perversion”, meaning same-sex partnership rights – had any stand on any of the major issues Europe was faced with.\(^{38}\)

With low turnout, GERB gathered 30,4% of the votes, compared to 18,9% for the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP). The Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS) gained 17,27%, which was considered a big success, especially since the party is experiencing heavy critique from the right wing political scene. The Coalition Reformist Block (RB) consisting of 5 small parties, gained one seat (6,45% of votes). The biggest looser of the 2014 elections was doubtlessly Ataka. Apart from good results in 2007 and 2009, Ataka gained only 2,96 % in 2014 EP elections.

Still, there is one more political coalition that appeared just before the elections and managed to win 2 of the 17 seats assigned for Bulgaria in the EP (gaining 10,66% of votes). The coalition is composed of small parties and movements: Bulgaria Without Censorship, Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation-Bulgarian National Movement, Agrarian People’s Union and St George’s Day movement.

The coalition is led by Nikolay Barekov, who is a former journalist and supporter of Boyko Borisov. The political programme of the coalition is populist, and for example promises to reintroduce conscription and to reinstate the Communist-era name of the country, the People’s Republic of Bulgaria,\(^{39}\) provide free medicine for children, set up state-owned companies for the purpose of buying off and processing agricultural produce, abolish flat income tax and reintroduce progressive income tax. Although the views on Europe and European integration remain mostly unclear, both of the MEPs representing the coalition joined the ECR political group.

\(^{37}\) N. Popkostadinova, ‘Angry Bulgarians...’
\(^{39}\) Ibid.
Conclusions

Bulgaria might be considered a trouble-maker – not only in the eyes of European institutions that must coordinate, lead and assess Bulgaria to account for what they have achieved in the area of domestic reforms, but also for researchers tracing Eurosceptic attitudes in the party politics of the Member States. It seems that the European issue is not on the top of the political agenda in Bulgaria, and we may risk the assumption that this is because European issues are not of such great importance for Bulgarian citizens as well.

The feeling of distrust towards politics is a general attitude of Bulgarian society, and the EU might be perceived by part of the citizens as a last and only guarantor of stability and the rule of law. As Tismaneanu argues in *Eastern Europe the point of historical reference is the former communist regime: the new elites are accused of being "the old elites with new masks",* thus the external structures might be seen as a possible provider of a positive change, being still supported by a bigger group of citizens than the domestic institutions. On the other hand, Bulgarian society is not interested in European issues and despite a positive approach towards European institutions, has little knowledge about their performance and rules of conduct.

Seven years after Bulgarian accession to the European Union, one may observe some parties using Eurosceptic rhetoric, but none of them has built its programme around European issues. Even though the Bulgaria Without Censorship coalition used some Eurosceptic arguments, the general attitude towards the EU is pragmatic. This pragmatism is a part of a political strategy, as strong anti-EU stances are not popular in Bulgaria. Bulgarians are rather pro-European, and the level of trust towards the EU institutions is much higher than towards the national ones. Eurobarometer polls demonstrate that Bulgaria is among the countries which are most optimistic about the future of the EU (61% optimistic and 27% pessimistic), while the EU average is 53% optimistic, versus 40% pessimistic. Although part of the society declares pro-Russian attitudes and claims that joining the Eurasian Union would be a better choice than
being a member of the EU, supporters of such opinions are naturally more willing to support Eurosceptic political parties.

The absence of Euroscepticism in public and political discourse might be interpreted as a general lack of interest in European issues that is accompanied and determined by a deficit of knowledge about European Union and its functioning. However, a positive outcome of the EP 2014 elections in Bulgaria is the fact that Ataka and other extremist organisations such as the National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria, which used xenophobic and nationalist rhetoric failed to win any seats in the European Parliament. This is not only another inverse trend compared to other European countries, but also a sign that there are limits to extreme positions in Bulgarian public and political discourse.

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Bibliography


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Key conceptual approaches used to describe Russia’s engagement in the Ukraine crisis

Introduction

Many scholars in security, defence and other areas of study have been trying to use a broad range of conceptual approaches to explain the nature of Russia’s engagement in Ukraine. Some of them have claimed that Russia’s annexation of Crimea and ongoing destabilization in eastern Ukraine serve as an indication of the emergence of the Russia’s hybrid warfare doctrine. They believe that Russia has been trying to adapt itself to the realities of modern warfare by elaborating a hybrid warfare doctrine within

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1 This paper was part of the research in the MA in Euroculture Programme
the last decade and that it has served as the basis for Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. 4

Other specialists oppose the use of recently emerged concepts like hybrid warfare to describe Russia’s engagement in Ukraine, by referring to their misleading notion of novelty, mainly due to the limited presence of newly displayed military and informational capabilities used by Russia in Ukraine and absence of any evidence which could support the claim of emergence of Russia’s hybrid warfare doctrine 5. They deem it necessary not to overemphasize the novelty and changes in Russian capabilities, while also not underestimating continuity of practices and techniques inherited from the Soviet Union 6. In their view, due to such overlooking of continuity factor, an unfortunate perception has been pervasive among policymakers and researchers that the application of such Russian capabilities represents a new and different form of warfare 7.

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As a result, the lack of shared understanding and agreement over the nature and causes of Russia’s behaviour in Ukraine has led to the situation when the international community is incapable of adequately perceiving and addressing challenges posed by Russia.

Hence, I explore in this paper if any of the currently used conceptual approaches could adequately describe the Russia’s engagement in Ukraine. To achieve that goal, I touch upon key conceptual approaches used to describe Russia’s engagement in Ukraine. I pay specific attention to the circumstances and context under which they have emerged, and whether any of them could be adequately applied to describe Russia’s behavior in Ukraine. In addition, I briefly examine drawbacks and innovative aspects of hybrid warfare and other concepts and touch upon the continuity factor that has to be taken into account prior to their use.

1. Methodological framework

In my research, I resorted to the analysis of circumstances and context under which key conceptual approaches used to explain Russia’s engagement in Ukraine have emerged in the past. My key goal was to understand if any of these approaches could explain Russia’s engagement in Ukraine and if there was any available evidence which could support the claim on emergence and application of hybrid warfare doctrine by Russia in Ukraine.

I also conducted secondary data analysis of Russian, European and US sources, through consulting books and analytical reports on the main conceptual approaches used to describe Russia’s engagement in Ukraine. In order to explore these conceptual approaches, I consulted research undertaken by Frank Hoffman, Bob Seeley, Timothy Thomas, Keir Giles, Roger McDermott, James Sherr, Colin Gray, Maria Snegovaya, Sacha Bachmann, Ralph Thiele, Petri Huovinen,
Tim McCulloh, Rick Johnson, Samuel Charap, Robert Wilkie, Ulrik Franke, Matthew Rojansky, Jolanta Darczewska, Michael Ruhle, Bettina Renz, Hanna Smith, Can Kasapoglu, Andis Kudors, Andras Racz, Janis Berzins and many others.

2. Key conceptual approaches used to describe Russia’s engagement in Ukraine
2.1 Transformational pattern in the Russian military as a prerequisite to the current conceptual debates

Discussions concerning the ways to implement military reforms in the USSR were started in the late 1980s due to the unfolding security transformations in the region, and subsequent Soviet withdrawal of its military units and weaponry from Eastern Europe⁸.

Since the USSR collapse, Russia was experiencing a steady economic decline which triggered disintegrative processes within the Russian army. These processes were fueled by the rapid fall of Russian military expenditures from around 41 billion US dollars in 1992 to about 14 billion US dollars in 1998⁹. As a result, Russia’s lost its status of a military superpower to become a country that was left with the army in a shambles with demoralized personnel and shaky organization¹⁰.

During Boris Yeltsin’s presidency, there were no significant military reforms due to insufficient funding and Yeltsin’s lack of interest in the Russian military.¹¹ As a result,

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Russian military reforms were limited to the reduction of troop numbers and minor transformations of military services.\(^\text{12}\)

Not surprising that since 1990s attention of scholars in the West was attracted to the issues of deteriorating conditions within the Russian military caused by underfinancing, institutional and social issues.\(^\text{13}\) The poor performance of Russian army in both Chechnya wars was mainly due to the backward organizational structures, poor equipment and training of Russian soldiers.\(^\text{14}\) This situation was deteriorated by the lack of strategic vision and operational drawbacks which were reflected in the battlefield performance of the Russian army. The key reason for that were the attempts of Russian military leadership to compensate for the inefficiency of its fighting units in Chechnya by unsuccessfully copycatting and integrating into its strategy operational and strategic elements applied during NATO’s actions in the Balkans in 1999 and Gulf campaign in 1991\(^\text{15}\). Such a state of Russian operation and strategic art only strengthened views among Western scholars concerning the inefficiency and lack of progress within the Russian military.\(^\text{16}\) However, even though after the first Chechen conflict some experts considered the Russian campaign as a sign of the inevitability of Russian military’s demise, 1999-2000 conflict demonstrated that such a conclusion could be premature\(^\text{17}\). In spite of Russia’s heavy casualties in Grozny in 1999, experts observed some limited improvements in training, planning and better coordination of fighting units.\(^\text{18}\)

Russia’s short war with Georgia in 2008 was another significant event that increased a scholarly attention to the developments within the Russia’s military. In contrast to


\(^{13}\) Ibid, 8


\(^{16}\) Olga Oliker, "Russia’s Chechen Wars 1994-2000: Lessons from Urban Combat", (n13)80

\(^{17}\) Ibid, 84
Russia’s campaigns in Chechnya, there were some visible signs of improvement of its military capabilities, especially as to planning, training and simultaneous coordination with its informational and diplomatic efforts. Russia military objective of taking control of South Ossetia and Abkhazia was reached within a short period of time and was considered as a surprise given the protracted nature of Russia’s previous involvement in Chechnya. Russia’s ability to use combined arms operations in compliance with its classical concept of operation art during the Russia-Georgia war in 2008 demonstrated improvements at the operational and strategic levels. Russia managed to effectively combine the use of air, navy and other conventional elements with irregular forces.

In spite of such visible progress in Russia’s military performance, its military success was mainly ascribed to the Soviet-inherited military forces and technologies that could only be used for large conventional warfare of the 20th century. Such performance received significant criticism for a number of deficiencies related to such conventional aspects of the Russian army as the quality of weaponry, hardware, and operational coordination. Not surprising that the future of Russia’s military was questioned in terms of Russia’s ability to uphold its attempts in regaining its previous status and position in the international arena.

The 2008 Russia-Georgia war served as an incentive for what was later considered as one of the most radical reforms of the Russian army since the end of the World War

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18 Ibid
22 Roger McDermott, “Russia’s Conventional Armed Forces and the Georgian War,” (n19):65
These reforms touched upon organizational, structural and training components of the Russian army. Most importantly, a large-scale weapons modernization plan was initiated, with the significant increase in military spending for procurement of new missiles, planes, ships, helicopters and other types of military hardware for all branches of Russia’s armed forces.

Since the start of these radical reforms of the Russian military, some specialists in the West were pointing to the absence of initial progress in their implementation with regard to the transition to new military equipment away from Soviet-inherited hardware. At the same time, other experts argued that Russian spending strategy and transformation processes were skewed and were not able to address relevant security challenges. The main reason for that was the excessive attention paid to developing and integrating new types of strategic weapons instead of focusing on relevant security threats of weapons proliferation, terrorism and insurgency on Russia’s southern flank.

The swift annexation of Crimea by Russia marked the shift in the assessment of Russia’s military capabilities. Russia’s ability to complete the Crimean operation within a three week period and without even a single shot fired astonished many Western scholars and decision makers. In the course of Russia’s annexation of Crimea, a well-
organized, properly equipped and disguised as local defense groups, Russian special operations forces managed to quickly take control of the Crimean peninsula and ensure swift conduction of illegal referendum on Crimea’s reunification with Russia within such a short period of time.\textsuperscript{31} Additionally, Russia’s ability to effectively mobilize informational instruments helped to facilitate a smooth annexation of Crimea by Russia.\textsuperscript{32}

Hence, post-Soviet Russian state experienced a shrinking economy and decaying and demoralized military within first two decades after the USSR collapse. The Soviet-inherited conventional capabilities coupled with a lack of proper training were seriously challenged during Russia’s engagement in Chechnya and were considered as early signs of Russia’s military demise. However, as a result of Russia-Georgia war in 2008, Russia was motivated to undertake a comprehensive modernization of its military which was initially perceived as ineffective by some scholars in the field. Subsequently, Russia’s swift annexation of Crimea was a complete surprise for many scholars and decision makers which were baffled by the unexpected ability of Russian military to combine military and non-military means to achieve its political and military goals in Crimea.

2.2 Context dependency of terminology ascribed to the Russia’s actions in Ukraine

Since the illegal annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014, scholars in defence, security and other areas of study have been trying to explore Russia’s engagement in the Ukraine crisis.\textsuperscript{33} Unexpected efficient organization and coordination of Russian

\textsuperscript{33} See Andras Racz, „Russia’s Hybrid War in Ukraine: Breaking the Enemy’s Ability to Resist“, FIIA Report, no.43 (2015); Andrew Monaghan, “Putin’s Way of War: the “War” in Russia’s “Hybrid Warfare””, Parameters 45, no.4 (2015-16); accessed 1 September 2016; Keir Giles, „Russia’s „New“ Tools for Confronting the West: Continuity and Innovation in Moscow’s Exercise of Power”, Chatham House
military units in conjunction with a successful use of such non-military components as diplomacy and information operations triggered contested debates concerning the emergence of a newly updated approach to modern warfare in Russia, which differs significantly from the backward Soviet-inherited practices previously used by Russia in Chechnya and Georgia. In order to explain this unusually successful performance of the Russian military demonstrated in Ukraine, such concepts as asymmetric warfare, full spectrum conflict, non-linear warfare, hybrid warfare and several other concepts have been applied to make sense of Russia’s engagement in Ukraine.

However, the use of such parallel and sometimes overlapping approaches to describe Russia’s engagement in Ukraine makes it particularly difficult to understand the nature of Russia’s activities in Ukraine. These concepts were constructed on the basis of specific circumstances, unique in each particular case and there is a risk that their application to describe Russia’s engagement in Ukraine could be counterproductive, especially in terms of the adverse impact they could have on the realistic assessment of current Russian military and informational capabilities and decision-making and strategic planning in the West aimed at addressing such Russian challenge.34 Hence, it is of utter importance to touch upon the context under which these concepts emerged, and explore if any of them could be applied to describe Russia’s engagement in Ukraine.

The first concept sometimes applied to explain Russia’s engagement in Ukraine is represented by the 4th generational warfare.35 The generational theory was put forward by Thomas Hammes and William Lind, and originally depicted warfare as a
chronological system of development of ideas about modern warfare. It consists of four generations, with the fourth generation of warfare that emerged in the mid-20th century, describing the mode of warfare with increased role of unconventional elements capable of offsetting the conventional military advantages. In this regard, Hammes calls it a favorable kind of warfare mostly used by insurgents, rebels who intend to apply military, economic, social and political networks to make enemy give up its strategic goals. Even though this concept was developed in the late 1980s, it regained its popularity after the wave of terrorist attacks in the early 2000s. However, initial impulse for the concept refinement was given by the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York, US and focused on attempts to describe the nature of actions of non-state actors like Al-Qaeda. According to some analysts, Al-Qaeda is responsible for organizational and operational transformation in the way non-state players could engage in a conflict by adapting to globalization and information technologies and transforming the warfare into the fourth generation warfare with state players losing their monopoly of war.

However, it is not clear how this concept could be applied to describe Russia’s engagement in Ukraine due to its limited practical utility and descriptive nature which only outlines the emergence of a new state of modern warfare and shift towards non-state players able to use a broad range of tools against any conventional opponents.

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37 Ibid
41 Ibid
The compound warfare concept is another approach used by some specialists to describe the current Russia’s actions in Ukraine.\textsuperscript{43} The emergence of this concept is usually associated with Thomas Huber, who describes it as a simultaneous use of conventional and unconventional forces, used separately under one unified command to produce complementary advantages.\textsuperscript{44} In theory, it builds on the 4th generation warfare construct to emphasize the effective use of unconventional forces, and the evident advantage in the combined use of regular and irregular forces.\textsuperscript{45} While this concept can adequately describe several such conflicts of the past as the American Revolution, the Peninsular War, and the Arab Revolt against the Ottomans, it fails to explain such situations as Russia’s incursion into Ukraine\textsuperscript{46}. The key reason for that is that this concept doesn’t touch upon the coordination of forces that can occur at lower levels, and also overlooks the importance of informational and cyber instruments which have played an important role in the conflict in Ukraine and other modern day conflicts.

Asymmetric warfare is another theory that is sometimes referred to the Russia’s actions in Ukraine.\textsuperscript{47} Asymmetric warfare is not a recent phenomenon and was applied for centuries when parties to armed conflict sought to defeat their opponents by exploiting their weaknesses.\textsuperscript{48} Later on, asymmetric warfare concept has evolved and included a broader set of means and instruments applied by non-state actors like terrorist groups, guerillas, and insurgents in asymmetric conflicts to achieve their

\textsuperscript{44} Thomas Huber ed., \textit{Compound Warfare: That Fatal Knot}, (Fort Leavenworth: US Army Command and General Staff College Press, 2002)
\textsuperscript{45} Timothy McCulloh and Richard Johnson, \textit{Hybrid Warfare} (MacDill: Joint Special Operations University, 2013),58
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid, 58
\textsuperscript{47} Bettina Renz, "Russia’s "New Way of War"? Asymmetric Warfare and the Ukraine Crisis", Nottspolitics (2015), accessed 2 September 2016, http://nottspolitics.org/2015/01/15/10771/
specific goals.\textsuperscript{49} To be more specific, in this context, asymmetric warfare often described as “a willingness and ability of an inferior (weaker) adversary to apply all its strength available against softest points of a superior (stronger) adversary for the sake of accomplishment of the desired strategic ends by delivering any physical, political, economic and mass psychological damage or disruption possible to a latter side.”\textsuperscript{50}

It should be noted that asymmetric warfare gained its recent prominence as the result of the 9/11 attacks and the US war in Afghanistan with unconventional tools and tactics being more associated with such non-state actors as Al-Qaeda which have used asymmetric methods to exploit state’s vulnerabilities in a variety of ways.\textsuperscript{51} In this regard, many experts mention the increase in the role of civil population in the asymmetric conflicts.\textsuperscript{52} It is often achieved by non-state players who target civilians by ignoring the rules of war to fulfill their overall strategic goals.\textsuperscript{53}

According to some experts, asymmetric warfare concept could be of partial usefulness while describing the Russia’s engagement in Ukraine due to several instances. First of all, it can help outline Russia’s ability to support pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine while avoiding legal consequences and maintaining plausible deniability of its actions.\textsuperscript{54} Second of all, it could describe Russian activities aimed at influencing Western political system and informational space by financing

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid
political groups opposing standard policies and promoting pro-Russian informational messages that doubt Western democracies.\textsuperscript{55}

In spite of the above examples where asymmetric warfare concept could be applied to describe several cases of application of Russia’s instruments of national power in an asymmetric way, its main focus still remains on the operational dimension of the conflict, which makes it rather limited to explain the whole spectrum of instruments used by the Kremlin in Ukraine. Apart from that, as could be seen from above, it is mostly applied to explain how non-state players use various techniques to gain an advantage over conventional opponents under special operational circumstances. Also, it is not appropriate to define Russia’s engagement in Ukraine as asymmetrical because it rules out the importance of conventional military forces engaged in the conflict.

Non-linear warfare is another concept sometimes used to describe Russia’s engagement in Ukraine.\textsuperscript{56} It derives from the fiction story “Without Sky” written by Vladislav Surkov, advisor to the Russian president under his alias of Nathan Dubovitsky.\textsuperscript{57} In this story, it describes the conflict situation when all parties are fighting all parties by using all available means.\textsuperscript{58} Later on, the concept of non-linear warfare was further developed by Peter Pomerantsev who emphasized the Kremlin’s use of information techniques to influence media and policy discourse in the West as well as the situation in Ukraine through the network of Kremlin-connected influencers.\textsuperscript{59} Mark Galeotti went even further to claim that non-asymmetric warfare concept could be a sign of the Kremlin’s attempt to develop a complex and political doctrine to reflect the changes in Russian perceptions concerning the transformation of the political, military

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\textsuperscript{55} Ibid
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid
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and economic battlespace. Moreover, he believes that the key reason for the development of such doctrine of non-linear warfare is the Kremlin’s attempt to counteract any cultural or geopolitical Western encroachment against the Russian Federation.

Hence, origins and essence of the non-linear warfare concept raises some questions concerning its relevance and application to describe Russia’s engagement in Ukraine. The fact that it has its roots in the fictional story raises doubts concerning its relevance in the academic sense, especially when applying it to the Ukraine crisis. Even though it was further complemented by the ideas of Mark Galeotti and Peter Pomerantsev who stressed the usefulness of non-military techniques used by Russia to counteract the West in the post-Soviet space and influence the situation in Ukraine through informational and economic instruments, there is no clear evidence that such doctrine of non-linear warfare is being developed or applied by Russia in practice. Hence, the only visible advantage of the use of this term is to underline the impact of informational and political tools jointly applied by Russia to influence the West and Ukraine. However, this concept remains vague and very broad, and it makes its practical utility quite limited. Another problem with it is that by calling Russian behavior as non-linear, it automatically entails the assumption about linearity in other forms of warfare which contradicts the key incentive of the application of this concept aimed at exploiting weaknesses of an enemy and avoiding his strengths.

Full-spectrum conflict is another concept that tries to explain the nature and ways of Russia’s engagement in Ukraine in a very integrated way. It was put forward by Robert Seeley and Oscar Jonsson in 2015, and it combines “both the multitude of

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63 Ibid
means involved: from ‘conventional’ military units to clandestine special forces and intelligence operatives, to economic threats, political influence, online and offline information battles, as well as ‘traditional’ subversion.64 These scholars emphasize the importance of close coordination and centralized command while explaining Russia’s activities through the prism of full spectrum approach65. According to them, there are serious conceptual advantages stemming from the use of this concept.66 The key advantage in support of its use is that it is able to encompass soft and hard power instruments used in a cohesive and efficient manner through the centralized state mechanisms of coordination and implementation67. Also, the neutrality and flexibility of the word “conflict” help to emphasize the presence of non-military components that are not violent in nature as well leaves space for varying extent of ambiguity and intensity of the conflict68.

It also should be pointed out that the above concept is just an additional attempt to explain a complex nature of Russia’s engagement in Ukraine by using concepts developed in the West. One specific example is represented by a full spectrum operations concept that was officially introduced within the US Army in 2001 and which recognizes not only a combined use of defensive, offensive and stability or civil operations but also a simultaneous use of diplomatic, economic and informational instruments of national power to achieve desirable strategic goals.69 However, in spite of some observable similarities between two versions of the above concept, there is one important difference. Seeley and Jonsson divided the concept of full spectrum conflict into four integrative categories consisting of information, political influence operations, kinetic violence, including energy and economy. Through their joint application to describe Russia’s engagement in Ukraine, they attempt to grasp the whole complexity

64 Ibid, 6
65 Ibid
66 Ibid
67 Ibid, 21
68 Ibid
of Russia’s engagement in Ukraine. However, what immediately gets attention is the
broadness of these categories that constitute the concept of full spectrum conflict.
There is a likelihood of missing some crucial information related to Russia’s instruments
and techniques. As a result, such a situation could entail the need to go beyond these
four integrative categories of the present concept of full spectrum conflict to explain the
sophisticated nature of Russia’s engagement in Ukraine. Hence, the present concept
could only serve as a suitable tool for getting familiarized with the key activity areas of
Russia’s military and non-military components simultaneously applied by Russia to
achieve its specific strategic goals in Ukraine.

Hybrid warfare concept is the most prominent concept used by many scholars in
defence, security and other areas of study to explain Russia’s engagement in Ukraine. Its roots could be traced back to the early 2000s when attention from the conventional
approach to warfare with its emphasis on large-scale and symmetrical combat shifted
towards low-intensity conflicts undertaken by paramilitary forces, militias, and other
non-state actors. The Israel-Hezbollah conflict in 2006 was one of the key factors in
attracting the attention to the increasing role of non-state players in the changing
realities of modern warfare. This situation, in turn, led to attempts undertaken by
various military experts to explore the behavior of such non-state actors as Hezbollah
which has utilized more accessible informational and military technologies and

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70 Oscar Johnson and Robert Seeley, “Russian Full-Spectrum Conflict: An Appraisal After
Ukraine,” (n53): 7
71 See Eve Hunter and Piret Pernik, “Challenges of Hybrid warfare”, ICDS (2015),
72 Robert Wilkie, “Hybrid Warfare: Something Old, not Something New”, Air&Space
successfully exploited weaknesses of state actors that have superior conventional military capabilities.\textsuperscript{74}

Frank Hoffman was among the first experts who emphasized the importance to introduce a new concept that could explain the nature of new kind of warfare, influenced by transformative military and informational technologies with their social, tactical and strategic affects.\textsuperscript{75} As a result, a new term called hybrid warfare was brought to the fore.\textsuperscript{76} In essence, it builds on the construct of compound warfare, by also emphasizing the synergistic effect from combining the regular and irregular components, together with the inclusion of terrorism, and criminal behavior.\textsuperscript{77} It also puts an emphasis on sophisticated campaigns combining low-level conventional and special operations, cyber warfare, and psychological operations conducted to impact a population of the targeted country and international opinion.

After taking a close look at the origins and current application of the concept of hybrid warfare used to describe the behavior and increased influence of non-state actors, it is not clear if it could be effectively applied to explain the activities of such state players as Russia. Even though the concept of hybrid warfare sounds relatively new, it seems to be of little analytical relevance due to its purely descriptive nature. It is mainly due to the fact that by the hybrid warfare experts usually consider a joint use of such commonly established types of warfare as unconventional and conventional used to reach certain political-military objectives. The concept of hybrid warfare doesn’t depict the emergence of new type of warfare. Moreover, such integrative components of this concept as conventional military capabilities, informational warfare, terrorism, and insurgency have already been considered through the prism of the above-mentioned concepts.

\textsuperscript{73} Timothy McCulloh and Richard Johnson, \textit{Hybrid Warfare}(MacDill: Joint Special Operations University, 2013), (n44): 20

\textsuperscript{74} Erika Holmquist, "ISIS and Hezbollah: Conduits of Instability" FOI (2015), accessed 7 September 2016, \url{http://www.foi.se/Documents/foir4058_reducerad.pdf}

\textsuperscript{75} Frank Hoffman, "Hybrid Warfare and Challenges", JPQ 52, no.1 (2009): 35

\textsuperscript{76} Eve Hunter and Piret Pernik, "Challenges of Hybrid warfare", ICDS (2015), (n 70):1

\textsuperscript{77} Timothy McCulloh and Richard Johnson, \textit{Hybrid Warfare}(MacDill: Joint Special Operations University, 2013), (n44): 7-8
Another issue with the concept of hybrid warfare is that it is rarely used in the official documents of military and civil state institutions responsible for national security and defence in Russia and many Western countries. For example, it is absent in the US official documents where the conclusion was reached about non-applicability of the present term due to the fact that its use doesn’t present any value in comparison to other more commonly used approaches.78

Conclusion

There is a commonly observable pattern in the development of such above-mentioned concepts as asymmetric warfare, hybrid warfare and 4th generation warfare in terms of the circumstances of their emergence as well as the shift in the focus towards increasing role of non-state actors in modern day conflicts.

The USSR demise and the end of the Cold War led to a shift from the Cold War policies that oriented on large scale, symmetrical state actors to the rise of concerns with transnational crimes, terrorism and identity issues which Barry Buzan labeled as “the image of new world disorder.”79 The incentive for the increasing role of non-state actors was provided by what Alvin Toffler named “the third wave” which implies the world’s transition from an industrial age to an information age.80 This “third wave” affected the ways the wars are conducted, especially with regard to the organization, scale and the very essence of warfare.81 As a result, it paved the way for emerging non-state players like Hezbollah with predominantly irregular fighting units to achieve state-like military capabilities through the access to new informational and military technologies, which were only available to state players in the past.82 George Casey

82 See Timothy McCulloh and Richard Johnson, Hybrid Warfare (n44):11; Leslie Brown.
described such situation as the moment when states no longer have the monopoly on the instruments of war.\textsuperscript{83} As a result, such situation caused an incremental growth of unconventional challenges to state-on-state warfare from such fronts as criminal, psychological, cyber and informational.\textsuperscript{84}

Subsequently, this situation led to scholarly attempts to elaborate the above-mentioned concepts which were intended to describe better the new conflict environment and ways to counteract newly emerged security challenges posed by non-state actors.

As could be seen from above, the concepts of asymmetric warfare, 4\textsuperscript{th} generation, and hybrid warfare were elaborated to underline the unique role played by such non-state players as insurgents, rebels and various terrorist groups which have managed to exploit weaknesses of various states with stronger conventional capabilities due to more accessible informational and military technologies and cohesive social, political and military networks used to the common goal.\textsuperscript{85}

In this regard, these concepts have also emphasized a greater focus on the impact and significance of non-military components with the growing role of means and instruments of information warfare effectively applied by non-state players against state actors. Currently, the information instruments utilized by non-state players pose a broad variety of new, multi-modal threats, which have little in common with the past examples of interstate aggression.\textsuperscript{86} Hence, such an increasing role of the informational component in the modern day conflicts enables to achieve strategic aims with minimizing the use of military means that require significant investment for their maintenance. As a result, the mind becomes the main battleground which demonstrates an accelerating growth in the importance of information and psychological warfare for both state and non-state players in terms of gaining the military advantage over


\textsuperscript{84}Robert Wilkie, "Hybrid Warfare: Something Old, not Something New"(n71):1

\textsuperscript{85} Sascha Bachmann, „Hybrid Wars: the 21st- Century’s New Threats to Global Peace and Security”, (n1) 89
potential enemies by exhausting them and influencing their population and the military. The key rationale for such activities is to reduce the reliance on military power in gaining desirable military and political results.

Apart from exploring the role played by non-state actors in the modern day conflicts and stressing the increasing role of non-military components, the above concepts were also developed in order to emphasize the need to counteract new security challenges posed by such non-state players as Al-Qaeda, ISIS, and Hezbollah. Discussions among military experts in France, Australia, the UK and other countries have taken place concerning the ways of integrating the information operations in their military campaigns to appropriately respond to the more skillful use of information techniques by non-state actors. Moreover, the realization of the seriousness of present unconventional challenge posed by non-state players, have put on the agenda of many Western countries the urgent need to establish relevant state structures and educational programmes within military and civil sector to facilitate the appropriate practical integration of influence in informational operations and its subsequent convergence with standard military capabilities.

Hence, the use of asymmetric, 4th generation and hybrid warfare concepts could only be of limited use while describing Russia’s engagement in Ukraine. It is mainly due to the fact that they were created to specifically describe the nature and behavior of non-state actors and emerging security threats posed by them. Furthermore, they have been developed to explore how non-state players use informational techniques to

89 Bettina Renz, "Russia and Hybrid Warfare- Going Beyond the Label", (n4):2-6
91 Ibid, 29-33
compensate for their military backwardness and skillfully exploit the weaknesses of state actors on the battlefield. Another incentive for their development has been to address these above challenges in practice through the creation of relevant state structures and conduction of specialized trainings.

Nevertheless, these concepts are not able to fully explain the behavior of such state actors as Russia as they were developed for the different purposes outlined above. If applied, they would simply be able to depict the increasing role of informational instruments applied by Russia in the Ukraine crisis. They would not help to properly examine the whole spectrum of military and non-military instruments used by the Kremlin in Ukraine due to the incompatibility of these concepts developed in the West with the realities of current Russian approach to warfare. In this regard, due to their descriptive nature, they would not be able to explain the recent developments of military and informational capabilities in Russia.

A similar situation could be observed in terms of applying compound warfare and full spectrum conflict concepts. Both concepts are quite broad and are not able to fully describe the complex array of instruments used by Russia in Ukraine. By artificially dividing Russia’s projection of power into several broad categories or trying to describe it as a combined use of conventional and unconventional forces makes it problematic to grasp the complex Russian strategic thinking and assess the sophisticated application of military and informational capabilities in Ukraine. Hence, the risks of not fully covering other aspects of Russia’s activities pose a threat to an objective and adequate analysis of the nature and key motives of Russia’s engagement in the Ukraine.

Hence, the above-mentioned concepts are not helpful in terms of analyzing Russia’s engagement in Ukraine due to the fact that they were initially designed for other purposes and under different circumstances. In the case of asymmetric warfare, hybrid warfare and 4th generational warfare, they were designed in the West following the terrorist attacks in the early 2000s and the rise of such non-state players as Al-Qaeda, ISIS, and Hezbollah. The key intention of developers of these concepts was to grasp the nature of newly emergent security threats posed by non-state actors and their skillful use of non-military instruments to exploit the weakness of states with superior
military capabilities. They were not designed to describe military and informational activities of state actors like Russia. In the case of compound warfare and full spectrum conflict, there is a risk of not adequately addressing the nature of Russia’s engagement in Ukraine. These concepts were also designed in the West and fail to adequately explain the Russia’s military and informational capabilities as well as its approach towards modern warfare.
Introduction

More than three years have passed since the illegal annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and the City of Sevastopol by the Russian Federation and the overall situation in Ukraine did not change much. Until now, Ukraine is still fighting its undeclared war (officially the ‘Anti-Terrorist Operation’) in Donbas against the so-called ‘pro-Russian separatists’ supported and equipped by the regular Russian army. The international status of Crimea did not become any different and it seems that both the Russian Federation and Ukraine do not have any strategy to change it. The international situation also did not change much. The Russian Federation keeps pushing for the ‘Minsk Agreements’ and their implementation, even if it was obvious that they cannot be implemented from the very beginning of their signature in September 2014, respectively February 2015. The international community and the European Union (EU) represented by Germany and France from time to time call on both sides to fulfil their duties and respect the ceasefire, which was never really in place for long. However, one this is undoubtedly different. The number of casualties keeps raising every day and it has been a while ago, since it surpassed 10,000 victims.

However, not to be only pessimistic, some things have been achieved as well, mainly on the Ukrainian side. Since the ‘Revolution of Dignity’ – as the third revolution on the Kyiv’s main square Maidan is called by the Ukrainians themselves – the people in Ukraine have realised a few things. First of all, majority of Ukrainians did realise that they constitute a unique political nation with its own language, territory, shared history and culture, the national myths and the common enemy as well. Second, Ukrainians
have realised that most of them want to become members of the EuroAtlantic community, including both the EU and NATO. In case of NATO, this is a historical moment as in the hypothetical referendum, majority of the Ukraine’s citizens would vote in favour of the accession to NATO for the first time.\(^1\) Third, Ukrainians have become aware that after the revolution they cannot just go back to their homes and leave “politics to politicians”, as it happened in 2004/5 after the Orange Revolution, which ended with great disappointment for everybody. The Revolution of Dignity created and forged a new civil society that has been fighting for the future of Ukraine ever since. Against the rule of oligarchs, omnipresent corruption, even against their own politicians that were elected in three free and fair elections since May 2014.

Nevertheless, one more thing remained the same since the annexation of Crimea. The division of the Central and East European countries in their reactions to the Russo-Ukrainian conflict.\(^2\) We can clearly identify those states that hold more hawkish position (Poland, Romania, the Baltic states), those more moderate towards Russia (Hungary) and the rest standing somewhere in between (Czechia, Slovakia or Bulgaria).\(^3\) For example, it majority of the CEE states was unacceptable that the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban just shortly after the illegal annexation of Crimea by the Russian

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\(^1\) According to the Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko: “Four years ago, only 16 percent (of the Ukrainian people) favoured Ukraine’s entry into NATO. Now it’s 54 percent.” The Telegraph (2017), ‘Ukraine's Petro Poroshenko ‘will hold referendum’ on NATO membership’. Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/02/02/ukraines-petro-poroshenko-will-hold-referendum-nato-membership/ (accessed on 8\(^{\text{th}}\) April 2017).


\(^3\) Gressel suggests a different categorisation of states: Poland, Baltics states, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria are among the “leaders” in helping to Ukraine. While Czech Republic and Hungary are classified as the so-called “fence-sitters”. Gustav Gressel (eds.) (2016). Keeping up Appearances: How Europe is Supporting Ukraine’s Transformation. European Council on Foreign Relations (London: 2016), 80.
Federation called on Ukraine to deliver an autonomous status to approximately 200,000 Hungarians living in Ukraine. Orban said:

"(…) they [the Hungarian minority in Ukraine] need to know, as well as the Ukrainians, that the Hungarian state will throw its full weight behind ethnic Hungarians' push for autonomy in Ukraine."

This cacophony of voices toward the Russia-Ukraine crisis stems from a number of internal and external factors diverging from different historical paths of the CEE countries to the dependence on Russia, especially regarding energy, among other things. What is more, these divisions go against traditional alliances and regional schemes of co-operation, such as the Visegrád Group (VG) consisting of Czechia, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary. Even if the V4 countries have been recently profiling as the ‘power block’ against some of the proposals coming from Brussels, especially the traditionally diverging positions on Russia and to certain degree also Ukraine has been its weakness since the early 1990s.

Therefore, the paper strives to answer the question, why the positions of V4 countries towards Russo-Ukrainian conflict are different and what is the position of Ukraine in the V4 cooperation? It does so looking at the position of Ukraine in the V4 regional cooperation from the historical perspective, with a special interest in the period from 2009 to 2013, finally including the Czech perspective on the V4-Ukraine relations illustrating the possible future trends of the partnership. Theorising the relations between the V4 and Ukraine, the author wants to describe and scrutinise the mutual partnership and come to conclusion, if it delivered the results promised in the numerous

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statements and declarations issued by the V4 countries. In the end, this analysis should help to better understand the contemporary situation of the divided V4 reaction to the Russo-Ukrainian conflict in the East, which has its origins much earlier than in 2013/14.

V4-Ukrainian relations before 2004

Even if many people claim that the relations between the V4 countries and Ukraine really started only in May 2004, when the V4 states finished their ‘Return to Europe’ or “Striving for European Integration”, the reality is more complicated. First and foremost, the bilateral relations between the (back then still) V3 countries were present and maintained since early 1990s and for example Poland was the first country to recognise Ukraine as an independent state together with Canada on 2nd December 1991. However, in 1990s the V3 (resp. V4) countries were fully engaged in their ‘Return to Europe’ mission and conducted their foreign policies accordingly being oriented on the European Communities, and since 1993 the EU.

This was particularly visible in the Czech foreign policy trying to distance from the Eastern Europe, but to lesser degree, it was true also for Poland. It was Poland that, for example, refused the ‘Kravchuk’s Plan’ of 1993 that proposed the creation of collective security zone in the CEE, due to Ukraine’s vague position on the nuclear weapons. Another major disappointment for Ukraine from Central Europe came shortly after, when the country wished to join the Visegrad Group. However, the member states (especially the Czech Republic and Slovakia) opposed this plan claiming that it would harm their relations with the West and slowed down the process of accession to NATO

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and the EU. Kyiv remained isolated for the second time with no “security guarantees”, but rather “security assurances” stemming from the 1993 Budapest Memorandum, as labelled by the US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott.\(^9\) Vulnerable and isolated, Ukraine submitted to the international pressure and gave up its third largest nuclear arsenal for some pragmatic, for others rather idealistic guarantees of state sovereignty and territorial integrity provided by the United States, United Kingdom and the Russian Federation.

In addition to that, Ukraine under Kuchma’s presidency was among the countries opposing the NATO enlargement to Poland, Czechia and Hungary, as it feared being squeezed between two military blocks. This happened in 2014, when Ukraine found itself in a security vacuum between the two opposing military powers without any of them providing reliable security guarantees for Ukraine’s territorial integrity or state sovereignty. With the 1993 Budapest Memorandum unscrupulously violated by the Russian Federation and without any strong reaction from the two remaining parties of the Budapest Memorandum, Ukraine is until today forced to fight against the third world military power on its own. To accommodate the Ukrainian position back in mid-1990s, Poland promised to push for the open doors to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. On several occasions, Poland and the V4 countries succeeded in promoting Ukraine’s relations with the West and NATO in particular. For example, Ukraine became the first member of the NATO’s ‘Partnership for Peace’, or contributed to the NATO peace-keeping missions in Bosnia and Hercegovina in 1995 and 1996 under the framework of Polish-Ukrainian peace battalion (POLUKRBAT). In 1997, Ukraine and NATO concluded the ‘Charter on a Distinctive Partnership’ formalising their partnership. Ukraine took also part in other NATO’s peace-keeping missions and operations, but this still could not balance the tensions between the Western community (especially the USA) and the Kuchma’s regime, which prevented Ukraine from getting the Membership Action Plan at the 2002 NATO Summit in Prague. Against

all odds, the V4 states assisted Ukraine to overcome the international isolation and strived to open doors to the EU and NATO. Poland was particularly active in this sense.

Finally, on the eve of EU’s enlargement in 2004, the then Czech President Vaclav Havel in his texts the ‘A new impetus for old Europe’\(^\text{10}\) and ‘Belarus, Our New Eastern Neighbours’\(^\text{11}\) reminded the EU of the new reality beyond its Eastern border. Concretely, he focused on the situation in Belarus and drew parallels with the democratic development in Central Europe and its dissident tradition. The second essay focused on the EU enlargement, which was described as a chance for the EU to transform itself and escape the bureaucratic trap into which it was falling. Last but not least, Havel wrote about the specific history of the CEE countries and their particular relations with Russia. Looking back at the statement, Havel would have been surprised by the V4’s response to the Russo-Ukrainian conflict:

“The countries of central and eastern Europe will bring greater concerns and fears about Russia and the western Balkans. Although Russia, now closer to the Union’s frontiers, will move up the EU’s agenda, it can expect less conciliation and more criticism. The new member-states will be particularly sensitive to any hint of the existence of a Russian sphere of influence.”\(^\text{12}\)

What is also important, Havel’s texts opened a new chapter in the Czech and generally Visegrad’s thinking about the Southern and Eastern neighbourhood. This foreign policy switch collided with the pro-democratic wave of protests known as the ‘Coloured Revolutions’ in the post-Soviet space that gave new impetus to the pro-Western forces in Georgia, Ukraine (later also in Moldova) and attempted to change the political course in Armenia, Belarus or the Russian Federation. This political and socio-economic


changes combined with the V4 thinking about the region in terms of continuation of the V4 tradition of transformation. Therefore, the VG invested in the post-Soviet countries and strived to bring them closer to the EU, especially through the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) launched at the same time as the EU’s ‘Big Bang’.

**V4-Ukrainian relations after the ‘Return to Europe’**

In 2004, the relations between the VG and Ukraine entered a completely new phase. The historical mission of ‘Returning back to Europe’ was completed and the Visegrad Four faced a dilemma how to proceed after its original goal was accomplished. On 12th May 2004, the V4 came with the Kromeriz Declaration specifying the areas of future cooperation:

“They [the V4 states] are ready to assist countries aspiring for EU membership by sharing and transmitting their knowledge and experience. The Visegrád Group countries are also ready to use their unique regional and historical experience and to continue to shaping and implementing the European Union’s policies towards the countries of Eastern and Southeastern Europe.”

The statement clearly illustrates the new geographic focus of the VG to the East and South from its borders underlying the importance of assistance to these states in their own accession to the EU using the specific know-how the V4 states developed until 2004. Moreover, the Declaration determined agenda for the years to come and gave V4 a new meaning. This was a strong message for all those suggesting that the VG should be dissolved, as “the key objectives set in 1991 Visegrád Declaration have been achieved”.

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14 Ibid.
The pivotal role among the post-Soviet countries was, of course, played by Ukraine, the biggest and most important player in the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood. The above-mentioned Orange Revolution gave the country a strong incentive to pursue closer ties with the EU that was recognised by the V4 countries, which issued a common statement on 7th December 2004 stating:

"Ukraine is not only a key neighbour and strategic partner of the European Union, but also a major player in regional and global security. We believe that a positive resolution of the crisis followed by a genuine democratization could create a basis for new quality in the EU - Ukraine relations. A democratic Ukraine, fulfilling its commitments and pursuing fundamental reforms, should be offered a long-term European perspective."\(^{15}\)

Similarly, on 13th January 2005 the European Parliament approved the European aspirations of Ukraine and pointed to the “natural right” of Ukraine to become a member of the European Union.\(^{16}\) Another strong message from the European Parliament was delivered in December 2005, when the EP even claimed that Ukraine should be given a “European perspective in the long term”.\(^{17}\) It is essential to note that the V4 deputies, primarily the Polish ones, stood behind the initiative and became the driving force for the European support to Ukraine. Another point worth noticing is the crucial involvement of the Polish diplomacy in the Orange Revolution, for example documented by the fact that the then Polish President Aleksander Kwaśniewski together


with his Lithuanian counterpart Valdas Adamkus became chief negotiators of the power transition of the Kuchma’s regime. Therefore, there might be some doubts about the common V4 approach to Ukraine, as most of the initiatives were driven primarily by Poland and its intensive involvement.

Nevertheless, the following communication and cooperation between the V4 countries and Ukraine continued in the same vein. On 10th June 2015, the V4-Ukraine summit on the level of prime ministers was held in the Polish town of Kazimierz Dolny. The VG confirmed its interest in collaboration with Ukraine and take active part in the EU-Ukraine relations. Moreover, the V4 countries offered their help with the Ukraine’s transition and reform process based on the EU-Ukraine Action Plan, for example providing the twinning program for the Ukrainian state officials and other technical assistance. Both multilateral and bilateral cooperation on the V4-Ukraine level was developed and each country offered its own assistance with sectoral agenda. The V4 countries launched scholarship programs and supported the people-to-people contacts across the Schengen border. In addition to that, the V4 states promised their help with the visa facilitation regime in reciprocity for the unilateral cancellation of the visa regime for the European citizens by Ukraine.

**V4 international development cooperation**

After 2004, the V4 countries started their programs of the international development cooperation (IDC) and among the supported states, the countries of Eastern flank became major recipients of the development aid, which has been constantly raising

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20 Between 2004 and 2007, 73 Ukrainian students were given scholarships by the International Visegrad Fund. The total number of scholarship was 106, which means almost 70 %.
21 Visegrad Group (2005), ‘Joint Declaration’. 163
since 2007. Zsuzsanna Vegh states that between 2007 and 2011, V4 countries spent most of their development aid on Ukraine, in comparison with Moldova where the V4 governments spent three times less financial resources. The official development aid (ODA) of 19.18 million USD for Ukraine was hardly comparable with other countries of the Eastern neighbourhood. Végh claims that the VG countries suffered from lack of experience and resources for the IDC, which explains why there were so many problems and inconsistencies in the IDC collaboration on the V4 level. On the other hand, she asserts that the V4 countries have their added value in the unique experience of political and socio-economic transition combined with the accession period and implementation of the EU’s acquis communautaire, which makes them an obvious partner for the East European and Balkan states. Moreover, the common goal of stability, security and prosperity of the European neighbourhood connects them with their immediate neighbours interested in the same matters. While engaged in more or less the same area, the V4 countries showed significant differences in terms of organisation, supervision or planning of distribution of the international development aid. However, the most influential tool of the V4 multilateral diplomacy and international development aid has since 2000 been the International Visegrad Fund, in 2011 substantially expanded by the ‘Visegrad 4 Eastern Partnership’ (V4EaP) initiative. This program is specifically focused on development of civil society and people-to-people contacts,

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24 Ibid., 9.
25 Gyimesi specifies that: "The V4EaP is funded through the International Visegrad Fund, the general grant scheme of the V4. The annual budget of the V4EaP amounts to 1.46 million EUR, which is far below the total ODA of around 70 million EUR that EaP countries received from the Visegrad states. The largest recipient of grants from the "Visegrad 4 Eastern Partnership Programme” is Ukraine, which received 3.8 million EUR between 2004 and 2016, amounting to a tenth of the ODA that the country received from V4 states in 2014 alone.” Gyimesi, ‘The Visegrad Group’s development assistance’.
including scholarships, small projects and grants aimed at socialisation among the V4 and EaP countries. Végh concludes with critics of the V4 IDC and recommendations for future development. Among them, she singles out coordination and mutual consultations at the V4 level to make better use of the limited resources. Moreover, she suggests that Ukraine and Moldova, where all four ODA programs are present, should be made entry points and serve as show cases of “more concentrated support with higher added-value”. Speaking on coordination, Vegh opines:

“Strengthening public administration, institution building or supporting the adoption of European standards (explicitly or implicitly – e.g. through customs, agriculture reform) are all present in each program. (...) Nevertheless, apart from the Czech country-strategy for Moldova, none of the strategy documents refer to the importance of international donor coordination”

From the Eastern Partnership to the Revolution of Dignity

In May 2009, the relations between V4 and Ukraine entered another phase once again, when the EU’s policy of Eastern Partnership (EaP) was launched during the first summit of Eastern Partnership in Prague. In the first half of 2009, Czechia was the second new EU member state that held the Presidency of the Council of the EU. However, the VG’s involvement in the EU’s Eastern policy began much earlier. Since 2005, the V4 issued numerous declarations in support of Ukraine and the remaining states of Eastern Europe and their relations with the EU. However, first serious initiative came only in July 2006, when Poland together with Lithuania reacted to the German plan of ‘ENP-Plus’, which was followed by a non-paper and in April 2007 more substantial document called ‘The Visegrad Group Contribution to the Discussion on the Strengthening of the European Neighbourhood Policy’, which specifically stated:

26 When it comes to scholarship, between 2004 and 2013 Ukrainians received 399 scholarships out of 660 in total, second being Belarus with 154 students, which clearly speaks in favour of Ukraine. Vegh, ‘Visegrad Development Aid’, 36.
27 Ibid., 26.
"Due to the cultural closeness and common historic experience the countries of the V4 have a deep interest in the development and prosperity of the countries in their immediate neighbourhood included in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The V4 consider the possibilities of a more effective use of the instruments of regional co-operation to provide our Eastern ENP neighbours stronger support in the implementation of their reforms and bringing them closer to the EU."  

The V4 focused on the issues of resources and energy invested in the Eastern Neighbourhood (in contrast to the Southern one), ‘Governance Facility’, accession perspective and finally the regional cooperation. Both Poland and Czech Republic took an active part in the negotiation process. However, it is essential to point out the reactionary character of the Visegrad Four states that beyond rhetoric and declarations only reacted to the German proposal of the ‘ENP-Plus’.

Besides, during the Czech Presidency of the VG in 2007-8, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic circulated its non-paper ‘ENP and Eastern Neighbourhood – Time to Act’, by which it opened the discussion on the topic and brought the EU’ Eastern policy to the attention of other member states. The VG proved to be the first and most important platform for discussions and place for coalition-building. However, even if the EaP proposal was endorsed at the Prime Ministers' Annual Summit in Prague on 16 June 2008 by all four Visegrad states, it was later presented to the General Affairs Council as the Polish-Swedish proposal. Therefore, the Visegrad Four did not play the leading, but rather supportive role, when it enshrined the Polish-Swedish more

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detailed version of the original Czech proposal. This outcome obviously left some bitterness among the Czech public officials and diplomats involved in the EaP negotiations. However, as Dangerfield emphasizes:

"This supporting role of the VG should not be underestimated however, as it has involved a particularly important contribution through the so-called ‘V4+’ facility. The VG has been a forum for policy consultation and alliance-building with other member states and subregional groupings with specific interests in Eastern Europe, particularly over the last couple of years as ENP reform gathered momentum and the EaP proposal came to fruition."

The launch of Eastern Partnership gives us an interesting lesson about the V4 operation, the VG’s foreign policy, including its Europeanisation. Firstly, it shows that due to lack of institutionalisation, V4 can only serve as a coordination and coalition-building platform, rather than strong power centre for pursuing foreign policy initiatives. Secondly, due to lack of experience with the EU policy making and lack of trust of the old member states, for the VG it was more beneficial to play the supporting rather than leading role in upgrading its vision to the EU level. However, the V4 role in preparing of the policy was crucial as it was not only Sweden, but also the Baltic states or Bulgaria and Romania that were invited for consultations. Hand in hand with that went the pivotal role of the Czech and Swedish presidencies of the EU Council in 2009, which

32 Personal consultations of author with the Czech decision-makers.
34 Since June 2000, the only V4 institution has been the International Visegrad Fund.
served as essential moments for formulation and realisation of the V4 foreign policy goals and common priorities not only towards the EaP, but also Ukraine. Thirdly, it must be admitted that it was essential to accommodate the old member states, such as Germany, to agree with the original V4 proposal and support the EaP policy. For example, the Czech Prime Minister Mirek Topolanek had to reiterate that the EaP is not aimed against anyone and submit to the German wording of “East European partners”, instead of the original “European partners” in the Prague Declaration of the EaP.

In 2009, the Eastern Partnership sent a strong message to the EaP countries that the EU is interested in the region. Even if for the ENP frontrunner Ukraine, the added value of the new policy was rather limited. Nevertheless, the V4 countries pushed for more initiatives aimed at democratisation, trade liberalisation and overall transformation of the partner countries, including accession to the European acquis, in order to associate the countries with the EU and integrate them in the common EU market. Among them, it is essential to mention the EU’s European Endowment for Democracy (EED) launched in 2011 during the Polish Presidency of the Council of the European Union. The year of 2011 was also crucial for two more reasons. First, the Visegrad Group celebrated 20 years of its existence. In Bratislava, the Visegrad Group issued its declaration once again confirming its goals and values stating:

“(…) to facilitate the process of enlarging the area of stability and democracy in the EU neighbourhood and actively contribute towards the implementation of European and Euro-Atlantic ambitions of the countries of Eastern Partnership and continue to support the Western Balkans countries in their EU and NATO integration. The added value of the unique know-how of the V4 and pooled resources of IVF may effectively assist

partner neighbourhood countries to turn their integration and democratisation endeavours into success; (...)³⁹

Second, the VG countries launched the ‘V4EaP’ project within the International Visegrad Fund, as mentioned earlier. The V4EaP aims at supporting the political and socio-economic reforms, but also at reacting to the degradation of democracy and human rights in the Eastern neighbourhood, namely in Ukraine. V4 chose to focus on the civil society and people-to-people contact as the main driving forces of change and socialisation with the EU, with special focus on the “four pillars—Flagship Projects, Standard Grants, Visegrad University Studies Grants and scholarship programs”.⁴⁰

Moreover, the VG countries continued to coordinate their activities with Germany, the key player within the European Union being interested in the EaP.⁴¹ Nevertheless, not even the V4 support could prevent the degradation of democracy, human rights and selective justice that appeared after the 2010 presidential elections in Ukraine won by Viktor Yanukovych.⁴² Together with stronger resistance towards political and socio-economic transition and pro-democracy measures, it was possible to observe a gradual weakening of the V4’s interest in the Eastern Partnership that is apparent until today, best visible on the Czech case.

Since the emergence of the Eastern Partnership, the Czech Republic belonged to the camp of supporter and promoters of the policy at the EU level. Nevertheless, already before 2013 it was possible to observe the declining importance of the policy in the Czech FP symbolised by the rhetorical “Czechia supports” without any real content of the claim.\textsuperscript{43} There are several reasons for that.

First and foremost, this is the domestic context symbolised by the general lack of interest in the foreign policy both by the public and the political parties, including lack of FP expertise. Then, even multiplied by split of the political and economic elite on the situation in Ukraine, partially using the logic ‘Russia-first’. This can be explained by the fact that the Czech Republic has no common border with the East European states and therefore even the common knowledge of the territory is generally very weak, which is reflected also in the hesitant position on the Russo-Ukrainian undeclared war today.

Third, the Czech Republic has completely different tradition of understanding Russia than, for example, Poland or the Baltic states, based on lack of experience with the Russian element. Russia is sometimes portrayed as the Soviet invader of 1968 Prague Spring, but in other cases as the fellow Slavic nation. Therefore, Russia has traditionally been a dividing element of the Czech society and its elites.\textsuperscript{44} On the other hand, Ukraine is often viewed as the distant country in the East having small Czech minority in the Western part of the country. Moreover, the Ukrainian minority consisting mostly of economic migrants to the Czech Republic is the most populous, which plays role in terms of portraying the picture of the country as well.\textsuperscript{45} Fourth, already before 2013 the


\textsuperscript{45} Marketa Seidlova in Vladimir Benc, \textit{Current Migration Trends in V4 Countries: Focus on Migration from Ukraine}. Research Centre of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association (Presov 2015): 31.
international situation got extremely complicated and the Western liberal and
democratic order was facing difficult challenges posed not only by nationalism,
extremism and xenophobia, but also by the Russian Federation supporting the extreme
right and left-wing parties all around Europe, including the V4 countries. In this regard,
we can talk, for example, about numerous contacts and financial support provided by
the Russian Federation to political, social and economic groups in the CEE region. Unfortunately, the Czech diplomacy is struggling to find its place in the world and does
often not follow its traditional alliances, the EU and NATO.

Based on all these facts, the Czech foreign policy is becoming less and less
understandable. On the top of that, the Czech President Milos Zeman constantly
undermines the Czech foreign policy interests and paints the world picture of Czechia
even more starkly. Therefore, the Czech Republic is often seen as an unreliable partner,
which pushes other V4 countries to look for alternative alliances. In case of Poland, for
example, orientation on the Baltic states and Romania that have the better and more
reliable reputation. However, not to be only critical, the Czech government – major
player in the field of foreign policy – stands firmly on the European mainstream position
currently aligning with the sanction regime against the Russian Federation and
supporting the Minsk process as the only possible solution to the situation in Ukraine
now, even if its position is often not persuasive and justified enough. Nevertheless,
the situation of the current regime in Hungary or Poland opening painful historical
debates with Ukraine are both extremely complicated as well. The recent visit of the V3
foreign ministers to Kyiv is a case in point in this regard.

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Influence in Central and Eastern Europe*. Center for Strategic & International Studies.
Available at: https://www.csis.org/analysis/kremlin-playbook (accessed on 9th April
2017).

47 Vit Dostal and Tereza Jermanova (eds.) (2017), *Agenda pro ceskou zahraniční
politiku 2017*, Asociace pro mezinárodní otázky (AMO). Available at:
http://www.amo.cz/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Agenda-pro-ceskou-zahraniční-

48 On 11th April 2017, the foreign ministers of Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary
went to Kyiv to meet their counterpart Pavlo Klimkin and assure him of the V4 “special
**Conclusion**

The academic essay dealt with the V4-Ukraine relations with special focus on the period between 2009 and 2013 and strived to come to understanding, why the Visegrad Four reactions to the Russo-Ukrainian conflict are so different and what is the position of Ukraine in the V4 cooperation. The paper approached the problem from historical perspective and tried to identify the patterns of mutual collaboration and the fact if the partnership between Visegrad Group and Ukraine materialised beyond the political declarations. The essay used primary sources from the V4 ranging from statements to declarations and joint documents with third parties, as well as a number of secondary sources of analytical character.

The essay came to the conclusion that the V4 cannot be understood in terms of the ‘power block’ or unitary actor due to the lack of institutionalisation. However, this is not to say that the VG did not serve as an important platform for the coordination and coalition-building for the foreign policy shaping of the EU’s agenda as well. This proved relevant, for example, during the negotiation of the Eastern Partnership policy. Nevertheless, the V4 never played a leading, but rather a supportive or even reactionary role, as its members lacked sufficient experience, reputation and power within the EU to upload the agenda to influence the EU’s foreign policy on their own.

On the top of that, the historical perspective clearly illustrated that the V4 states – Slovakia and Hungary in particular – did not share the same will and interest in the Eastern Partnership countries, which in the end limited the common position of the Visegrad Group. Taking this into account, the V4 did not prove to fulfil its promises to Ukraine to the full extent. Instead, it provided only limited help and assistance to the relations” with Ukraine and support for the state sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. However, the Hungarian FM Peter Szijjarto then suggested that Ukraine and Hungary should sign a double-citizenship agreement in favour of the Hungarian community living in the west of Ukraine, which is under the current circumstances unacceptable for the Ukrainian elites, leaving a bitter taste after the meeting. Ceske noviny (2017), ‘Klimkin pri setkani s ministry V4 varoval pred ruskou propagandou’. Available at:  [http://www.ceskenoviny.cz/zpravy/klimkin-pri-setkani-s-ministry-v4-varoval-pred-ruskou-propagandou/1472470](http://www.ceskenoviny.cz/zpravy/klimkin-pri-setkani-s-ministry-v4-varoval-pred-ruskou-propagandou/1472470) (accessed on 14th April 2017).
countries of Eastern Partnership, respectively Ukraine, corresponding with its own limited power and resources. After 2011, the Visegrad Group proved to have only limited options how to influence the domestic processes in Ukraine. Finally, the case of Czech Republic and its perspective on the V4-Ukraine partnership explained, why the V4 countries do not share a common position neither on Ukraine, nor on Russia and why the V4 as a regional player might without strong common impetus get less and less relevant for the situation of Eastern Europe in future.
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**EU-UN Coordination in Peace Operations in Africa. The Case of Democratic Republic of Congo**

**Introduction**

Since 2003 the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN) have been trying to develop operational cooperation in the field of conflict management. The basic assumption of the partnership was to link legal and institutional capacity of the United Nations, with military operational capabilities of the European Union in order to effectively contribute to global peacekeeping. This however turned out to be a challenging task, which put a strain on both organizations. Since the beginning of the EU-UN cooperation many studies has been focusing on the legal and institutional analysis of the EU and UN peacekeeping units, their institutional-political discourse, practices and inter-operability (Brosig 2014). Not much attention has been devoted to in-depth critical analysis of EU-UN cooperation already conducted under the framework. That is why this article focuses not only on the institutional overview of the cooperation, but also reflects upon operational ability of both organizations to coordinate its efforts in the field and cooperate on a larger scale. The article analysis the case of three missions: EUFOR DRC and MONUC and Artemis and evaluates their performance and tasks carried out under the framework of EU-UN strategic conflict management.

**Institutionalization of the EU-UN cooperation in crisis management**

The institutionalization of EU-UN cooperation in crisis management started in 2001 and

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1 Article is based on Master Thesis entitled „Multilateral Conflict Management: EU-UN Coordination in sub-Saharan Theatre of Operation”, defended at the Faculty of International and Political Studies, Jagiellonian University in Krakow
2003, with establishment of systematic meetings between high-level officials and departments responsible for civilian and military crisis management (Woollard 2011). Initially, the EU and UN agreed on a political ‘platform for intensified cooperation’ involving EU ministers, UN Secretary General, EU High Representative and European Commission (Major 2008:6). The idea was to establish series regular meetings at every significant political and institutional level relevant to the political planning process in order to eliminate duplication of efforts and resources in specific areas of international intervention (Laatikainen and Smith 2006).

The official institutionalization process started in 2003 with the announcement of Joint declaration on EU-UN cooperation in crisis management. The document affirmed that the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security rests with the UN Security Council, however the EU being a co-signatory of the declaration recognized itself as a part of the operational framework. The declaration called for establishment of joint EU-UN working teams in order to coordinate and align joint efforts in regards to mission planning, training, communication, and best practices (Major 2008). The EU-UN commitments were seconded in the European Security Strategy and further UN and EU joint communications, where the EU recognized and underlined its “role in strengthening the UN and equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively in the field of peace operations” (European Security Strategy 2013).

The institutional and operational rapprochement did not go without problems. The UN officials expressed their worries concerning rather limited involvement of the EU Member States in the UN-led peace efforts (Schmidt and Zyla 2011). The diplomats had serious reservations regarding the EU ability to reach consensus actually put “boots on the ground” where it is needed, in timely and effective manner. One of the biggest concerns of the UN was that the EU would be more of a financial partner, than the operational one. It should be noted that in the early 2000s, the EU involvement in UN – led operations was indeed small, amounting to 11% of the overall deployed personnel (UNDPKO 2015). The financial contribution, however, was far more significant. The EU member states covered approx. 40% of the operational budget and the top contributors
are: Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Spain (Ibidem). The UN wanted assurances that ‘well-equipped peacekeeping’, being held by the Western countries, would not be reserved exclusively for the old continent, leaving the African ‘cocktail of disasters’ to the UN (Newman and Richmond 2006). Soon enough, these assurances were about to be tested with one of the most complex and prolonged conflicts in Africa – the Democratic Republic of Congo crisis.

**Practical Dimension of the Cooperation: military interventions in the Democratic Republic of Congo**

The EU and UN have always been considerably involved in the Congolese peace process (Major 2008). The UN has been present in the region since 1961, attempting to, either militarily or politically, influence the peace process and stabilize the political situation (Gegout 2009). The Union has begun its involvement in the early 2000s, providing its support to the transition process through civilian and political missions: EU security sector reform mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUSEC RD Congo), police mission (EUPOL RD CONGO) and the EU Special Representative to the Great Lakes Region (Gowan 2011). In the light of common involvement, Congo was a perfect spot for testing the coordination and cooperation capabilities of the two organizations. Both, EU and UN, had already conducted peace efforts in the region and knew the specificities of the conflict. Nonetheless, the cooperation proved to be problematic and generated a lot of tensions between the organizations (Karlsrud 2015).

*Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo - MONUC*

In 1999 the United Nation Security Council authorized a peacekeeping mission to facilitate the implementation of Lusaka Agreement and support transitional government (Gegout 2009). As a complementary advisory body, involved parties, decided to establish the International Committee to Assist the Transition. Its main goal was to assist the government during the process of transformation, and produce a strategy of sustainable development for the DRC. As for 2009, with a budget reaching $1 billion
and approx. 18,000 personnel the mission became a largest and most expensive operation commanded by the UNDPKO (Gowan 2011).

The mandate of the mission included four factors: implementation of the ceasefire agreement; monitoring and reporting violent behaviours; DRRR (disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, repatriation, resettlement); facilitation of transition, including assistance during the election process (Rotberg 2003). The mission structure was based on regular framework with Force Commander in charge of military contingent and the UN Special Representative responsible for civilian matters. Most of the mission force was located in the eastern part of Congo, due to its tendencies to rapid outbursts of violence (Gegout 2009)The operation started very modestly, with personnel of 90 troops, but the scale of the conflict and violent clashes between the belligerents called for considerable reinforcements of every aspect of the operation – including the mandate itself (Doss 2014). In the period 1999-2010, the Security Council had been reviewing the MONUC mandate three times, adjusting its peace-enforcement character under Chapter VII, and increasing its force capacity up 22,000 soldiers (Gowan 2011). Since early 2000s, MONUC often participated in joint operations with integrated national army, but despite significant demobilisation, many rebel groups still remained active – especially, Ugandan rebel group Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) settled in north east parts of the DRC (Murphy 2016).

**Operation Artemis**

In June 2003 the European Union launched its very first autonomous military operation within the framework of the ESDP. The main goal of the mission was to pacify the region of Ituri – one of the most violent districts of the DRC. The operation consisted of a short-term stabilization force, in the timeframe of three-months and authorized until MONUC each its full operational capacity in that part of the DR Congo (Major 2008). The district of Ituri has always been problematic in terms of security and peacebuilding. Since signing the Nairobi Accords in 1999 the region suffered over 50,000 victims in factional fighting till early 2003 (Rotberg 2003). In consequence, the IDP rate was one the highest in the area -over 500,000 people fled the district to other parts of DR
Congo. The Ituri was an example of the rebel sub-state controlled and influenced by the external actors from Kinshasa, Goma, Rwanda and Uganda, who backed and supplied rival factions (Doss 2014). In 2002 the Luanda Agreement between the DRC and Uganda, called for withdrawal of the Ugandan troops from the eastern DR Congo. The process was to be followed by an Ituri Pacification Commission, a multi-factional body, established as a peacebuilding coordinator. The IPC had support of all involved parties, including Kinshasa, Kampala, and MONUC (Murphy 2016). The Commission managed to establish temporary authorities - Ituri Interim Administration, and appointed MONUC as a security provider in region. Unfortunately, the Ugandan withdrawal was followed by violent clashes between the militia and other belligerents. Tribal militias tried to take control over the capitol of Ituri (Bunia), the attempt triggered violence throughout the region and made thousands of people to abandon their homes (Gegout 2009). The MONUC battalion was unable to protect IDPs not mentioning reacting on outbursts of violence outside the headquarter zone. The UN force was relatively small (700 troops) and functioned under Chapter VI, that obliged the international force to protect the civilians. Nonetheless, the Uruguayan force commander refused to intervene because of deteriorating situation, which was beyond MONUC’s capabilities. The history of 1994 was about to repeat itself, though the violence was at noticeably lower level than it was in Rwanda - that gave the UN time and chance to stabilize the situation.

The first partner, asked for support by the UN was not the EU High Representative but the President of France - Jacques Chirac. The French political involvement in region was well known. France had capabilities, proper experience, and especially will to intervene. In his letter of 15 May 2003 the Secretary General called for the rapid deployment to Bunia of a highly trained and well-equipped multinational force, under a lead of a Member State, to provide security at the airport as well as to other vital installations in the town and to protect the civilian population (Major 2008:12). The purpose of the call was to relieve the UN battalion until 1 September 2003, when reinforcement from the Bangladeshi contingent could be deployed.
France agreed on the intervention, under several conditions: the operation would be granted with Chapter VII mandate; there would be approval of the operation from the countries involved in the peace process; the operation would be limited in time and scope (Murphy 2016). Regarding these limitations, the French government agreed on leadership of such operation, with multinational force composition, and under general framework of the UN (Gowan 2011). The original codename for the operation was ‘Mamba’ and was to be conducted with the French planning and strategic capabilities. During the preparatory phase, the French realized that such operation may be a great opportunity to prove the European self-sufficiency in the field military operations (Simón 2012). Thus, with the consent of the Member States the ‘Mamba’ was Europeanized and renamed ‘Artemis’.

The UN Security Council legalized the mission on 30 May 2003. The deployment of Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF – codename in the UN nomenclature) was authorized on 1 September 2003 and geographically restricted to Ituri region (Major 2008). The provisions of the mandate obligated the force to contribute to the stabilization of the security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia, and if situation requires to contribute to the safety of the civilian population, the UN personnel and the humanitarian presence in town (Security Council 2003). Respectively to the UN resolution, the EU Council decided to launch its first military mission outside the Berlin-pus formula – the Joint Action was adopted on 5 June 2003(Schmidt and Zyla 2011).

France was the framework country, which provided not only core military contingent (90% of the overall force 4,700) but also whole planning military structures (Gowan 2011). The EU Member State committed staff officers and troops to work at Operational Headquarters in Paris. The Fore Headquarters was in Entebbe ( served also as a Rear Headquarters). Apart from French soldiers, the UK and Belgian special units were operating on the ground (Brosig 2010). The plan of the operation was quite simple - first the deployment of the special forces, followed by the engineers was to secure tactical airlifts of personnel and equipment; second stage was to pacify Bunia, which was under control of militiamen, and declare the town and a 10km area around it a
The effectiveness of the operation weakened military capabilities of the main rebel groups in the region, including cutting them off military supplies. In the last phase of the mission the EU-UN troops conducted force transformation to the Bangladeshi – led MONUC forces. The Artemis troops stayed two more weeks, as a bridging force, participating in common patrols as well as MONUC planning programme. With time, the capital of Ituri managed to restore its main political and economic functions, the IDPs returned to the city and began the process of rebuilding (Karlsrud 2015).

**EUFOR Congo**

Another example of EU-UN conflict management in Africa was the case EUFOR Congo-MONUC cooperation. Due to upcoming elections in DR Congo in 2006, the UN decided to reinforce its ground force (MONUC) with the European contingent. On 25 April 2006 the Security Council adopted the resolution under Chapter VII, authorizing the EU to deploy forces in the DRC, as a support team to the MONUC and overall peace process. The mission was charged with following tasks: to support MONUC to stabilize a situation, in case UN mission faces serious difficulties in fulfilling its mandate within existing capabilities; to contribute to the protection of civilians under imminent threat of psychical violence in the areas of deployment; to contribute to airport protection in Kinshasa; to secure freedom of movement of the personnel as well as the protection of the EUFOR Congo installations; to execute operation in limited character in order to extract individuals in danger (Security Council 2006). Accordingly, the EU Join Action referred to the overall character of mandate established by the resolution, adding the provision securing the explicit political and strategic control over the mission to the EU (Kartsonaki and Wolff 2015).

The EUFOR Congo was comprised of three components: the core military force deployed in Kinshasa; an on-call force which stationed in Gabon; and strategic reserve in Europe (Major 2008). Altogether, the military contingent of the mission reached 2,400 personnel from 21 Member States. By keeping the stand-by force outside the target operational area, the mission remained its flexibility and did not have to keep...
heavy equipment in the Force Headquarters in Kinshasa. The Gabon component played the role of reinforcements, if the original force could not handle the emergency. To keep the mission fully operational the Force Commander had at his disposal air support from the French airbase located in Chad. The rapid reaction capability was handed over to the Spanish Legions (Grupo Tactico Valenzuela), and Polish military police secured the base installations (Gegout 2009).

The main operational goal of the mission was to secure the presidential and parliamentary elections. The UN risk analysis anticipated a high probability of violence outbursts, especially in Kinshasa. The deployment of the European forces was to ease potential attacks during the electoral process. Though, the EUFOR did not face any serious military challenges it was involved in stabilization tasks on several occasions. In response to the MONUC request, the EU forces pacified violent clashes after the announcements of the first round results (Doss 2014). One of the most serious intervention took place during the meeting between the presidential opponent, Jean Bemba, and the members of CIAT. The presidential gourd attacked the Bemba’s headquarter with a number of the Western ambassadors inside (Schomerus and de Vries 2014).

Overall, the mission was considered as a success. EUFOR Congo fulfilled its mandate, secured the election process, assisted MONUC on request, and did not suffer casualties. The European force was able to transform into an efficient military contingent with rapid reaction capabilities. Overall cooperation with MONUC resulted with joint stabilization initiatives, which limited and constrained possible spill-over of violence (Murphy 2016). According to the EU officials the external effectiveness of the mission was significant. The superficial image of the mission accentuates only positives but there is another side of the story. The mission was never challenged by the military threat, the core activities were almost policing. It is difficult to assess the efficiency of the capacity when it was never fully exercised. Moreover, the geographical scope of the mission is highly questionable. Only a part of the force could have reacted when the violence continued outside the capitol. The external observers, regarding the character

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2 Core military force was from France (1,090); Germany (780); Spain (130); Poland
of the mission, called it rather cosmetic than substantive. These are only external effects of the mission. There is also another internal dimension of the operation, which is even more problematic and requires a detailed assessment.

**Assessing interoperability**

During the analysis of the cooperation I shall refer to the three-step typical operation assessment, which encompasses the following aspects: decision-making and planning process; cooperation in the field; and logistics. As it was highlighted in the previous parts of the chapter, the external effectiveness of both Artemis and EUFOR Congo operations was considered to be significant. However, the purpose of this section is to elaborate the inter-operational aspect of the mission, with regard to the joint EU-UN crisis management framework. The operation Artemis was a typical supplemental mission, established to fill the UN operational gap. Rapid deployment capacity of the European forces was a remedy for the deteriorating situation within the Ituri region. Small – scaled and short-termed force comprised of well-trained and equipped personnel appeared to be a very precise tool of providing peace. The planning phase was proceeded almost explicitly within the French framework, and the decision making process was without neither detailed consultations with the UN nor other Member States (Murphy 2016). The success of the Artemis mission inspired the European Union to build a completely new capacity within the Community framework - the EU Battle Groups concept. The character of the mission, an autonomous EU-led operation with the UN authorization followed by the UN reinforcements, is an example of the ‘second case operation’ of the EU-UN framework. Thus it did not require close field cooperation between the forces. The EU troops simply supplemented the UN in the field, where MONUC could not operate. The only cooperation was at political level, though it was not significant, and during transitional phase when the EU force was handling over its mandate.

(130); Belgium (60); Sweden (55)
The case of EUFOR Congo is far more complex and from technical point of view - challenging. The Congo mission of 2006 was to be an example of well-coordinated joint EU-UN effort in the field. It is interesting to notice that the formal request for the military support was addressed directly to the Presidency bypassed the whole system of inter-institutional consultations - the mechanism, which was established exactly for such situations (Gegout 2009). The call for support came to Brussels in December 2005 requesting full assessment and the EU demands on clarifications regarding the possible mandate for the operation (Major 2008). Finally, the consultation process proceeded at political level within diplomatic EU, UN and interested Member States staff. The overall process of ‘joint mission’ launching circumscribed to three core documents: UN Security Council resolution, EU Joint Action, and letters exchanged between the High Representative and Secretary General. After the agreement on overall framework the EU and UN could proceed to the second phase of mission planning process.

The preparatory process in the case of the DR Congo mission appeared to be a hard laboured and extremely prolonged process, which suffered from lack of proper political leadership not mentioning technical capacity (Doss 2014). Traditionally for missions in Central Africa, the lobbying countries were France and Belgium. The problem was that if one these state would become a framework country the neutrality of the operation could have been question. Thus, the French decided to involve a third actor, which was be a leader of the whole joint undertaking - Germany. The problem was that neither Germany nor other Member State was willing to welcome this responsibility. To overcome German reluctance, the French initially proposed deployment of the EU Battle Group (Franco-German BG). Unfortunately the idea was rejected by Germany, due to unequal national proportions within the force (Major 2008). Moreover, the Battle Groups were to attain Full Operational Capability in 2007, and as for 2006 were unable to cover the UN mandate. A compromise was achieved when Germany and France each obliged to cover one-third of the overall force capacity of the mission.

The European Union did not launch the institutional planning process until the domestic disputes were settled. Official proceedings started in March 2006, after the decision on strategic structures and the contributing states. The final EU mission plan outlined force
deployment options, but did not address the fundamental aspects of the EU-UN field cooperation. The whole preparatory process had been concluded before the UN legally authorized the operation. This approach revealed lack of any kind of EU-UN coordination during the most crucial moments of planning phase. The EU introduced to the Security Council complete set of documents, which was not followed by necessary inter-organizational consultations. The EU manifested its limitations and the Security Council had to adjust the resolution to the mission capacity. It rather showed an unequal character of the cooperation, at least at the preparatory level. Even though, there was a mechanism of inter-institutional dialogue, none of the actors involved in the process exercised it.

**Operational Coordination**

The main problems with EU-UN operational coordination concerned mostly the aspects of: military intervention, complexity of the procedures, different chains of command, and limitations of the EUFOR contingent. One of the principle goals of the EUFOR was to reinforce and assist MONUC. The problem was that according the EU rules of engagement, the European force could react only within restricted area and in response to exceptional circumstances beyond MONUC’s capabilities (Murphy 2016). If the EUFOR intervention was to take place, it required lengthy authorization process beginning with the EU High Representative and other top EU officials (Major 2008). Another problem was a lack of agreement on exchange of classified information. Due to technological and procedural differences, the intelligence exchange between EU and UN was practically impossible. This made the cooperation far less effective, more problematic as both organizations, which were to cooperate with each other had to keep literal secrets from one another.

Further, the cooperation between the mission was affected by the different Chain of Command (CoC) and a different allocation of competences at operational and force level (Major 2008). The MONUC command consisted of two levels: political-strategic controlled by the UNDPKO; and military strategic which was commanded by the Force
Commander General Gaye in the DRC. The UN Force commander was equipped with wide autonomy in the field and relatively small but efficient military staff. EUFOR on the other hand, suffered from defragmentation of competences. The EU CoC encompassed: Political and Security Committee which was responsible for political-strategic aspect of the mission; Operational Headquarter in Potsdam that was the highest military command and provided overall military-strategic services; and the Force Commander who was in charge of operational on ground military force (Gegout 2009). This incompatibilities often generated a lot of confusion and unnecessary tensions between the organizations and contingent. The most significant problem turned out to be in the force assistance procedures. *With exception of emergencies, the commitment of the EUFOR was to be obtained through a formal request by the Secretary General to the High Representative* (Gowan 2011). The lack practical application of the procedure manifested during the command post exercise codenamed MAZURRI in July 2006. The purpose of the training was to test the force launching procedures in the case necessary assistance to the UN. The result was disastrous, but not surprising. The EU’s answer arrived to the MONUC Commander within 24h. What is even worse, if the crisis situation would have occurred outside Kinshasa, the process would probably be concluded within 72h (Major 2008).

The issue of logistics was handed over to the United Nations as an on ground actor. It became quickly evident the UN and the EU does not share a commons understanding of logistics. The MONUC was practically unprepared to supply a mission size of EUFOR. The Europeans did not accept the quality of the UN service, so in consequence decided to supply themselves with the local goods – especially food (Gowan 2011). Eventually, logistics turned out to be one of the weakest points of the cooperation. Another, almost traditional, problem was a tactical airlift. This capability was as important as operability of the stand-by force in Gabon. EUFOR in Kinshasa was short in aircrafts, thus the potential rapid-deployment could have been one at a time. This shortage seriously undermined operational capabilities of the force (Gegout 2009). Fortunately, EUFOR did not have to test its rapid-reaction mechanism outside Kinshasa.
In spite of above-mentioned technical and institutional obstacles, the missions were considered successful. Why the cooperation still worked, even though the mechanisms appeared to be insufficient? In that particular case the answer refers not to institutional or political but to human factor. Both Force Commanders very quickly acknowledged the constrains of cooperation and established simple mechanisms of coordination. First of all, the structuralized and intensified exchange of information between the EU and UN Force HQs through liaison officers. Secondly, daily debriefings on the situation followed by the exchange of analysis and assessments (Major 2008). Finally, mutual confidence and understanding between two commanders, who luckily shared the same academic background - both attended to the elite French military academy (St-Cyr) (Doss 2014). All these factors, were extremely beneficial to the overall success of the mission. The question is: If the ad hoc structures could handle the cooperation why should the organizations establish permanent mechanism coordination? Another mission may not be so fortune as it was in the case of EUFOR Congo. Eventually, the European Force will be challenged militarily, strategically, and logistically. Mission cannot constantly rely on resourcefulness of their commanders, without well-tailored mechanism and common understanding the EU-UN missions may turn into humanitarian-military disasters.
Final remarks

After more than a decade, the EU-UN inter-institutional dialogue is still developing without any substantial progress increasing its operational capabilities. There is an advanced mechanism of consultations, through inter-departmental meetings and high-level summits, but both organizations still lack systematic cooperation at strategic level. The EU-UN cooperation in Congo has proved that there is still a long way ahead. The two organizations were not prepared to cooperate then, and they are not ready to conduct large-scale interventions today. The architects of crisis management on both sides have to face their limitations and try to develop a system that would utilize the best and strongest elements of the partnership. Both, the EU and UN should more concentrate on joint strategic planning and pooling/sharing their resources and operational procedures.
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The “Polite Ones” in Peacekeeping: Canadian Civil-Military Cooperation

Abstract: Canadians are known for being fond of the idea of peacekeeping and the Canadian Forces are active in military operations. To boost their efficiency they have implemented the concept of an integrated approach. Its main assumption is the coordination of efforts within three operational areas: defence, development and democracy. This requires a specialised solution which would facilitate cooperation between the different entities acting within those areas. The solution is the notion of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC). The objective of this article is to present characteristics of the Canadian doctrine of CIMIC. Both civil-military cooperation and the integrated approach were performed during operations in Afghanistan, which will serve as an example of Canadian CIMIC.

Key words: civil-military cooperation, peacekeeping, Canada, Afghanistan

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Popular culture very often presents Canadians as the polite, apologetic and to an extent naïve nation. This seems to stand in contrast with another known fact – that they are also very active in military operations. As noted by Preece, “since the formative ‘golden years’ of Canadian foreign policy, Canadian peacekeeping has taken the shape of folklore; spanning generations, spurring discussion, and invoking feelings ranging from

pride to contempt”. During the Cold War period, Canada participated in over a dozen United Nations peacekeeping missions and Canadians were so attached to the concept of peacekeeping that, at some point it has been called the “Tooth Fairy of Canadian foreign policy”. In this sense it was not surprising that the Canadian Armed Forces became actively engaged in the intervention in Afghanistan, even though the NATO-led and UN-sanctioned International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan was not a traditional peacekeeping mission. One of the main tasks of the Canadian Armed Forces in Afghanistan was to conduct “combat operations to root out and drive out insurgent groups such as the Taliban to create a secure environment for development and reconstruction to take place”. This provision stood in stark contrast with at least two out of three traditional principles of peacekeeping – limited use of force and impartiality. Although this involvement has raised much criticism, for over twelve years Canadian soldiers performed also non-kinetic tasks of development, support and training operations in varying capacities and regions in Afghanistan. An important activity which allowed Canadian troops to perform these tasks was the so-called civil-military cooperation. Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) is as a part of NATO's peacekeeping doctrine – a military function which facilitates interactions with the civilian environment in the area of operation. Official NATO documents create a framework based on which individual

3 Ibid., p. 8.
7 National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces website, The Canadian Armed Forces Legacy, op. cit.
member states develop their own national approaches towards civil-military cooperation. As a result, as observed by Sebastiaan Rietjens there are visible differences among CIMIC policies of states.\(^8\) In this sense Canadian Armed Forces “have a broad mandate towards civil-military cooperation. Not only do they value civil-military cooperation as a force multiplier, they also emphasise it as an aid multiplier and are often actively involved in humanitarian assistance”.\(^9\) Canadian CIMIC is additionally reinforced by the implementation of the concept of an integrated approach, which links defence, development and diplomacy.

The objective of this article is to analyse the characteristics of the Canadian approach towards CIMIC. What makes Canadian CIMIC operators successful in dealing with civil actors in areas of operation? On the other hand, what challenges are posed by the introduction of an integrated approach? Can CIMIC be the solution for these problems? The answers will be based on a two-pronged approach: theoretical analysis of official documents, reports and articles and a case study of the performance of Canadian Forces in Afghanistan. The article proceeds in three main parts. The first part provides the background and the history of the concept of civil-military cooperation. The second part is devoted to Canadian history of participation in peacekeeping and theoretical approach of Canada’s presence in Afghanistan. The third part focuses on characteristics of Canadian CIMIC based on the performance of the their forces in Afghanistan.

**The history and the institutional background of CIMIC**

Together with the end of the Cold War NATO started to conduct the so-called ‘out of area’ operations, beyond its own domestic borders. These operations were performed on territories where civil institutions were not necessarily fully functioning due to damages in the administration caused by war or limited trust of the local population

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\(^8\) S. Rietjens, Civil-military Cooperation in Response to a Complex Emergency: Just Another Drill?, Twente: University of Twente, 2008.

\(^9\) Ibid., p. 38.
towards governments. What is more the sheer number of civilian entities present in the area of operation was constantly growing and started to include new types – such as small non-governmental organisations (NGOs), highly engaged governmental organisations (GOs) or international organisations (IOs). An unprecedented example of this phenomenon was the KFOR mission in Kosovo where over 500 NGOs, GOs and IOs started to be active in the area together with the beginning of the operation. What is more, NATO started to realise that in the post-Cold War context the definition of security is broader and should include “political, economic, social and environmental factors in addition to the indispensable defence dimension”. This new type of reality posed various challenges to the armed forces and required a new military approach to the civilian dimension of peacekeeping. Thus, following the Kosovo intervention in the late 1990s NATO started a process of institutionalisation of civil-military cooperation. In 1999 NATO’s Strategic Concept officially recognised the importance of interactions between civil environment (both governmental and non-governmental) and NATO forces for the success of the military mission. Following this declaration, NATO Military Committee established a military policy on civil-military cooperation (CIMIC). According to the official definition civil-military cooperation is understood as “coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national populations and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies”. It is therefore a military function, performed in support of the military commander which aims at facilitating interactions and cooperation with various civilian actors. According to Military Committee’s directions, CIMIC “has to be an integral part of the entire

13 Ibid., art. 60.
15 Ibid., art. 4.
operation, requiring close co-ordination with other military capabilities and actions”. In this sense, CIMIC constitutes a communication and cooperation bridge not only with various types of civilian actors, but also with different military branches and units. The main NATO document regulating CIMIC is the Allied Joint Publication 9 (AJP 9) released in 2003 and updated to AJP-3.4.9 in 2013. It creates the top – strategic – level of CIMIC’s official publications and forms the basis of CIMIC’s existence, defining its principles, tasks and application.

There are three core functions of CIMIC: Civil-Military Liaison, Support to the Force and Support to the Civil Environment. They are all interconnected and performed during all stages of an operation. At the beginning of NATO CIMIC, more attention was dedicated to supporting civilian environment that support to the force. As a result of NATO’s experiences in Afghanistan this was reversed and in the current version of the doctrine support to the force is considered a more relevant function. The first core function, civil-military liaison, means establishing and maintaining communication and cooperation which facilitate a close working relationship between the force and civilians. In other words, soldiers who perform CIMIC tasks constitute a metaphorical bridge between the NATO forces and civilian actors present in the area of operation. Their task is to create close ties with civilians, in a way which will allow to consult, exchange information regarding respective actions and coordinate (or at least de-conflict) activities. At the same time, it should be noted that according to the NATO CIMIC doctrine, it is not CIMIC task to collect intelligence, though such information can also be obtained as a by-product of civil-military cooperation. The second CIMIC function refers to supporting the military forces. NATO commanders, “depending on the circumstances, will require significant [civilian] support from within their joint operational area”. In this sense, CIMIC provides assessment and advice on the matters related to the civilian dimension of the area of operation, including evaluation of its “critical impact on the conduct of operations as well as the impact of the military situation influencing the civil

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16 Ibid., art. 15.
environment”. What is more, NATO Commander may be partially dependent on civilian resources e.g. local translators, as well as information from civilian sources. It is CIMIC’s task to provide access to civilian resources, as well as promote the acceptance of the force among civilian actors. The third function – support to the civil environment – covers a wide spectrum of CIMIC activities but is “conducted [only], if it is required to create conditions supportive for the accomplishment of the military mission within the context of the mandate”. In this sense, this function is also subordinate to the overarching aim of the military operation. It might involve using a wide range of military resources such as information, personnel, equipment or training to assist various civilian actors. However, CIMIC will support the civilian environment in this direct way only as a last resort when the appropriate civil authorities and agencies are unable to carry out the task.

CIMIC activities performed within those functions will alter accordingly to the type of crisis. The varying factors include not only the nature of the immediate operational environment but also the relationship between the force and the civilians. For example in the so-called traditional peacekeeping operations (in short conducted after the ceasefire) the focus of CIMIC is likely to be broader than in combat operations. Initially, the principles governing the civil-military cooperation were divided into two groups: regarding the military direction of CIMIC and regarding the civil-military relationship. In the first group, the first and the most important principle was the mission primacy, derived from the definition of CIMIC which states that NATO conducts civil-military cooperation in support of the military mission. The second group of principles – governing the relationship between civilians and the military – was to guide the establishment and maintenance of an effective civil-military relationship. AJP 9 distinguished six principles belonging to this group: cultural awareness, common goals, shared responsibility, consent, transparency and last but not least, communication. The set of CIMIC principles was updated in the AJP-3.4.9, which also abolished the

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18 NATO Standardisation Agency. AJP-3.4.9..., op. cit., art. 0204, b, 3.
19 Ibid., art. 0204, c.
division into principles regarding the military direction and regarding civil-military relationship. The new catalogue was also much broadened and is now divided into seven categories.\textsuperscript{21} First of all, CIMIC is guided by the need to understand the context and environmental awareness. “Military operations now take place within a wider political and civil context than before, and commanders are increasingly required to take account of social, political, cultural, religious, economic, environmental and humanitarian factors when planning and conducting these operations.”\textsuperscript{22} Therefore soldiers performing CIMIC need to have a deep knowledge of the cultural context of the mission and be able to advise the commander and provide education and training to the force on matters related to culture. In order to do that, they also need to assess the different actors involved in the area of operation. Secondly, CIMIC soldiers need to be able to understand the aims and objectives of the military and civil actors. In this sense, CIMIC provides “the necessary interaction to facilitate and support the planning and conduct of coherent, and, where necessary, integrated activity” of all actors present in the area of operation in order to synchronise the effects of their actions and pursue common goals.\textsuperscript{23} Next, CIMIC needs to be performed within the international law. “While fulfilling these legal requirements, commanders should always seek, within the constraints of the mission, to reduce the effect of military operations on and where possible facilitate maximum support for the civil population.”\textsuperscript{24} But also, CIMIC needs to take into consideration local law – adopted by the local government, as well as cultural and religious norms of the local population and ethical rules of the humanitarian sector.

The fourth group of principles regards gaining respect and trust of civilian counterparts. In this respect, CIMIC soldiers need to establish and maintain relationships with the civilian partners, preferably even before entering the area of operation. Maintaining these interactions in a transparent way and operating within legal constraints is therefore crucial to the success of civil-military cooperation. Next, CIMIC should be conducted with respect towards civilian primacy and ownership. This means that all

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\textsuperscript{20} J. Preece, The Canadian Peacekeeping Narrative..., op. cit., p. 8.
\textsuperscript{21} NATO Standardisation Agency. AJP-3.4.9..., op. cit., art. 0301-0302.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., art. 0302, a, 1.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., art. 0302, b.
\end{flushright}
CIMIC tasks should be performed in a way that would avoid a long-term dependency on military resources. “It is important to develop a culture of ownership and ‘self help’ within the local population.” What is more, military planning process should include a phase of transition to civilian ownership and a plan for an exit strategy. Furthermore, CIMIC should be integrated into the planning process. Civil-military cooperation should be therefore taken into consideration when establishing priorities and a commonly agreed development strategy and should facilitate synchronisation of civil and military actions. These actions should be conducted bearing in mind the principle of resource management. Finally, the last group of CIMIC principles regards effective communication. CIMIC facilitates communication between military and civilian personnel as it “requires to a high extent the relay of information in both directions”. This pertains also to strategic communication between military commanders and their national and international political and policy decision making bodies. Effective civil-military communication requires interoperable communication and information systems, efficient infrastructure and “an enlarged network to facilitate communication in an omnidirectional way”.

Canadians in Afghanistan

The history of Canadian presence in Afghanistan dates back to October 2001, when the Canadian government declared its contribution to the Operation Enduring Freedom. When in 2003 the mandate of International Security Assistance Force was broadened to cover the entire country, Canadian forces were made responsible for the area of Kabul as a part of a peace-support Operation Athena. The deployment in Kabul created the first phase of the operation. Its main objective was helping the Afghan Transitional

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24 Ibid., art. 0302, c, 1.
25 Ibid., art. 0302, e, 1.
26 Ibid., art. 0302, g.
27 Ibid., art. 0302, g, 4.
28 U.S.-led operation in Afghanistan, which started on 7 October 2001, after Al-Kaida’s attack on the World Trade Centre.
Authority maintain safe and secure environment in the city while a constitution of Afghanistan was developed.  

In phase two, starting from 2005, *Operation Athena* moved to the Kandahar Province to become the Canadian Forces’ longest running combat mission. In accordance with NATO’s doctrine, development of Afghanistan was performed by Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). PRTs were joint civil-military structures which, in cooperation with Afghan authorities, supported humanitarian actions organised by different organisations and agencies. Their task was also to support good governance, the rule of law and promotion of human rights. Canada was given a choice to take charge of one of three Provincial Reconstruction Teams: based in Ghor (central province of Afghanistan), Herat (in western part of the country) or Kandahar (south, neighbouring Pakistan, created and initially led by the United States Army). Commander of the Army gen. Rick Hillier chose the latter. There were couple of reasons for this decision. First of all, Kandahar Province provided visibility for the Canadian mission. The city itself is the traditional capital of Afghanistan and the heart of the Pashtun people. It was also the initial base of the Taliban fighters. Secondly, despite its agricultural potential (due to the vicinity of the Arghandab River which flows through the region creating favourable conditions for cultivation) the province suffered from great poverty. A large part of the capital of the province suffered from the lack of running water, little electricity and high unemployment. These unfortunate conditions created potential for a quick and visible improvement, which was important for the positive image of Canadian forces. What is more, Kandahar was a significant communication knot and logistic base thanks to a large airfield built by the Soviets.

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29 NATO-led military mission, established by the United Nations Security Council in December 2001 by Resolution 1386.  
31 Ibid.  
33 In Afghanistan the Pashtun people are the dominant ethnic and linguistic group.
Another important factor which led to Canadian presence in this region was the vicinity of the American contingent, as the Canadian plan assumed deployment of a relatively small number of troops (at most three thousand). The Canadian contingency could therefore count on American help in case of need. This proved to be additionally useful as the US provided the Canadian Forces with much needed equipment (for example by lending helicopters or mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicles).34

During the *Operation Athena*, Kandahar was one of the most underdeveloped and dangerous provinces of Afghanistan.35 In the spring of 2006 large numbers of Taliban fighters crossed the border with Pakistan and left the province in regular heavy combat for the next three years. Because of that the Canadian PRT’s main focus was on providing security in the area rather than performing development activities. Consequently, the number of civilians in the Camp Nathan Smith was relatively small.36 Despite these difficult conditions, several Canadian NGOs were working in Afghanistan, both non-denominational and faith based, among which one can name WUSC (World University Service of Canada)37, MEDA (Mennonite Economic Development Association)38 and Rights and Democracy.39 These organisations were working in such areas as education, development, support to local businesses or empowerment of women. Other civilians working in the PRT represented Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the Correctional Service of Canada. In 2011 *Operation Athen* was replaced with a non-combat training mission – *Operation Attention* which is based in Kabul. After the end of the military engagement of Canada in Afghanistan some civilian Canadians continued their work in the now American PRT in Kandahar.40

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34 Ibid.
35 Examining Canada’s Role in Afghanistan, Q&A session with the panel, TVS/TVSBSC, Programs and lectures related to Canadian Studies. Available at: [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pYnaLABUKTY](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pYnaLABUKTY), (accessed: 04.05.2013).
36 Examining Canada’s Role in Afghanistan, Q&A session with the panel... op. cit.
39 Closed by the Canadian government in 2012.
The Canadian Armed Forces withdrew from Afghanistan in March 2014.

At the time of the intervention in Afghanistan a new concept of peacekeeping operations was implemented in the Canadian military doctrine – an “integrated” (or “whole of government”) approach.\(^{41}\) It is based on an assumption that international interventions must deal with a wide range of factors which contribute to the crisis. Its solution requires a comprehensive approach towards three operational areas: defence, diplomacy and development. This so-called “3D peacebuilding” helps building accountable public institutions in countries suffering from interconnected problems such as the vicious circle of poverty and violence.\(^{42}\) Coordination of efforts is needed during the whole process – from planning through to execution. The integrated approach and the importance of economic assistance have a long tradition in Canada. In 1947, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs Louis St-Laurent “exposed the basic principles of Canadian foreign policy and provided a first rationale for foreign aid: to create a favourable, stable environment for international trade, and hence for Canadians themselves”.\(^{43}\) Reaffirmation of the foreign aid as a tool of conflict prevention in Canadian foreign policy could be observed after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the war in Yugoslavia.\(^{44}\) Indeed, similarly as in the case of CIMIC, the concept of integrated approach is derived from experiences learned during the Balkan wars and results from the consequences of the phenomenon of failed states. Its roots are therefore very close to those that brought in institutionalised civil-military cooperation. The idea of asymmetric conflict, enhanced focus on human rights, frail state institutions and civilian humanitarian agencies working in the area of operation created a need for a new approach towards peacekeeping, including methods of dealing with its civilian dimension. In effect, the perception of traditional peacekeeping was

\(^{41}\) Known as the ‘comprehensive approach’ in the NATO doctrine.


\(^{44}\) Ibid. p. 161.
broadened and different categories of peace-support operations were created (e.g. peacemaking and peace enforcement). In 2005 in the International Policy Statement, the Government of Canada declared that “the best way for Canada to make a difference in post-conflict situations is to pursue a ‘3D’ approach, undertaking Defence efforts to strengthen security and stability, pursuing Diplomacy to enhance prospects for nation-building and reconstruction, and making certain that Development contributions are brought to bear in a coordinated and effective way”.

The integrated approach underlines the interrelation between security and development. Therefore it requires communication and coordination at different levels: international and interagency as well as strategic, operational and tactical, and within different areas: diplomatic, military and humanitarian. Civil-military cooperation can therefore be regarded as a tool of the integrated approach. Of course the use of an integrated approach in actual operations poses challenges. The first and the biggest one is the complicated relation between the military and civilian humanitarian actors. Potential conflict can arise at several levels: the culture, mandate and organisation of work, the difference between short-term military approach and long-term NGO approach, and the attitude towards gathering intelligence. In this situation CIMIC’s principle of shared responsibility comes to aid. The link between activities of the force and civilian entities should be formed as soon (and as clearly) as possible to prevent the rise in security risks and complication in the battlefield. Shared responsibility can only be built upon the foundation of common goals, trust and constant communication. Another challenge for the integrated approach, as mentioned before, is the coordination between different levels. For instance, according to Travers and Owen during the planning of the second phase of Operation Athena, the cooperation between the three main Canadian agencies lacked efficiency. As a result, greater attention was devoted

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47 DFAIT, CIDA and DND (Canadian Department of National Defence).
to development activities (such as building schools) instead of the provision of security (like stemming opium cultivation). At the international level, collaboration within the coalition is even more challenging due to a lack of a single organisational structure which would coordinate efforts of different actors. Nevertheless, Travers and Owen noted that Canada could serve as an example of a successful coordination of policies concerning the intervention in Afghanistan at the departmental level, yet it needed improvement in cooperating in the field and within the coalition. The solution requires enhancing communication and transparency of action between all the entities participating in the process of planning an intervention.

**Canada and civil-military cooperation**

When it comes to CIMIC, Canadian Forces have been performing this type of activity since the end of the Second World War. Yet initially it was regarded as a secondary duty. In 2000 CIMIC was announced a reserve capability, believing that reservists might have a better ability in dealing with civilians. Based on Canadian experiences in peacekeeping Longhurst defined a set of qualities of a good CIMIC operator. Among them he named loyalty, diligence, responsibility and honesty. These have a very close relationship to the general principles of CIMIC. Combined with appropriate training they prepare Canadian troops for the work in the field.

The choice of CIMIC operators is based on their individual characteristics but also on other qualities, which were identified as useful during previous operations or rotations within the same operation. When it comes to the *Operation Athena* the first set of lessons learned were established just after the Rotation 0. In this sense, the

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48 P. Travers, T. Owen, Between Metaphor and Strategy... op. cit., p. 697
49 Ibid., p. 697.
50 Ibid., p. 696.
52 Ibid., p. 55.
53 Ibid., p. 56.
54 During Rotation 0 the 3rd Battalion of the Royal Canadian Regiment Battalion Group was deployed from August 2003 until February 2004.
knowledge of the local language was perceived as a big advantage as teams relying on locally hired translators were less effective. Secondly, the timing and the type of training were distinguished as matters of high importance. Training should be conducted well in advance before the deployment as it allows CIMIC operators to participate in multinational exercises. Those operators who did not participate in such exercises needed more time to learn and their ability to work in an international environment was reduced.\textsuperscript{55}

When it comes to training itself, Canadian candidates for CIMIC soldiers have to complete various courses, including: knowledge of negotiation/mediation, interviewing techniques, project management, enhanced cultural awareness and media training. Apart from the training prior to the deployment, a confirmation training of CIMIC personnel was conducted within the theatre with the objective to introduce and ensure common understanding of CIMIC between different teams as well as to secure better coordination between them.\textsuperscript{56}

Another important quality of Canadian CIMIC in Afghanistan was its organisation – mainly the size of CIMIC cells.\textsuperscript{57} The basic building block was the Tactical CIMIC Team. Usually it consisted of three CIMIC operators and two drivers (who in accordance with the Canadian CIMIC procedures were an integral part of the team, as they fulfilled different roles such as provision of security and observation). When a task force was provided with special funding for community improvements projects a CIMIC project cell was created. Its tasks was to facilitate the project process from initiation to completion and to ensure it kept to Canadian standards. Thanks to such organisation the Canadians were flexible enough to successfully perform CIMIC activities in Afghanistan.

According to the definition of CIMIC, the operators’ main task during the operation in Afghanistan was to support the commander of ISAF in fulfilling his mission. This was

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., p. 4.
\textsuperscript{57} G. M. Longhurst, The Evolution..., op. cit., pp. 57-58.
done by establishing and maintaining positive working relations with civil entities on the ground.\textsuperscript{58} Canadian troops used a set of methods to create this relationship. Regular meetings were held with local authorities and representatives of the indigenous society (such as villagers, teachers and students) and a number of small impact projects was conducted.\textsuperscript{59} They benefitted mainly the local community and included such actions as repARATION of roads and provision of school equipment. Apart from that, the Canadian Forces donated school and medical supplies and distributed \textit{ISAF News} – the first regular publication in Canadian area of responsibility. All those activities proved high value of Canadian CIMIC operators at the tactical level in Afghanistan but also had positive impact on the relation between the local population and the Canadian Armed Forces, thus increasing the force protection.\textsuperscript{60}

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\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., pp. 60-62.
Summary

The Canadian Forces have been present in Afghanistan since 2001. First they were responsible for the area of Kabul and then for the Kandahar Province, where they led their Provincial Reconstruction Team. The Canadian area of responsibility had strategic importance but it also was one of the most underdeveloped and dangerous regions in Afghanistan. The PRT was systematically dealing with Taliban insurgents, therefore the Canadians’ main concern was the provision of security. Despite these difficulties and in accordance with the integrated approach (part of the Canadian official peacekeeping doctrine), security was only one out of three dimensions of the mission. The other two were development and diplomacy. Implementation of this approach required a special tool, which would allow to combine those three dimensions. As a solution came the idea of civil-military cooperation – an instrument which supports the commander of the mission through liaison between the force and civilians.

Civil-military cooperation and, in broader sense, peacekeeping go in line with the way Canadians perceive themselves. Ideas of neutrality and multilateralism are inherent to both CIMIC and the Canadian identity\(^{61}\) and this might be regarded as one of Canadian keys to success. Another one is their ability to define and use conclusions drawn from previous operations, including lessons learned concerning aspects of civil-military cooperation.\(^{62}\)

The first lesson learned by the Canadian Armed Forces was due diligence in choosing and preparing CIMIC personnel. CIMIC soldiers in Afghanistan were mainly recruited from reservists who, being a little bit of both civilians and military, were regarded as the most suitable to do the job. Canadian CIMIC soldier were also chosen according to their personal characteristics. The most successful excelled at diplomacy rather than confrontation, therefore they needed to have strong inter-personal relation and communications skills.\(^{63}\) The set of qualities of a good CIMIC operator was carefully

\(^{60}\) Ibid., p. 32.
\(^{61}\) J. Preece, The Canadian Peacekeeping Narrative... op. cit., p. 8.
\(^{63}\) R. MacEachern, Brigade level CIMIC... op. cit., p. 2.
determined basing on long Canadian experience in performing peacekeeping missions and civil-military cooperation. It was also tailored to match CIMIC’s principles regarding the relationship between the civilians and military. All this combined with a careful training, prepared Canadian troops for the work in the field. Yet another important quality of Canadian CIMIC is its organisation – mainly the size and purpose-oriented structure of CIMIC cells. All those factors were particularly useful in establishing and maintaining positive working relations with civil entities on the ground. This is what makes Canadian Forces such a valuable part of CIMIC.
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